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Abstract
This thesis, rstly, studies the impact of nancial liberalization and political insta-
bility on economic growth and quantitatively examines the relative importance of
the identied underling reasons of Argentine riddle by using an innovative econo-
metric methodology and unique data set: it presents power ARCH estimates for
Argentina from 1896 to 2000. The main results show that the long-run effect of
nancial liberalization on economic growth is positive while the short-run effect
is negative, albeit substantially smaller. The political instability effects are sub-
stantially larger in the short-run than in the long-run. We also investigate potential
mechanisms for the effects of nancial liberalization and political instability on
economic growth: direct impact or happening through the variation of growth
volatility. Our results also suggest that nancial development, trade openness and
political instability are the main factors to explain the Argentine decline.
Furthermore, real business cycle variability - growth relationship and the link
between ination and its uncertainty are investigated by using monthly data of
four Asian countries/regions (Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) and
parametric power ARCH methodology to proxy uncertainty. We nd that more
uncertainty about output leads to a higher rate of growth in three of the four
countries/regions and the form of the uncertainty matters. Output growth reduces
its uncertainty in all countries/regions via ination uncertainty except Singapore.
For all countries/regions, ination signicantly raises ination uncertainty as pre-
dicted by Friedman. On the other hand, increased uncertainty affects ination
positively in Japan and Singapore, which support the Cukierman-Meltzer hypoth-
esis. We nd a negative sign for Taiwan which is in accordance with the Holland
hypothesis when error term was normally distributed, however, this result is not
statistically signicant when the student-t distribution is applied. Interestingly,
South Korea's data reveals a positive sign initially, however, it turns around when
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a structural dummy is incorporated. This dramatic outcome in favour of the Hol-
land hypothesis, and chimes in with Dueker and Kim (1999), who claim that the
ination was strictly controlled by the South Korean monetary authority.
In addition, this thesis investigates two-way causal relationships between spread,
volatility and volume in the FTSE100 stock index over the period from 1992 to
2004 by using bivariate AR-FI-GARCH model and multiple measurements of
risk and spread. The measurements of the spread include relative bid-ask spread,
effective bid-ask spread, the inventory cost component of the bid-ask spread and
the information cost component of the bid-ask spread. Risk is proxied by two
measurements of price volatility: the close-to-close volatility and the range-based
volatility. We also take the impact of electronic trading into account. Our results
suggest that the spread and volume are positively impacted by volatility simul-
taneously. In addition, both volatility and volume are negatively affected by the
spread. Furthermore, we nd that the inventory cost component of the spread
has a negative effect on volatility, in contrast, the information component of the
spread positively impacts volatility. These results support the argument that spec-
ulation generates volatility in the market and higher transaction costs benet sta-
bility of the market.
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Introduction
Instability and performance are often inversely related. Financial crises are associated
with growth decelerations and contractions, while political protest tends to disrupt pro-
ductive activities thereby negatively affecting economic growth. Such amplied uncer-
tainties, driven either by economic or political events, have deleterious consequences in
terms of economic performance, especially in the short-run. In the long-run, however, -
nancial development and political instability may instead have positive effects on growth.
For example, the supply of credit to the private sector and transitions from autocracy to
democracy are often considered as key determinants of long-run growth across countries.
Seminal papers are those by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), Tornell et al. (2004) and
Loayza and Rancière (2006) argue that despite the development of the nancial system
being robustly associated with economic growth, it is also often found to be the main
predictor of nancial crises. That is, while the long-run effect of nance on growth is
positive, in the short-run it is negative. However, cross-country heterogeneity and busi-
ness cycles synchronization issues may play an undesirably large role in generating this
result, in general, and in particular regarding the relative magnitudes of these two effects.
For instance, Loayza and Rancière (2006) report that the size of the effects is similar
but the negative short-run effect is often larger than the positive long-run effect. To put
forward a deeper understanding of these relationships we try to answer the following
questions. What is the relation between nancial development on the one hand and eco-
nomic growth and its volatility on the other? Does the sign and intensity of such effects
vary over time and do they vary with respect to short- versus long-run considerations? Is
there a dynamic asymmetry in the impact of nancial development (that is, is it negative
in the short- and positive in the long-run)?
Besides the nancial development, the uctuation of economic performance/variability
in the business cycle affects economic growth as well. Until the early 1980s, macroeco-
nomic theorists treated the analysis of the real business cycle (RBC) as separate from
1
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the study of economic growth. In the 1980s, three important contributions in business
cycle theory by Kydland and Prescott (1982), Long and Plosser (1983), and King et al.
(1988) integrated the theories of the business cycle and economic growth in their mod-
els. However, these models did not consider the possibility that the variability of the
business cycle might relate to the rate of economic growth. Similarly, for the most part,
developments in growth theory have been made without consideration of the variability
in the business cycle. The scene has changed recently at both the theoretical and empiri-
cal front. At the theoretical level, Blackburn and Pelloni (2005) and a number of studies
summarised by these authors examine how cyclical uctuations might relate to long-run
economic growth. At the empirical level, highlight the importance of the reduction in US
GDP growth volatility in the last two decades and its implications for growth theory. The
early dichotomy in macroeconomic theory between economic growth and the variabil-
ity of economic uctuations should be reconsidered given several theories regarding the
relationship between output volatility and growth predict a positive, negative or no asso-
ciation between the two variables. The empirical evidence to date based on cross-section
country studies, panel data studies, or time-series analyses of individual countries are also
quite mixed. The theoretical and empirical ambiguity surrounding the RBC variability
economic growth relationship provides us with the motivation to expand on the empirical
aspects of this issue.
In order to promote economic growth, many countries (especially Asian countries such
as South Korea) adopt export oriented growth strategy which is normally associated with
high ination. The issue of the welfare costs of ination has been one of the most re-
searched topics in macroeconomics both on the theoretical and empirical fronts. Fried-
man (1977) argues that a rise in ination leads to more nominal uncertainty. The opposite
direction of causation has also been analyzed in the theoretical literature. Cukierman and
Meltzer (1986) argue that central banks tend to create ination surprises in the presence
of more nominal uncertainty. Clarida et al. (1999) emphasize the fact that since the late
1980s a stream of empirical work has presented evidence that monetary policy may have
important effects on real activity. Consequently, there has been a great resurgence of
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interest in the issue of how to conduct monetary policy. If an increase in the rate of ina-
tion causes an increase in its uncertainty, one can conclude that greater uncertainty which
many have found to be negatively correlated to economic activity is part of the costs of
ination. Thus, if we attempt to provide a satisfactory answer to the questions "What
actions should central bankers take?" and "What is the optimal strategy for monetary au-
thorities to follow?" we must rst develop a clear view about the temporal ordering of
ination and nominal uncertainty.
Steady economic growth needs support of a healthy nancial market which has high liq-
uidity and low uctuation. One of the most critical factors that investors look for in any
nancial market is liquidity. Liquidity is dened as the ability to trade stock rapidly with
little price impact. To maintain liquidity, exchanges use market makers, who are individ-
uals willing to provide a nancial market whenever the investors wish to trade. In return
for providing the nancial market, market makers are granted monopoly rights by the ex-
change to post different prices for stock purchases and sales. As a result, market makers
buy stock at the bid price and sell the stock at the higher ask price. This ability to buy
the stock low and sell high is the market makers' compensation for providing liquidity in
the nancial market. Their compensation is dened as the ask price minus the bid price,
which in turn is dened as the bid-ask spread. Studies such as Atkins and Dyl (1997),
Constantinides (1986), Glosten and Harris (1988), Menyah and Paudyal (2000) and Stoll
(1989) relate the spread or the change in the spread to a vector of characteristics that are
associated with the individual securities. These factors identied in prior spread mod-
els are the market value of the rm, the risk of the security, and the trading volume. On
the other hand, the bid-ask spread also inuences risk and trading activity in the nancial
market. Tobin (1978, 1984), Stiglitz (1989) and Summers and Summers (1989) argue that
higher transaction cost leads to a lower market volatility since it discourages the short-
term speculation which is believed as turmoil in the market. However, opposing views
include Friedman (1953), Miller (1991), Dooley (1996) who believe that short-term spec-
ulation benets to stabilizing as well. Grundfest and Shoven (1991) and Kupiec (1996)
also point out that higher transaction cost leads to lower transaction frequency which
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requires larger price movement. A deep understanding of the two-way causality rela-
tionships between liquidity and risk certainly benets to maintaining a healthy nancial
market.
The rest of this section outlines the structure of the thesis, and briey summarizes the
subsequent chapters and their main results. The following chapters represent a collection
of ve self-contained research articles and can be read independently.
Chapter 1 studies the impact of nancial liberalization and political instability on eco-
nomic growth. It contributes to this literature by using an innovative econometric method-
ology and unique data set: it presents power ARCH estimates for Argentina from 1896
to 2000. The main results show that the long-run effect of nancial liberalization on
economic growth is positive while the short-run effect is negative, albeit substantially
smaller. The political instability effects are substantially larger in the short- than in the
long-run. We also investigate potential mechanisms for the effects of nancial liberal-
ization and political instability on economic growth: direct impact or happening through
the variation of growth volatility.
Chapter 2 quantitatively examines the relative importance of the identied underling rea-
sons of Argentine riddle. Argentina is the only country in the world that was "devel-
oped" in 1900 and "developing" in 2000, various underlying reasons have been identied
(chiey political instability, nancial development, ination, trade openness, and inter-
national nancial integration). We use the power-ARCH framework and annual data
since 1896 to study how important are these factors vis-à-vis both growth and growth
volatility. Our results suggest that nancial development, trade openness and political
instability are the main factors, with important differences in terms of their short versus
long-run behavior.
Chapter 3 investigates real business cycle variability - growth relationship over a pe-
riod which includes signicant variation in output growth, such as the 1970s oil shock
(supply shock), the 2001 electronic industry depression (demand shock) and the credit
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crunch in 2008 (nancial crisis). Using monthly data in four Asian countries/regions
(Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) and parametric power ARCH methodology
to proxy uncertainty, we obtain two important ndings. First, we nd that more uncer-
tainty about output leads to a higher rate of growth in three of the four countries/regions
and the form of the uncertainty is matter. Second, output growth reduces its uncertainty
in all countries/regions via ination uncertainty except Singapore. Our results are ro-
bust to alternative specications and provide strong support to the recent emphasis by
macroeconomists on the joint examination of economic growth and the variability of the
business cycle.
Chapter 4 contributes to the issue of the welfare costs of ination by examining the
link between ination and its uncertainty. We use parametric power ARCH models of
the conditional variance of ination to capture the relationship between ination and its
uncertainty by using monthly data for Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan over a
period ranging from 1965 to 2010. For all countries/regions, ination signicantly raises
ination uncertainty as predicted by Friedman. Increased uncertainty affects ination
positively in Japan and Singapore in support of the Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis. We
nd negative sign for Taiwan which is in accordance with the Holland hypothesis when
error term is normal distributed, however the results are not statistically signicant when
student-t distribution is applied. Interestingly, South Korea's data reveals positive sign
initially, however, it turns around when structural dummy is incorporated. This dramatic
outcome in favour of Holland hypothesis, and chime in with Dueker and Kim (1999) who
claim that the ination was strictly controlled by South Korean monetary authority. In a
sensitivity analysis we show that an arbitrary choice of the heteroskedasticity parameter
inuences this relationship signicantly.
Chapter 5 investigates two-way causality relationships between spread, volatility and
volume in FTSE100 stock index over the period from 1992 to 2004 by using bivariate
AR-FI-GARCH model and multiple measurements of risk and spread. Measurements of
spread include relative bid-ask spread, effective bid-ask spread, the inventory cost com-
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ponent of the bid-ask spread and the information cost component of the bid-ask spread.
Risk is measured by two measurements of price volatility: the close-to-close volatility
and the range-based volatility. We also take the impact of electronic trading into account.
Our results suggest that spread and volume are positively impacted by volatility simulta-
neously. On another hand, both volatility and volume are negatively affected by spread.
Furthermore, we nd that the inventory cost component of spread has negative effect on
volatility, in contrast, the information component of spread positively impacts on volatil-
ity. These results support the argument that speculations generate volatility in the market
and higher transaction costs benet stability of the market.
Chapter 1
Financial Liberalization, Volatility and the
Finance-Growth Nexus
1.1 Introduction
Instability and performance are often inversely related. Financial crises are associated
with growth decelerations and contractions, while political protest tends to disrupt pro-
ductive activities thereby negatively affecting economic growth. Such amplied uncer-
tainties, driven either by economic or political events, have deleterious consequences in
terms of economic performance, especially in the short-run. In the long-run, however, -
nancial development and political stability may instead have positive effects on growth.
For example, the supply of credit to the private sector and transitions from autocracy to
democracy are often considered key determinants of long-run growth across countries.
In this light, this paper tries to answer the following questions. What is the relation be-
tween nancial development on the one hand and economic growth and its volatility on
the other? Do the sign and intensity of such effects vary over time and do they vary
with respect to short- versus long-run considerations? Is there a dynamic asymmetry in
the impact of nancial development and political instability (that is, is it negative in the
short- and positive in the long-run)?
This paper tries to tackle these questions using an innovative econometric framework and
a unique type of data as it employs the power-ARCH (PARCH) framework and annual
time series data for Argentina covering the period from 1896 to 2000. The Argentinian
puzzle, according to della Paolera and Taylor (2003), refers to the fact that since the
Industrial Revolution, Argentina is the only country in the world that was developed in
7
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1900 and developing in 2000 (see Figure 1.1)1. Campos et al. (2008) provide evidence
that the development of nancial markets as well as political instability are the most im-
portant factors in understanding this puzzle (these are more important than reasons nor-
mally given for the Argentinian puzzle such as ination, trade openness and international
nancial integration.)
Fig. 1.1. Ratio of Argentina's GDP per Capita to Developed Countries' GDP per Capita,
1885-2003
Figure 1. Ratio of Argentina's  GDP per capita to Developed Countries' GDP per capita, 1885-2003
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Ratio of Argentina to US-CAN-NZ-AUS Ratio of Argentina to Western Europe
As far as the literature on the nance-growth nexus is concerned, the present paper tries
to contribute by offering econometric evidence based on historical data. Levine (2005)
and Fecht et al. (2008) argue that the prevailing consensus favors a positive, lasting and
signicant effect from nancial development to economic growth and that such effects
are predictably stronger from measures of nancial efciency (for instance, the share in
GDP of credit to the private sector) than from standard measures of nancial depth (such
as M3 over GDP). By using a range of nancial development measures we can throw
light on the impacts of these different dimensions over a period of time much longer than
1 Authors' calculations using GDP per capita data from Maddison (2007), Western Europe is dened as
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
and United Kingdom. The other group, Western Offshoots, includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand and
United States.
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that normally considered in the literature. Doing so, also allows us to investigate, inter
alia, whether the impact of nancial development on growth occurs directly or through
growth volatility2.
An important issue we tackle is that of the contrasting short- versus long-run effects of
nance on growth. Seminal papers are those by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), Tornell
et al. (2004) and Loayza and Rancière (2006). Despite the development of the nancial
system being robustly associated with economic growth, it is also often found to be the
main predictor of nancial crises. That is, while the long-run effect of nance on growth
is positive, in the short-run it is negative. However, cross-country heterogeneity and
business cycle synchronization issues may play an undesirably large role in generating
this result and in particular regarding the relative magnitudes of these two effects. For
instance, Loayza and Rancière (2006) report that the size of the effects is similar but
2 Levine (2005) surveys the nance and growth literature. On nance and volatility, see Bekaert et al.
(2006) and Prasad et al. (2004).
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the negative short-run effect is often larger than the positive long-run effect. In this
paper we use data for a sufciently long period of time and nd supporting evidence
for this asymmetric dynamic effect with the negative short-run effect being substantially
smaller than the positive long-run effect3. Moreover, we try to shed light on important
puzzles such as the one regarding the duration of the political instability effects. While
the conventional wisdom is that these effects are severe in the long-run, Campos and
Nugent (2002)4 and Murdoch and Sandler (2004) argue that they are stronger in the
short- than in the long-run.
One last intended contribution is to try to bridge the literature on the macroeconomics
of instability (based on cross-sectional and short-panels) with that on the relationship
between growth and its volatility, which is mostly time-series based5. The latter tends
to downplay the potential dependence between growth and its volatility by assuming a
linear relationship, the so called Bollerslev GARCH specication. Another nal puzzle
we try to address is on the sign of the growth-volatility link: while Grier and Tullock
(1989) argue that larger standard deviations of growth rates are associated with larger
mean growth rates, Ramey and Ramey (1995) show that output growth rates are adversely
affected by their volatility.
Anticipating our main ndings, we note the following in relation to the questions raised
at the outset. The relationship between, on the one hand, nancial development and
political instability and economic growth, on the other, is not as straightforward as one
may think at rst. We nd that it crucially depends on the type of political instability and
of nancial development, as well as short- versus long-run considerations. The short-
run effect on economic growth of both informal instability and nancial development is
3 One important issue, which is beyond the scope of this paper, is regarding the causes of nancial devel-
opment, in particular, the legal origins versus political institutions debate (see Haber and Perotti, 2007).
4 They argue that the long-run negative effect of political instability on growth depends on the inclusion of
African countries and of institutions.
5 Durlauf et al. (2005) survey the former, and Grier et al. (2004), Fountas and Karanasos (2006) and
Fountas et al. (2007) review the latter. One paper that tries to link these literatures, and is close to ours in
this sense, is Asteriou and Price (2001), which present time series (quarterly) data evidence for the UK since
1960.
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negative and direct and these results are robust to accounting for structural breaks, which
are important in light of the long time span we cover in this study. Yet, while the long-
run inuence of nance is positive, that of informal instability remains negative. We also
nd that the impact of formal instability is mostly indirect and operates through growth
volatility. These results suggest that the "severity" of the political instability effects in a
sense "dominates" that of nancial development: while the short- and long-run nance
effects work in opposite directions, the effects of political instability are both negative and
seem to operate through different channels. In this paper, we show that formal political
instability is detrimental to growth via the volatility channel and our results suggest that,
together with informal instability, may have played a truly substantial role in the decline
of the Argentinian economy during the XXth century.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the context by showing how political
instability and nancial development contributed to the decline of Argentina from a posi-
tion of a rich or developed country in year 1900 to that of a middle-income or developing
country in year 2000. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 details the econometric
methodology. Section 5 discusses the main results. Section 6 concludes and suggests
directions for future research.
1.2 The Role of Finance and Instability in Argentinian
Growth
Among economic historians, there is little disagreement that the period from 1875 to the
eve of World War I is the Belle Époque of Argentinian economic history (Taylor, 1992;
Sanz-Villarroya, 2007). There is also little disagreement that Argentina's uniqueness de-
rives from no other country having ever climbed so dramatically down from the selected
group of developed countries (Figure 1). The two major disagreements remain not about
whether but when the decline started and why. Some authors argue that it started with the
1930 crisis (e.g., Diaz-Alejandro 1985). Others argue for an earlier turning point (Taylor,
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1992, argues for 1913), while Sanz-Villarroya (2005) argues for an even earlier structural
break6.
Irrespective of exactly when the decline started, until the immediate post II World War,
Argentina was still ranked 10th country in the world in terms of per capita income (Al-
ston and Gallo, 2007, p. 6). Della Paolera and Taylor (2003, p.5) note that by 1900
Argentina's income per capita had risen from about 67 per cent of developed country-
levels in 1870, to 90 percent in 1900, and 100 per cent in 1913. Whatever its exact status
in 1913, for all practical purposes Argentina was an advanced country. They also cal-
culate that after that the ratio of Argentina's income to OECD income fell to 84 percent
in 1950, and then to 43 percent in 1987 (see also Figure 1.1). We calculate that this ratio
rebounds in the 1990s but again reverts with the 2001 crisis7. It must not go unnoticed
that in a recent book on the Great Depressions of the XXth Century (Kehoe and Prescott,
2007), Argentina is the only country that has two chapters (out of 16) entirely and solely
dedicated to its economy.
It is not surprising, therefore, that there is a vast literature on the Argentine puzzle, pro-
viding alternative explanations for the long-run relative economic decline. Campos et
al. (2008) provide a quantitative assessment of the relative importance of the causes that
have been identied in the economic history literature (namely political instability or
institutions, nancial development, ination rates, public decits, trade openness and in-
ternational nancial integration). They nd that the two most important ones are political
instability and nancial development.
A large number of studies underscore nancial development as a major factor in the
Argentinian puzzle (della Paolera and Taylor, 1998). Taylor (2003) associates the Ar-
gentinian decline with low savings rates (the high dependency rate linked to the liberal
6 Below we present and discuss our Bai-Perron estimates of the date of structural breaks in Argentinean
growth. We nd (and adjust our estimates accordingly) evidence for two structural breaks: 1922 and 1964.
7 Growth was negative from 1999 culminating with -10% in year 2002. The 2001 crisis entailed a default
on large part of the external debt, devaluation, ination, and the freezing of bank accounts (the corralito.)
Riots, looting and anti-government demonstrations followed. See Kehoe (2003) for a discussion.
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immigration policies). A related argument is that (restricted) access to nance perpetu-
ates high levels of wealth and income inequality. More recently, Prados de la Escosura
and Sanz-Villarroya (2009) have argued that the size and efciency of nancial interme-
diation (contract intensive money) is key to explaining the Argentine puzzle.
Although a large literature associates the long-run relative decline of the Argentinian
economywith political factors (see della Paolera and Taylor, 2003, and references therein),
we are unaware of studies that try to evaluate this association quantitatively. For instance,
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p.7) observe that: The political history of Argentina re-
veals an extraordinary pattern where democracy was created in 1912, undermined in
1930, re-created in 1946, undermined in 1955, fully re-created in 1973, undermined in
1976, and nally reestablished in 1983. In a recent paper, Alston and Gallo (2007) iden-
tify the onset of widespread electoral fraud in the 1930s as a turning point for the erosion
of the rule of law and thus as a major reason for the Argentinian decline.
In what follows, we take these considerations on board to provide a quantitative account
of the relative importance of two of the main reasons often identied with the Argentinian
debacle, political instability and nancial development.
1.3 Measurement
Our data set contains measures of political instability, nancial development and eco-
nomic growth. The main data source is the Cross National Time Series Data set (Banks
2005), which has historical series on income per capita and various dimensions of insta-
bility. This is a commercial database that has been extensively used in the scholarship
on growth, nancial development and political instability (Durlauf et al., 2005.) Data
are available yearly for Argentina from 1896 until 2000, excluding the years of the two
World Wars.
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Drawing upon the literature on growth and nance (Levine 2005) we use a broad range of
measures of nancial development, some reecting depth and others efciency aspects
(see Figure 1.3). One note of caution is that there are various aspects of nancial devel-
opment which may be considered important but for which data are only available after
about 1960 (e.g., intermediation spreads) and hence can not be used in the present study.
The rst indicator we use is the ratio of M3 to GDP, from Alston and Gallo (2007).
The main reason for considering this measure is that it has been used extensively in
the nance-growth literature (King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 2005). One well-known
drawback of this measure, however, is that the ratio of M3 to GDP reects nancial depth
or the relative size of the nancial system. It does not necessarily reect how efcient
the nancial system actually is. We also use a narrower version of this variable (M1 over
GDP) to check for the robustness of our results (source of the data is Bordo et al., 2001).
Our two other measures of nancial development try to capture the efciency of the
nancial sector, not its relative size. The source for both is Mitchell (2003). The rst is
the bank deposits by the private sector as a share of GDP (private deposits). A second
measure is the total deposits in savings banks as a share of GDP. Given its more restrictive
nature, we use the latter mostly for robustness checks, thereby attaching greater weight
to private deposits8.
We use a taxonomy of political instabilities based on the distinction between formal
and informal (that is, whether or not instability originates from within the political sys-
tem)9. Our informal political instability variables are as follows: annual number of anti-
government demonstrations (peaceful public gatherings of at least 100 people), assassi-
nations (dened as politically motivated murders or attempted murders of a high govern-
ment ofcial or politician), guerrilla warfare (armed activity, sabotage, or bombings by
independent bands of citizens and aimed at regime overthrow), strikes (a general strike
8 Because these nancial development variables are found to be I(1), in the estimation they all enter in
rst-differences (see Figure 1.3).
9 Our political instability variables enter one by one in the econometric estimation, thus they are not affected
by the taxonomy itself. The taxonomy is introduced in Campos and Karanasos (2008).
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Fig. 1.3. Measures of Financial Development
M3 over GDP M1 over GDP
Private Deposits over GDP Savings Banks Deposits over GDP
of 1,000 or more workers involving more multiple employers and aimed at government
policies), and revolutions (illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, attempts
at, or successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion). These series are available since 1919
(Figure 1.4). Our formal political instability variables (Figure 1.5) are as follows: the
number of cabinet changes, the size of the cabinet, the number of constitutional changes,
government crises, the number of legislative elections, and purges (which measure any
systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of
the regime or the opposition)10.
Before discussing methodological issues, we note that Granger causality and Hausman
exogeneity tests were carried out and these support treating causality as owing from
nancial development and political instability to economic growth, and not the other
way around (these results are available upon request).
10 Among all formal instability variables, purges is the closest to what we call informal instability, while
revolutions is the one we think is closer to the formal instability variables.
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Fig. 1.4. Measures of Informal Political Instability
Anti-Government Demostrations Assasinations
Guerilla Warfare Revolutions
Strikes
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Fig. 1.5. Measures of Formal Political Instability
Cabinet Changes Cabinet Size
Constitutional Changes Government Crises
Legislative Elections Purges
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1.4 Econometric Framework
The PARCH model was introduced by Ding, Granger and Engle (1993) and quickly
gained currency in the nance literature11. Let growth (yt) follow a white noise process
augmented by a risk premium dened in terms of volatility (ht):
yt = c+ kht + xit + t; (1.1)
with
t = eth
1
2
t ;
where xit is either the political instability or the nancial development variable.
In addition, fetg are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) random variables
withE(et) = E(e2t 1) = 0;while ht is positive with probability one and is a measurable
function of the sigma-algebra
P
t 1, which is generated by fyt 1; yt 2; : : :g:
In other words, ht denotes the conditional variance of growth. In particular, ht is speci-
ed as an asymmetric PARCH(1,1) process with lagged growth included in the variance
equation:
h

2
t = ! + f ("t 1) + h

2
t 1 + 
yt l + xit; (1.2)
with
f (et 1) = [jet 1j   &et 1] ;
where  (with  > 0) is the heteroscedasticity parameter,  and  are the ARCH and
GARCH coefcients respectively, & with j&j < 1 being the leverage term and 
 being the
level term for the lth lag of growth. In order to distinguish the general PARCH model
11 See, for example, Karanasos and Kim (2006). Karanasos and Schurer, (2005, 2008) use this process to
model output growth and ination respectively.
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from a version in which  is xed (but not necessarily equal to two) we refer to the latter
as (P)ARCH.
The PARCH model increases the exibility of the conditional variance specication by
allowing the data to determine the power of growth for which the predictable structure
in the volatility pattern is the strongest12. This feature in the volatility process has im-
portant implications for the relationship between political instability, nance, ination,
and growth and its volatility. There is no strong reason for assuming that the conditional
variance is a linear function of lagged squared errors. The common use of a squared
term in this role is most likely to be a reection of the normality assumption traditionally
invoked. However, if we accept that growth data are very likely to have a non-normal er-
ror distribution, then the superiority of a squared term is unwarranted and other power
transformations may be more appropriate.
The PARCH model may also be viewed as a standard GARCH model for observations
that have been changed by a sign-preserving power transformation implied by a (mod-
ied) PARCH parameterization. He and Teräsvirta (1999) emphasize the point that if
the standard Bollerslev type of model is augmented by the heteroscedasticity parameter
(the power term), the estimates of the ARCH and GARCH coefcients almost certainly
change.
Moreover, by squaring the growth rates one effectively imposes a structure on the data
which may potentially yield sub-optimal modeling and forecasting performance relative
to other power terms. One way to assess the severity of this assumption is to investigate
the temporal properties of the power transformed absolute growth jytjd. First, we examine
the sample autocorrelations of the power transformed absolute growth jytjd for various
positive values of d. Figure 1.6 shows the autocorrelogram of from lag 1 to 20 for a
range of d values. The horizontal lines show the 1:96pT condence interval (CI) for
12 See Karanasos and Schurer (2005) and Karanasos and Kim (2006).
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Fig. 1.6. Autocorrelation of jytjd from High to Low
the estimated sample autocorrelations if the process yt is i.i.d. In this particular case,
CI = 1:96pT = 0:2032:
The sample autocorrelations for jytj0:8 are greater than the sample autocorrelations of
jytjd for d= 1, 1.5, 2 and 2.5 at every lag. Or to put it differently, the most important
conclusion from the autocorrelogram is that jytjd has the largest autocorrelation when
d = 0:8 . Furthermore, the power transformations of absolute growth when d is 0.8 have
signicant positive autocorrelations at least up to lag 10. Moreover, note that at all lags,
jytjd has the lowest autocorrelation when d is 2 and 2:5. This result appears to argue
against Bollerslev's specication.
Above all, the statistical signicance of the in-mean effect is highly dependent on the
choice of the value of the heteroscedasticity parameter. The effect might become in-
signicant if the power term surpasses a specic value. This suggests that if one assumes
a priori a linear relationship between a variable and its uncertainty, the so-called Boller-
slev specication, a signicant link between the two might not be detected13.
13 Karanasos and Schurer (2008) nd that the relationship between the variable and its conditional variance
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1.5 Econometric Results
In this section we discuss our estimation results on the effects of political instability and
nancial development on economic growth in Argentina14. We start with a comparison
between their direct and indirect effects on growth (the latter dened as taking place
through growth volatility). We proceed by examining their asymmetric dynamic effects
with emphasis on the economic signicance of their long- and short-run impacts. This
section closes with a discussion of a crucial robustness check (given the long span of
time covered by our data), namely an assessment of the effects on our main results of
accounting for structural breaks.
1.5.1 Baseline Results
We start with the estimation of the (P)ARCH(1,1) model in equations (1.1) and (1.2) in
order to take into account the serial correlation observed in the levels and power trans-
formations of our time series data. The tables below report the estimated parameters
of interest for the period 1896-2000. These were obtained by quasi-maximum likeli-
hood estimation (QMLE) as implemented in EVIEWS. The best tting specication is
chosen according to the Likelihood Ratio (LR) results and the minimum value of the
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) (not reported). Once heteroscedasticity in the con-
ditional variance has been accounted for, our specications appear to capture the serial
correlation in the growth series15.
is sensitive to changes in the values of the heteroscedasticity parameter. Put differently, the estimated values
of the in-mean and the level effects are fragile to changes in the power term.
14 As mentioned above, Campos et al. (2008) study the relative importance of the various factors often
identied as main causes of the long-term relative decline of Argentinean per capita GDP since the late XIXth
century. These include political instability (institutions), nancial development, trade openness, international
nancial conditions, and ination. They nd that institutions (formal and informal political instability) and
nancial development are the most important factors.
15 For all cases, we nd that the leverage term is insignicant, so we re-estimate excluding this parameter.
Controlling for both autoregressive terms as well as in-mean terms is important, because as shown in Ghysels
et al. (2005), Conrad et al. (2010) and Conrad and Karanasos (2010) the omission of autoregressive terms
may lead to spuriously signicant in-mean terms. However, for all cases, we nd that the IC choose the model
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We specify model 1 with  = 
 = 0 in equation (1.2) in order to study the direct effects
of political instability and nancial development, while model 2 with  = 0 in equation
(1.1) allows us to investigate their indirect impacts on growth. In all cases the estimates
for the in-mean parameter (k) are statistically signicant and positive. The estimated
ARCH and GARCH parameters ( and ) are highly signicant throughout16.
For model 1 ( = 
 = 0 ), when the informal political stability variables are used, the
power term coefcient  ranges from 0.8 (revolutions) to 1.0 (anti-government demon-
strations). The corresponding value for all but one specication with formal instability
variables is 0.8 (last column of Table 1.1). For model 2 (with  = 0 ), with the informal
instability variables AIC selects (P)ARCH models with  equal to 0.9 (anti-government
demonstrations, guerrilla warfare and strikes) or to 0.8 (assassinations and revolutions)17.
For three out of the six formal variables the estimated value is 1 (last column of Table
1.2). Finally, for both models 1 and 2, when the nancial development variables are used,
in all but one case the IC chooses a (P)ARCH specication with estimated power term
0.8.
From the results for Model 1, the parameters  for assassinations, guerrilla warfare and
strikes (three measures of informal political instability) reveal their direct, negative and
statistically signicant impact on economic growth. Note also that none of the corre-
sponding effects for the formal instability variables are statistically signicant (Panel B).
Importantly, we nd the impact of nancial development on economic growth to be pos-
itive and statistically signicant, irrespective of the variable we use to measure it18.
without the lagged growth and since its inclusion is insignicant, we re-estimate excluding this parameter.
Moreover, the coefcients of lagged growth, which are always insignicant, do not qualitatively affect the
main results below. These results are available from the authors upon request.
16 With a limited number of observations the non-linear structure should not be overextended as this imposes
excessive requirements on the data. Therefore we estimate the direct (model 1) and the indirect (model 2)
effects separately.
17 In the expressions for the conditional variances reported in Table 1.2, various lags of growth (from 1 to
12) were considered with the best model (l = 6) chosen on the basis of the minimum value of the AIC.
18 We check the robustness of our ndings with respect to the presence of level effects (results not reported).
That is, we estimate model 1 with 
 6= 0. As with model 2 below, for all cases but one, there is evidence of a
positive bidirectional feedback between growth and its volatility.
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Table 1.1. Direct Effect of Political Instability and Financial Development on Economic
Growth. (P)ARCH estimates
k    
Panel A. Informal Political Instability
Anti-Government Demos 1:00
(1:66)
 0:0010
(1:36)
0:83
(4:15)
0:44
(1:90)
1:00 
Assassinations 1:38
(1:85)
 0:0014
(1:70)
0:54
(3:86)
0:58
(4:04)
0:90 
Guerilla Warfare 1:00
(3:69)
 0:0013
(4:35)
0:77
(5:43)
0:47
(3:13)
0:90 
Revolutions 0:99
(4:31)
0:0001
(0:14)
0:61
(5:17)
0:59
(4:95)
0:80 
Strikes 0:99
(3:07)
 0:0012
(2:13)
0:79
(4:66)
0:44
(2:38)
0:90 
Panel B. Formal Political Instability
Cabinet Changes 2:40
(3:97)
0:0001
(0:03)
0:31
(3:89)
0:72
(5:09)
0:80 
Cabinet Size 0:79
(1:78)
0:0002
(1:47)
0:90
(4:13)
0:46
(2:32)
1:00 
Constitutional 1:80
(1:99)
 0:0027
(1:35)
0:56
(3:01)
0:48
(1:25)
0:80 
Government Crises 1:03
(2:53)
 0:0004
(0:42)
0:65
(4:89)
0:54
(3:59)
0:80 
Legislative Elections 1:91
(2:69)
 0:0003
(0:15)
0:38
(3:43)
0:69
(5:79)
0:80 
Purges 1:27
(1:92)
 0:0010
(1:55)
0:58
(4:03)
0:56
(3:69)
0:80 
Panel C. Financial Development
Private Deposits/GDP 0:76
(2:66)
0:98
(9:21)
0:70
(4:99)
0:57
(4:94)
0:80 
Savings Bank Deposits/GDP 0:74
(1:80)
0:58
(3:43)
0:76
(4:36)
0:56
(4:97)
0:80 
M3/GDP 0:81
(1:94)
0:32
(1:71)
0:94
(3:76)
0:43
(2:04)
1:00 
M1/GDP 0:69
(2:30)
0:58
(5:14)
0:75
(5:29)
0:56
(5:85)
0:80 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + xit + "t; h

2
t = ! +  j "t 1 j +h

2
t 1.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
The results in Table 1.1 are interesting for at least two reasons. One is that they pro-
vide evidence strongly suggesting that the type of political instability matters vis-à-vis
economic growth: informal instability has a direct and negative effect, while formal in-
stability does not. Second, they show that nancial development has a positive and direct
effect on growth, with M3 over GDP (a measure of the size of the nancial sector) ar-
guably being the weakest effect. In order to assess the robustness of these results, we
investigated the effects of specifying instead lagged values of the informal instability
measures and we have concluded that this does not qualitatively affect our main ndings
(these results are available from the authors upon request).
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Examining the results for Model 2 (reported in Table 1.2) and focusing our attention on
the  and k parameters19, we can now see that the formal political instability variables
have strong indirect (through volatility) negative effects on growth. This result obtains
for cabinet changes and size and constitutional changes. That is, these variables affect
volatility negatively ( < 0) and, since k > 0 , they affect growth negatively as well20.
Interestingly, none of the nancial development and informal instability measures reveals
such indirect effects (instead, as discussed above, they exhibit a direct impact on growth).
These results reinforce the notion that the type of political instability matters with respect
to economic growth: while informal instability may have a direct impact, the effect of
formal political instability seems to operate indirectly, via growth volatility21.
1.5.2 Short-Run and Long-Run Effects
In this section we investigate how short- and long-run considerations help us rene our
baseline results. Another potential benet is that the required use of lags may help al-
lay any lingering concerns about endogeneity. In order to estimate short- and long-run
relationships we employ the following error correction (P)ARCH form
yt = xi;t l + '(yt 1   c  xi;t 1) + "t; (1.3)
19 Note that, for all cases in model 2, there is evidence of a positive bidirectional feedback between growth
and its volatility. The existing empirical literature focuses mainly on the effect of volatility on growth, see
Fountas et al. (2006) and Fountas and Karanasos (2007).
20 We also estimate model 2 using an EGARCH specication. The results (not reported) are very much
similar to the results we report in the paper.
21 Because data is normally missing for the War years both for economic growth and for the key explanatory
variables (i.e., nancial development and political instability), most of the available direct imputation methods
would be ineffective, in that they would not be able to generate different results from the ones we report
here. Moreover, we were able to obtain another, independent, GDP growths series from Aioli, Catao and
Timmerman (2010) which differs from most other GDP series in that it contains information for the War
years. The results (discussed below) we obtain from this other series are very much similar to the results we
report in the paper.
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Table 1.2. Indirect Effect of Political Instability and Financial Development on Economic
Growth. (P)ARCH estimates
k   
  
Panel A. Informal Political Instability
Anti-Government Demos 1:25
(2:56)
0:65
(4:52)
0:46
(5:94)
0:17
(4:51)
 0:0002
(0:31)
0:90 
Assassinations 1:09
(2:72)
0:68
(5:30)
0:27
(5:84)
0:27
(5:84)
 0:0038
(1:45)
0:80 
Guerilla Warfare 1:12
(2:46)
0:73
(4:80)
0:46
(4:00)
0:10
(2:00)
0:0007
(0:82)
0:90 
Revolutions 1:22
(2:03)
0:69
(3:73)
0:45
(2:37)
0:11
(1:80)
 0:0002
(0:14)
0:80 
Strikes 1:14
(2:33)
0:70
(3:55)
0:48
(2:69)
0:06
(1:73)
0:0011
(1:27)
0:90 
Panel B. Formal Political Instability
Cabinet Changes 1:28
(1:96)
0:55
(2:99)
0:53
(4:90)
0:21
(3:93)
 0:0050
(4:03)
1:00 
Cabinet Size 1:14
(1:77)
0:60
(3:89)
0:54
(5:02)
0:18
(2:48)
 0:0002
(2:13)
1:00 
Constitutional Changes 1:18
(1:94)
0:69
(4:40)
0:45
(4:15)
0:18
(3:75)
 0:0077
(3:40)
1:00 
Government Crises 1:12
(2:30)
0:72
(4:59)
0:47
(3:28)
0:11
(2:44)
0:0007
(0:57)
0:90 
Legislative Elections 1:46
(2:52)
0:62
(4:70)
0:44
(3:52)
0:20
(3:12)
 0:0110
(1:17)
0:80 
Purges 1:06
(3:00)
0:75
(5:26)
0:46
(4:32)
0:09
(1:99)
0:0004
(0:64)
0:90 
Panel C. Financial Development
Private Deposits/ GDP 2:05
(2:23)
0:41
(3:04)
0:62
(6:75)
0:40
(5:69)
0:58
(0:53)
0:80 
Savings Bank Deposits/ GDP 1:81
(1:92)
0:53
(2:95)
0:60
(6:37)
0:32
(6:84)
 0:38
(0:38)
0:80 
M3/GDP 1:35
(2:48)
0:58
(4:22)
0:48
(4:49)
0:23
(4:03)
0:29
(0:36)
0:80 
M1/GDP 1:22
(2:56)
0:49
(5:30)
0:59
(9:46)
0:34
(5:67)
 0:13
(0:23)
0:80 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + "t; h

2
t = ! +  j "t 1 j +h

2
t 1 + 
yt 6 + xit. ? The orders of the lags are seven and ve respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
1.5 Econometric Results 26
where  and  capture the short and long-run effects respectively, and ' is the speed of
adjustment to the long-run relationship.22 This is accomplished by embedding a long-
run growth regression into an ARDL model.23 In other words, the term in parenthesis
contains the long-run growth regression, which acts as a forcing equilibrium condition
yt = c+ xit + ut; (1.4)
where ut is I(0). The lag of the rst difference of either the political instability or nan-
cial development variables (xi;t l) characterizes the short-run effect. The condition for
the existence of a long-run relationship (dynamic stability) requires that the coefcient
on the error-correction term be negative and not lower than  2 (that is,  2 < ' < 0).
We also take into account the (P)ARCH effects by specifying the error term "t as follows
"t = eth
1
2
t ; (1.5)
where
h

2
t = ! +  j"t 1j + h

2
t 1: (1.6)
Table 1.3 presents the results on the estimation of short- and long-run parameters linking
informal political instability or nancial development with growth24. In all cases, the
estimated coefcient on the error correction term (') lies within the dynamically stable
range(-2,0). More precisely, the estimates of ' for informal instability and nancial
development lie within the range -0.71 to -0.50 and -0.85 to -0.44, respectively.
22 As pointed out by Loayaza and Rancière (2006) the requirements for the validity of this methodology are
that: i) there exists a long-run relationship between the variables of interest and, ii) the dynamic specication
of the model is sufciently augmented so that the regressors are strictly exogenous and the resulting residual
is serially uncorrelated.
23 For details on the ARDL approach, see Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran and Shin (1999).
24 In some cases where the routines did not converge we estimate the short- and long-run effects in two steps.
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Regarding the short- and long-run effect estimates,  and  , we focus our analysis rst
on those obtained from the informal instability variables. In all cases the estimates of
the short-run coefcients are highly signicant and negative and their absolute values are
higher than the corresponding values for the long-run coefcients (for anti-government
demonstrations, the long-run effect is not signicantly different from zero). This pro-
vides evidence for the notion that the duration of the political instability effect does in-
deed matter and, for informal instability, such effects tend to be considerably stronger
in the short- than in the long-run, in line with Campos and Nugent (2002) and Murdoch
and Sandler (2004). The unexpected result is for revolutions: we found that the long-run
effect on growth is positive. One possible explanation is that of escalation: political in-
stability comes in cycles in which the level of political violence accelerates, with maxima
coinciding with revolutions. Because revolutions reect illegal or forced change in gov-
ernment elites (as well as successful or unsuccessful armed rebellions), their occurrence
may be the culmination of a cycle of political violence, thus marking the beginning of a
period of relatively low levels of political instability (and higher or more stable growth
rates.) Another piece of evidence one can offer in support of this conjecture is that the
revolutions series peaks around the date of the second structural break we identify in the
GDP growth series (further details below.)
Next we discuss the important results regarding the nancial development variables. In
the long-run, we nd that nancial development affects growth positively ( > 0). This
result is in agreement with a large empirical literature (Levine 2005) and it is interesting
that we reproduce it with a rather different methodology. However, the short-run coef-
cients tell a differently story: we nd that the short-run impact of nancial development
on growth is negative and signicant (  < 0). Thus our results square well with recent
ndings by Loayaza and Rancière (2006), among others, in that the sign of the relation-
ship between economic growth and nancial development crucially depends on the time
horizon one takes (the effect being negative in the short- and positive in the longer-run.)
It is also worth noting that our results are robust to various measures of nancial devel-
opment and also that the stronger long-run effects we obtain are for measures of nancial
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efciency rather than for measures of the size of the nancial sector. Finally, as men-
tioned above, cross-country heterogeneity may play an undesirably large role in this type
of result (e.g., Loayza and Rancière 2006) in that the size of the two effects this literature
estimates is very similar, often with the negative short-run effect being somewhat larger.
Because in this paper we use data for only one country and nd supporting evidence for
this asymmetric dynamic effect, one possible contribution is to help dispel such concerns
about this result. We nd that the negative short-run effect seems substantially smaller
than the positive long-run effect (see also Table 1.6 below).
In sum, these results as a whole indicate that the severity of the political instability effects
may "dominate" that of nancial development: while the short- and long-run nance
effects work in opposite directions, the effects of political instability are both negative
and seem to operate through different channels. Formal political instability is detrimental
to growth via the volatility channel and, together with informal instability (which has a
negative direct effect on growth), may have played a truly substantial role in the relative
decline of the Argentinian economy since its peak in the 1920s.
1.5.3 Accounting for Structural Breaks
In this section we subject our baseline results to an important robustness test. That is, we
assess structural breaks. We use the methodology developed by Bai and Perron (2003)
to examine whether there are any structural breaks in growth, its volatility, the various
political instability and nancial development variables25. This methodology is widely
used because it addresses the problem of testing for multiple structural changes under
very general conditions on the data and the errors. In addition to testing for the existence
of breaks, these statistics identify the number and location of multiple breaks26.
25 Campos et al. (2009) compare a range of estimation methodologies for structural breaks in this type of
low-frequency long historical data series.
26 Details are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 1.3. Short- and Long-run effects of Political Instability and Financial Development
on Economic Growth. (P)ARCH estimates
  '   
Panel A. Informal Political Instability
Antigovernment
Demos  0:0009(2:92)
l=2
0:0006
(1:04)
 0:70
(4:96)
0:98
(7:17)
0:41
(6:26)
0:80 
Assassinations  0:0019
(2:46)
l=4
 0:0012
(3:52)
 0:71
(3:89)
0:82
(5:68)
0:53
(9:10)
0:90 
Guerilla Warfare  0:0014
(3:38)
l=3
 0:0007
(2:59)
 0:60
(7:20)
1:10
(4:19)
0:36
(3:59)
0:90 
Revolutions  0:0015
(2:13)
l=5
0:0013
(2:37)
 0:50
(3:60)
0:83
(5:76)
0:52
(6:85)
0:80 
Strikes  0:0026
(2:13)
l=4
 0:0021
(2:74)
 0:54
(4:89)
0:76
(4:39)
0:55
(6:65)
0:80 
Panel B. Financial Development
Private
Deposits/GDP  1:35(1:81)
l=5
0:94
(23:72)
 0:44
(4:64)
0:37
(2:63)
0:80
(6:69)
0:90 
Savings Bank
Deposits/GDP  0:55(1:89)
l=1
0:59
(4:84)
 0:70
(3:23)
0:74
(6:69)
0:56
(6:21)
0:80 
M3/GDP  0:16
(3:00)
l=4
0:16
(1:60)
 0:83
(4:11)
0:81
(6:59)
0:52
(7:19)
0:80 
M1/GDP  0:21
(1:91)
l=1
0:43
(4:20)
 0:85
(4:14)
0:74
(6:89)
0:54
(6:62)
0:80 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = xi;t l + '(yt 1   c  xi;t 1) + "t; h

2
t = ! +  j"t 1j + h

2
t 1.
 (l is the order of the lag) and  capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
' indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
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In the case of the economic growth series (and, interestingly, also for growth volatil-
ity) the Bai-Perron methodology supports two structural break points. The rst occurs
for year 1922 and the second for year 1964 (see gure 7). For our political instability
variables, we nd no structural breaks for the assassinations, guerilla warfare, cabinet
and constitutional changes series27, and nor do we nd any breaks in the four nancial
development variables.
However, our Bai-Perron results support the idea that general strikes and government
crises have one common structural break, which is dated at year 1955. This is the year
of the military coup in which President Juan Domingo Perón was overthrown by the
military. Breaks in the revolutions and purges series are detected for about the same
political period, more specically for year 1951 (see gure 7)28. Further, we also nd
one structural break in cabinet size and legislative elections (these are dated 1946 and
1949, respectively) while in anti-government demonstrations we nd two breaks dated
1954 and 1972. With arguably one exception (anti-government demonstrations in 1972,
which were motivated by demands for the return of Perón from exile), all the structural
breaks in our political instability series occur during Perón governments. Perón was
elected president three times. His rst term is from 1946 to 1952. He is re-elected in
1951, his second term starts in 1952 and ends abruptly in 1955. His third term is between
1973 (where he is allowed to return from Spain after an18-year exile) and 1974 (when
he suffers fatal heart attack.) Although marked by severe economic problems, the second
term (1951 to 1955) is more often remembered for its political instability (the various
terrorist attacks being a sad prelude to the so-called Dirty War of the 1970s).
In what follows, we incorporate dummy variables in the equations (1.1) and (1.2), thus
taking into account breaks in the political instability variables and in the volatility of
27 Our data shows no guerilla warfare before 1948 and after 1977.
28 In purges there is a second break dated 1978 but since after that year there were no purges we do not need
to use a dummy variable to account for it.
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Fig. 1.7. Structural Breaks
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growth. First, we introduce the following notation. D1t, D2t are (intercept) dummies
dened as D1t, D2t = 1 in the periods 1922-2000 and 1964-2000, respectively, and D1t,
D2t = 0 otherwise. Similarly, Dit is a (slope) dummy indicating the period which starts
from the year of the break in the political instability variable (xit). For example for strikes
and government crises Dit = 1 in the period from 1955 to 2000 whereas for cabinet size
Dit = 1 during the period from 1946 until the end of the sample.
The augmented model is given by
yt = c+ kht + xit + 1Ditxit + t; (1.7)
and
h

2
t = ! + !1D1t + !2D2t +  j"t 1j + h

2
t 1 + 
yt l + xit + 1Ditxit: (1.8)
Recall that the coefcients  and  capture the impacts of the political instability variable
on growth and its volatility respectively. Similarly, 1 and 1 correspond to the two
effects from the year of the break onwards. Thus the two effects are captured by  and 
in the period up to the year of the structural break, and by  + 1 and  + 1 during the
period from the year of the break until the end of the sample. As above in order to study
the direct effects of political instability and nancial development we specify model 1
with  = 1 = 0; while model 2 with  = 1 = 0 allows us to investigate their indirect
impacts on growth.
We also incorporate intercept dummies and level effects in the conditional variance equa-
tion (1.6), as follows
h

2
t = ! + !1D1t + !2D2t +  j"t 1j + h

2
t 1 + 
yt l: (1.9)
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Overall, we nd our results to be robust to the inclusion of the structural break dummies
(see Tables 1.4- 1.6)29. That is, (i) informal instability has a direct negative effect on
growth, while formal instability has an indirect (through volatility) negative impact on
growth, (ii) the effects of informal instability are signicantly stronger in the short- than
in the long-run, (iii) nancial development affects growth positively in the long-run but
negatively in the short-run, with the former being the dominant effect. As mentioned
above, this latter result is very important. Previous research has robustly established
that nancial development affects growth positively in the long-run but negatively in
the short-run but has struggled with the fact that the magnitude (that is, the economic
signicance) of the short-run effect tends to be larger than the long-run effect. This has
been in part attributed to country heterogeneity. In this paper, we show that this may
indeed be a major cause: the bottom panel of Table 1.6 shows that for all four measures
of nancial development we estimate the negative short-run effect to be smaller than
the positive long-run effect. Further, for our preferred measure (private deposits), the
magnitude of the long-run impact is more than three times that of the short-run effect
(-0.29 versus 0.9).
Note also that the causal negative effect of strikes reects the period 1955-2000 (see Panel
A of Table 1.4), which is not surprising given the intricate relationship between the gov-
ernments of Peron and organized labor. In addition, the impact of revolutions on growth
becomes negative after 1951. As mentioned above, this is surprising and one possible
explanation we offer is in terms of a cycle of escalation of political instability (which
culminates in a revolution). It is also worth noting that before 1951, economic growth
seems to be independent of changes in purges, whereas after 1951 a negative causal rela-
tionship starts, which implies that purges after 1951 behave similarly to the other infor-
mal instability variables (see Panel B of Table 1.4). Interestingly, the causal effects from
legislative elections and government crises to growth volatility, become stronger after we
account for their structural breaks in 1949 and 1955 respectively (see Panel B of Table
29 These results are also robust to the inclusion of intercept dummies in the mean equation for growth (not
reported).
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1.5) with the latter result being the only unexpected one. Finally, note that when we take
into account breaks and level effects in the volatility of growth, the long-run effects of
assassinations and revolutions disappear (see Panel A of Table 1.6) thereby reinforcing
our nding that the effects of informal political instability are more severe in the short-
than in the long-run. Moreover, the coefcient of M3 over GDP also becomes insignif-
icant, while the same does not happen to other, nancial sector measures, in particular
those reecting efciency (not size).
A nal robustness test for our results was the use of alternative GDP growth series. Us-
ing the series constructed by Aiol et al. (2010) shown in Figure 1.2, we nd that all our
main conclusions regarding the direct and indirect effects remain unchanged. That is, (i)
informal instability (anti-government demonstrations, guerilla warfare and strikes) have
a direct negative effect on growth, while formal instability (constitutional, and legisla-
tive elections) have an indirect (through volatility) negative impact on growth, and (ii)
nancial development (private deposits/GDP and M3/GDP) has a positive and direct ef-
fect on growth. We also provide evidence for the notion that the duration of the political
instability effect does indeed matter and, for informal instability, such effects tend to be
signicant only in the short-run but not in the long-run. Similarly, we nd that the short-
run impact of nancial development on growth is negative and signicant, whereas in the
long-run the positive effect of nancial development diminishes. Finally, we also note
that we can not detect any structural break in the GDP growth series from Aiol et al.
(2010) which provides additional support for our results in light of the above discussion.
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Table 1.4. Direct Effect of Political Instability and Financial Development on Economic
Growth: Accounting for Structural Breaks. (P)ARCH estimates
k  1 !1 !2   
 
Panel A. Informal Political Instability
Anti-Government Demos 2:68
(2:00)
 0:003
(0:50)
0:003
(0:62)
 0:02
(1:44)
0:04
(3:40)
0:42
(3:20)
0:42
(3:21)
0:10
(2:90)
0:90 
Assassinations 2:17
(1:85)
 0:002
(0:16)
    0:04
(3:29)
0:48
(4:24)
0:37
(3:52)
0:09
(2:34)
0:90 
Guerilla Warfare 2:07
(2:85)
 0:001
(2:68)
    0:04
(3:54)
0:46
(5:34)
0:42
(5:40)
0:18
(4:68)
0:80 
Revolutions 1:71
(2:63)
0:002
(4:19)
 0:003
(4:75)
 0:04
(1:82)
0:07
(3:52)
0:57
(5:40)
0:11
(1:12)
0:25
(5:70)
0:80 
Strikes 2:17
(1:71)
0:0002
(0:38)
 0:001
(1:78)
  0:03
(3:44)
0:49
(3:74)
0:41
(4:00)
0:06
(2:40)
1:00 
Panel B. Formal Political Instability
Cabinet Changes 2:41
(2:25)
0:0007
(1:05)
   0:02
(1:53)
0:06
(4:21)
0:41
(3:69)
0:36
(4:11)
0:10
(1:90)
0:80 
Cabinet Size 2:12
(3:01)
 0:0006
(1:24)
0:0003
(0:89)
 0:02
(1:56)
0:05
(4:01)
0:44
(4:09)
0:42
(5:03)
0:16
(4:56)
0:80 
Constitutional Changes 2:24
(2:13)
0:0007
(0:50)
   0:02
(1:70)
0:06
(4:21)
0:43
(3:28)
0:36
(2:74)
0:10
(1:99)
0:80 
Government Crises 2:10
(1:70)
 0:0009
(1:14)
 0:0009
(1:08)
  0:03
(2:85)
0:50
(3:86)
0:40
(3:95)
0:10
(4:70)
1:00 
Legislative Elections 1:53
(1:69)
0:0010
(1:27)
 0:0030
(1:41)
  0:02
(1:38)
0:50
(3:53)
0:47
(5:38)
0:22
(4:17)
1:00 
Purges 2:43
(1:93)
0:0010
(1:59)
 0:0020
(2:87)
  0:03
(3:26)
0:40
(3:23)
0:48
(6:20)
0:08
(6:51)
1:00 
Panel C. Financial Development
Private Deposits/GDP 2:26
(2:64)
0:90
(4:03)
   0:02
(1:58)
0:05
(4:33)
0:36
(2:72)
0:50
(4:04)
0:11
(1:79)
0:80 
Savings Bank Deposits/GDP 3:75
(3:05)
0:63
(2:34)
    0:03
(4:52)
0:51
(4:50)
0:45
(5:13)
0:04
(2:03)
1:00 
M3/GDP 2:96
(1:89)
0:09
(0:35)
   0:01
(1:52)
0:04
(3:50)
0:38
(2:86)
0:43
(3:19)
0:04
(1:23)
1:00 
M1/GDP 2:70
(2:15)
0:51
(2:85)
   0:02
(1:65)
0:05
(3:99)
0:39
(3:09)
0:43
(3:40)
0:06
(1:71)
0:90 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + xit + 1Ditxit + "t;
h

2
t = ! + !1D1t + !2D2t +  j "t 1 j +h

2
t 1 + 
yt 6.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
We include a second dummy (Dit) with estimated coefcient 0:0006(0:10).
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Table 1.5. Indirect Effect of Political Instability and Financial Development on Economic
Growth: Accounting for Structural Breaks. (P)ARCH estimates
k !1 !2  1   
 
Panel A. Informal Political Instability
Anti-Government Demos 2:06
(2:08)
  0:04
(2:05)
0:006
(0:53)
 0:005
(0:43)
0:50
(3:32)
0:42
(3:06)
0:06
(1:21)
0:90 
Assassinations 2:08
(3:22)
 0:03
(1:31)
0:05
(4:38)
 0:002
(1:11)
  0:46
(4:74)
0:36
(3:22)
0:18
(4:07)
0:80 
Guerilla Warfare 2:43
(1:71)
 0:03
(1:85)
0:05
(3:98)
0:001
(1:01)
  0:43
(3:44)
0:39
(3:18)
0:08
(1:54)
0:90 
Revolutions 1:93
(1:91)
 0:03
(2:34)
0:05
(4:03)
0:002
(2:57)
0:001
(0:62)
0:52
(4:49)
0:23
(2:83)
0:20
(6:49)
0:90 
Strikes 2:38
(2:27)
  0:04
(2:95)
0:001
(0:09)
0:001
(1:33)
0:41
(3:31)
0:47
(4:14)
0:06
(1:73)
0:90 
Panel B. Formal Political Instability
Cabinet Changes 2:29
(1:73)
 0:01
(1:51)
0:04
(4:03)
 0:003
(4:39)
  0:43
(3:18)
0:33
(2:98)
0:12
(4:44)
1:00 
Cabinet Size 2:73
(1:83)
 0:01
(1:66)
0:04
(4:25)
 0:001
(1:79)
0:0004
(1:58)
0:36
(3:00)
0:47
(5:06)
0:04
(1:56)
1:00 
Constitutional Changes 2:84
(2:22)
 0:10
(1:42)
0:03
(3:57)
 0:020
(4:60)
  0:30
(2:21)
0:53
(5:10)
0:07
(3:30)
1:00 
Government Crises 2:75
(2:25)
  0:04
(3:30)
 0:002
(1:80)
0:003
(3:50)
0:33
(2:66)
0:55
(4:74)
0:008
(0:03)
0:90 
Legislative Elections 1:97
(2:23)
  0:02
(1:21)
 0:010
(1:69)
 0:005
(2:43)
0:49
(3:66)
0:46
(3:14)
0:12
(2:67)
0:90 
Purges 1:96
(1:38)
 0:04
(2:30)
0:06
(3:79)
0:003
(1:57)
 0:002
(1:11)
0:55
(5:05)
0:21
(2:37)
0:15
(5:02)
0:90 
Panel C. Financial Development
Private Deposits/GDP 2:89
(2:19)
 0:03
(1:71)
0:07
(4:07)
0:02
(0:02)
  0:37
(2:80)
0:39
(2:16)
0:12
(1:89)
0:80 
Savings Bank Deposits/GDP 2:37
(1:71)
  0:05
(3:24)
 0:57
(0:61)
  0:35
(2:43)
0:54
(3:37)
0:16
(3:23)
0:80 
M3/GDP 1:78
(2:33)
  0:04
(1:95)
0:59
(0:64)
  0:62
(4:66)
0:29
(2:31)
0:24
(3:43)
0:80 
M1/GDP 2:73
(2:73)
 0:02
(1:64)
0:06
(3:74)
 0:16
(0:17)
  0:40
(3:16)
0:38
(2:53)
0:13
(2:87)
0:80 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + "t; h

2
t = ! + !1D1t + !2D2t + xit + 1Ditxit +  j "t 1 j +h

2
t 1 + 
yt 6.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
We include a second dummy (Dit) with estimated coefcient 0:007(1:06).
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Table 1.6. Short- and Long-run Effects of Informal Political Instability and Financial De-
velopment on Economic Growth: Accounting for Structural Breaks. (P)ARCH estimates
  ' !1 !2   
 
Panel A. Informal Political Instability
Antigovernment
Demos  0:0010(1:92
l=1
)
 0:0006
(0:93)
 0:37
(3:62)
  0:03
(1:68)
0:47
(2:05)
0:48
(2:70)
0:12
(3:97)
0:90 
Assassinations  0:0018
(1:90
l=4
)
0:0004
(0:54)
 0:31
(3:36)
  0:04
(2:28)
0:52
(2:15)
0:39
(2:14)
 0:01
(0:27)
0:90 
Guerilla Warfare  0:0012
(1:61
l=6
)
 0:0008
(2:46)
 0:27
(3:11)
  0:04
(2:69)
0:62
(3:20)
0:30
(2:31)
0:04
(0:83)
0:90 
Revolutions  0:0004
(1:77)
l=0
 0:0002
(0:37)
 0:22
(2:10)
 0:03
(1:54)
0:06
(3:85)
0:57
(2:35)
0:28
(2:83)
 0:05
(1:25)
0:90 
Strikes  0:0012
(1:96)
l=6
 0:0012
(2:35)
 0:28
(2:83)
  0:06
(2:43)
0:62
(3:49)
0:30
(2:18)
0:04
(0:53)
0:80 
Panel B. Financial Development
Private
Deposits/GDP  0:29(3:22
l=5
)
0:90
(3:50)
 0:26
(2:16)
 0:03
(1:96)
0:07
(4:87)
0:45
(1:79)
0:31
(2:81)
 0:02
(0:47)
0:90 
Savings Bank
Deposits/GDP  0:54(3:55
l=5
)
0:60
(2:57)
 0:26
(2:27)
  0:05
(1:71)
0:58
(3:18)
0:41
(1:91)
0:06
(0:66)
0:80 
M3/GDP 0:08
(0:58
l=4
)
0:11
(0:58)
 0:23
(2:26)
 0:02
(1:60)
0:04
(4:02)
0:55
(2:03)
0:30
(3:10)
 0:03
(1:00)
1:00 
M1/GDP  0:21
(2:78
l=5
)
0:35
(1:89)
 0:28
(2:73)
 0:03
(2:07)
0:07
(4:93)
0:45
(2:03)
0:34
(3:27)
 0:04
(0:69)
0:80 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = xi;t l + '(yt 1   c  xi;t 1) + "t;
h

2
t = ! + !1D1t + !2D2t +  j"t 1j + h

2
t 1 + 
yt 6.
 (l is the order of the lag) and  capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
' indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
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1.6 Conclusions
Within a power-ARCH framework using data for Argentina from 1896 to 2000, we nd
that: (a) informal political instability (assassinations, guerilla warfare, strikes) have a
direct negative effect on economic growth, while formal instability (e.g., cabinet changes
and size, and constitutional changes) have an indirect impact on growth (through its
volatility); (b) nancial development affects economic growth positively; (c) the informal
instability effects are substantially larger in the short- than in the long-run; and (d) the
nancial development effects are negative in the short- but positive and substantially
larger in the long-run.
These ndings raise a number of new questions that we believe may be useful in mo-
tivating future research. Here we highlight two related suggestions: one on the role of
nance and one on methodology. Regarding the role of nance in the process of eco-
nomic development, our ndings extend a large body of previous research in that we also
show a strong, positive impact of nancial development on growth in the long-run. How-
ever, the negative effects of political instability on growth might outweigh the positive
inuence of nancial development. We nd that different forms of political instability
affect growth through different channels over different time windows, making up for a
strong and rather resilient effect that seems very powerful vis-à-vis the benets from -
nancial development. Yet Argentina is unique: no other country in the world since the
Industrial Revolution went from riches to rags. Put differently, Argentina is an outlier
and further research should replicate our analysis using the historical experience of other
countries (ideally in a panel setting). That is, future studies should focus on the relation-
ship between political instability, nancial development and economic growth in a panel
of developing countries. Notice, however, that the data requirements are very heavy in-
deed, with most developing countries lacking historical data even on key gures, such as
per capita GDP, going back to the beginning or middle of the XIXth century. This, of
course, does not make this task less important. The second suggestion refers to a possible
methodological improvement, namely the application of the bivariate PARCH model to
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the problem at hand (despite the relatively small number of observations). A joint estima-
tion of the political instability-nancial development-growth system in a panel of coun-
tries would clearly represent progress and is something we feel future research should try
to address.
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Table 1.7. Direct Effect of Political Instability/Financial Development on Economic
Growth, with Laged Growth in Variance Equation. (P)ARCH estimates
k    
 
Panel A. Informal Political Instability
Anti-Government Demos 1:27
(2:55)
 0:0009
(1:47)
0:66
(4:66)
0:42
(4:47)
0:25
(5:61)
0:80 
Assassinations 1:18
(2:60)
 0:0009
(1:70)
0:72
(4:63)
0:42
(4:03)
0:15
(2:80)
0:90 
Guerilla Warfare 1:04
(2:38)
 0:0011
(2:88)
0:74
(4:11)
0:47
(5:26)
0:10
(6:08)
1:00 
Revolutions 0:99
(1:98)
 0:0006
(2:22)
0:63
(6:38)
0:48
(7:06)
0:31
(7:54)
0:80 
Strikes 1:22
(2:69)
 0:0012
(2:33)
0:66
(4:04)
0:43
(4:48)
0:23
(4:46)
0:90 
Panel B. Formal Political Instability
Cabinet Changes 1:23
(1:92)
0:0014
(1:32)
0:59
(3:94)
0:52
(5:06)
0:24
(4:09)
0:90 
Cabinet Size 1:29
(1:76)
 0:0001
(0:29)
0:53
(2:97)
0:57
(5:34)
0:16
(2:85)
1:00 
Constitutional Changes 1:28
(2:04)
 0:0031
(1:46)
0:54
(3:86)
0:54
(6:21)
0:23
(4:15)
0:90 
Government Crises 1:24
(2:74)
 0:0030
(0:44)
0:62
(4:40)
0:47
(6:82)
0:20
(4:57)
0:90 
Legislative Elections 1:21
(2:09)
0:0013
(1:30)
0:57
(4:02)
0:53
(8:72)
0:22
(5:82)
1:00 
Purges 1:23
(2:12)
 0:0007
(1:21)
0:68
(3:62)
0:45
(4:82)
0:13
(3:95)
1:00 
Panel C. Financial Development
Private Deposits/GDP 0:96
(2:83)
0:84
(3:65)
0:53
(3:07)
0:61
(4:64)
0:31
(2:76)
0:80 
Savings Bank Deposits/GDP 0:96
(2:14)
0:52
(3:43)
0:74
(3:91)
0:50
(4:17)
0:22
(2:89)
0:80 
M3/GDP 1:06
(1:91)
0:47
(2:70)
0:65
(2:97)
0:51
(2:98)
0:05
(0:61)
0:80 
M1/GDP 0:88
(3:04)
0:50
(3:52)
0:61
(3:99)
0:58
(5:99)
0:21
(3:86)
0:90 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + xit + "t; h

2
t = ! +  j "t 1 j +h

2
t 1 + 
yt 6.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
Comment: The coefcient of the level effect is signicant in all cases (see the 
 column). The impact of the
informal instability and nancial development on growth is robust to the presence of level effects (see the 
column).
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Table 1.8. Direct Effect of Informal Political Instability/Financial Development on Eco-
nomic Growth, with Laged Growth in Mean and Variance Equations. (P)ARCH estimates
k     
 
Panel A. Informal Political Instability
Anti-Government Demos 0:27
(0:30)
0:29
(0:89)
 0:0009
(1:29)
0:58
(3:93)
0:54
(7:25)
0:19
(3:23)
0:90 
Assassinations 0:45
(1:80)
0:27
(0:63)
 0:0009
(1:88)
0:58
(3:12)
0:50
(6:03)
0:26
(4:29)
0:80 
Guerilla Warfare 1:05
(1:11)
0:05
(0:25)
 0:0011
(2:38)
0:57
(3:31)
0:55
(6:60)
0:12
(9:18)
1:00 
Revolutions 0:73
(1:37)
0:10
(0:69)
 0:0005
(1:16)
0:60
(4:25)
0:51
(10:23)
0:20
(5:85)
0:90 
Strikes 0:48
(2:21)
0:19
(1:36)
 0:0013
(3:44)
0:83
(5:30)
0:37
(5:49)
0:22
(4:04)
0:80 
Panel B. Financial Development
Private Deposits/GDP 0:79
(1:07)
0:09
(0:43)
0:71
(3:55)
0:45
(3:05)
0:67
(6:28)
0:33
(4:17)
0:80 
Savings Bank Deposits/GDP 0:82
(0:83)
0:17
(0:97)
0:87
(3:47)
0:60
(:3:16)
0:59
(6:84)
0:30
(7:78)
0:80 
M3/GDP 1:17
(1:45)
0:13
(0:73)
0:12
(0:79)
0:41
(2:46)
0:63
(4:89)
0:27
(4:18)
0:90 
M1/GDP 0:96
(1:85)
0:05
(0:37)
0:44
(2:51)
0:47
(3:64)
0:63
(7:14)
0:34
(3:94)
0:80 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + yt 1 + xit + "t; h

2
t = ! +  j "t 1 j +h

2
t 1 + 
yt 6.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
Comment: In all cases the coefcient of lagged growth is insignicant (see the  column). Informal
instability (assassinations, guerilla warfare and strikes) has a negative effect on growth whereas nancial
development (with the exception of M3/GDP) affects growth positively (see the  column).
Table 1.9. Indirect Effect of Formal Political Instability on Economic Growth, with Laged
Growth in Mean and Variance Equations. (P)ARCH estimates
k    
  
Formal Political Instability
Cabinet Changes 0:62
(1:30)
0:14
(0:78)
0:60
(2:73)
0:51
(3:37)
0:33
(3:33)
 0:0068
(1:79)
0:80 
Cabinet Size 0:91
(1:94)
0:03
(0:17)
0:66
(4:30)
0:50
(5:17)
0:28
(3:73)
 0:0002
(1:16)
0:90 
Constitutional Changes 0:81
(1:35)
0:17
(1:06)
0:42
(2:62)
0:63
(5:16)
0:24
(2:93)
 0:0168
(2:81)
0:80 
Legislative Elections 0:31
(0:56)
0:39
(0:53)
0:51
(3:40)
0:52
(6:45)
0:16
(4:13)
 0:0193
(2:73)
0:90 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + yt 1 + "t; h

2
t = ! +  j "t 1 j +h

2
t 1 + 
yt 6 + xit.
No convergence for Government crises and Purges.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
Comment: In all cases the coefcient of lagged growth is insignicant (see the  column). Formal
instability (cabinet and constitutional changes and legislative elections) has a negative effect on the volatility
of growth (see the  column).
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Table 1.10. Indirect Effect of Formal Political Instability on Economic Growth, EGARCH
estimates
k   
 
Formal Political Instability
Cabinet Changes 0:14y
(1:07)
1:27
(5:74)
0:82
(19:52)
4:80
(2:93)
 0:85
(2:16)
l=2
Cabinet Size 2:04
(3:19)
1:02
(7:40)
0:87
(17:73)
3:99
(3:80)
 0:004
(0:15)
l=2
Constitutional Changes 1:48
(1:83)
0:94
(7:76)
0:90
(27:14)
2:64
(1:84)
 1:83
(2:56)
l=0
Government Crises 0:49
(2:93)
2:60
(7:42)
0:79
(21:85)
6:61
(12:67)
 0:70
(9:17)
l=1
Legislative Elections 2:69
(3:42)
1:30
(3:49)
0:78
(15:59)
4:41
(4:27)
 1:93
(5:55)
l=3
Purges 0:01z
(1:08)
1:27
(5:74)
0:82
(19:52)
4:80
(2:93)
 0:85
(2:16)
l=2
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + "t;
log(ht) = ! +  j et 1 j +log(ht 1) + 
yt 6 + xit l:
yEstimates for standard deviation.
zEstimates for logarithm of variance.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
Comment: In all but one cases formal instability has a negative effect on the volatility of growth (see the 
column).
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Table 1.11. Direct and Indirect Effects of Political Instability/Financial Development on
Economic Growth (Real GDP Growth). (P)ARCH estimates
Panel A. Direct Effect:  = 1 = 0
k    1 
Informal Political Instability
Anti-Government Demos 5:73
(1:43)
0:23
(2:67)
0:42
(4:15)
 0:018
(7:49)
l=4
0:017
(4:78)
l=4
1:00 
Guerilla Warfare 8:22
(0:67)
0:27
(2:76)
0:18
(1:75)
 0:005
(2:07)
l=3
  1:10 
Strikes 12:09
(0:89)
0:27
(2:77)
0:18
(1:80)
 0:006
(3:77)
l=3
  1:00 
Financial Development
Private Deposits/GDP 15:79
(1:13)
0:29
(2:95)
0:19
(1:90)
0:07
(2:22)
l=1
  1:10 
M3/GDP 7:15
(0:60)
0:31
(3:38)
0:18
(1:58)
0:18
(2:19)
l=3
  1:10 
Panel B. Indirect Effect:  = 1 = 0
k    1 
Formal Political Instability
Cabinet Changes 0:94
(0:18)
0:24
(2:39)
0:25
(2:52)
 0:008
(2:56)
l=5
  1:10 
Constitutional Changes 0:65y
(1:57)
0:27
(2:91)
0:30
(2:76)
 0:011
(2:91)
l=4
  1:20 
Legislative Elections 2:03y
(1:75)
0:32
(4:10)
0:28
(2:15)
 0:006
(1:67)
l=2
 0:004
(0:99)
l=2
1:00 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + yt 1 + xi;t l + 1Dit lxit l + "t;
h

2
t = ! +  j "t 1 j +xit l + 1Dit lxit l .We include a second dummy (Dit) with estimated coefcient 0:002(0:53).
yestimates for standard deviation.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
Comment: Informal instability (anti-government demos, guerilla warfare and strikes) has a negative effect
on growth whereas nancial development (private deposits/GDP and M3/GDP) affects growth positively
(see the  column in panel A). Formal instability (cabinet and constitutional changes and legislative
elections) has a negative effect on the volatility of growth (see the  column in panel B).
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Table 1.12. The short- and long-run effects of Informal Political Instability/Financial De-
velopment on Economic Growth (Real GDP Growth)
  
Panel A. Informal Political Instability
Anti government Demos  0:002
(0:43)
l=4
 0:012
(0:26)
 0:71
(5:30)
Guerilla Warfare  0:007
(2:86)
l=3
 0:007
(2:06)
 0:68
(6:02)
Strikes  0:004
(1:70)
l=3
 0:006
1:71
 0:67
(6:18)
Panel B. Financial Development
Private Deposits/GDP  0:02
(0:83)
l=3
 0:05
(1:26)
 0:69
(6:19)
M3/GDP  0:10
(1:82)
l=5
0:06
(0:54)
 0:69
(6:10)
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the
following model:
yt = xi;t l + (yt 1   c  xi;t 1) + "t;
 (l is the order of the lag) and  capture the short-
and long-run effects respectively.  indicates the
speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
Comment: The short- and long-effects of informal instability (guerilla warfare and strikes) on growth are
negative (see the  and & columns in Panel A). Financial development (M3/GDP) affects growth (negatively)
only in the short-run.
Chapter 2
Non-Linear Econometric Evidence on
Growth and Volatility in Argentina since 1890
2.1 Introduction
The general economic trend since the Industrial Revolution has clearly been one of eco-
nomic betterment. Since 1850, a sustained increase in living standards is evident across
the globe. Comparing the situation in 1900 with that in 2000, one can identify four dif-
ferent types of country trajectories. A handful of countries were rich or developed in,
say, year 1900, and remain rich or developed in year 2000 (for example, the U.S. and
the U.K.) A few other countries were developing in 1900, but turned around and by year
2000 were among the developed countries. Examples of this second group are Japan and
most of the European periphery (including Portugal, Italy and Spain.) The vast majority
of countries belongs to a third group of countries, those that were relatively poor in year
1900 and remain relatively poor or developing in year 2000. The fourth group of coun-
tries encompasses those that were developed in 1900 and are developing in 2000. Only
one country falls into this category and that is Argentina.
Although placed among the highest incomes per capita in the world in 1900, Argentina's
ratio to OECD income fell to 84 percent in 1950, 65 percent in 1973, and a mere 43 per-
cent in 1987. . .Argentina is therefore unique (della Paolera and Taylor, 2003, p. 5).
Unsurprisingly, this Argentine puzzle has received a great deal of attention and schol-
ars have identied several potential reasons, chiey among them nancial development,
political instability (or institutions), macroeconomic volatility, ination, trade openness,
public decit, and international nancial integration. Surprisingly, we nd no studies
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trying to quantify and assess the relative importance of this array of reasons. Hence this
paper tries to ll this gap.
Within a power-ARCH (PARCH) framework and using annual time series data for Ar-
gentina covering the period from 1896 to 2000, the aim of this paper is to put forward
answers to the following questions. What is the relationship between, on the one hand,
nancial development (domestic and international), public decits and ination, trade
openness and political instability and, on the other, economic growth and volatility? Are
the effects of these variables direct (on economic growth) or indirect (via the conditional
growth volatility)? Does the intensity and sign of these impacts vary over time? Does
the intensity of these effects vary with respect to short- versus long-run considerations?
Is the intensity of these effects constant across the different eras or phases of Argentine
economic history (in other words, are they independent from the main structural breaks
we estimate)?
This paper tries to contribute to our understanding of the main causes of economic
growth. Durlauf et al. (2005) and Acemoglu (2009) provide recent, authoritative surveys
that support the view that there seems to be dissatisfaction with the empirical growth lit-
erature. This paper tries to improve matters in this regard by focusing on one the most
undisputed and intriguing outliers (as opposed to follow the common practice of trying to
learn something about growth by focusing on the mean or median country). We believe
this study can further our understanding about economic growth because: (a) we study
only one individual country over a very long period of time with annual frequency data,
(b) we extensively use the economic history literature to guide our choice of potential
important reasons for the Argentine decline, (c) we choose an econometric methodology
that has been seldom used in the empirical growth literature despite the fact that it eas-
ily allow us to contrast the direct to the indirect (i.e., via the volatility channel) effects of
each of our candidate reasons, sort out the short- from the long-run impacts, and distill
2.1 Introduction 47
the consequences of accounting for important structural breaks on the robustness of our
key results.
Another important benet of our choice of econometric framework is that it helps shed-
ding light on an important and resilient puzzle on the relationship between output growth
and its volatility. While Ramey and Ramey (1995) show that growth rates are adversely
affected by volatility, Grier and Tullock (1989) argue that larger standard deviations of
growth rates are associated with larger mean rates. The majority of ARCH papers ex-
amining the growth-volatility link are restricted to these two key variables. That is, they
seldom assess whether the effects of the presence of other variables affect the relation
and, in the rare occasions that happens, they are usually ination and its volatility that
comes into play.30 One contribution of this paper is to study if and how the growth-
volatility relationship changes in light of a much wider set of variables. Note also that
the use of annual data allows us to perform a more appropriate test of the hypothesis
that predicts a positive effect of output variability and uncertainty on the growth rate of
output.31
Our results are presented following specic types of effects. That is, we discuss direct
(on mean economic growth), indirect (via volatility), dynamic (short and long-run) and
structural break effects. Moreover, in trying to satisfy both the time-series and economic
growth literature traditions (the former mostly univariate and the latter multivariate), for
each effect we report estimates for one variable at a time before discussing the full mul-
tivariate results.
As for the individual univariate direct effects on economic growth, we nd evidence for
direct inuences on real GDP growth from nancial development (ratio of private de-
30 For a comprehensive review of this literature see Fountas et al. (2006). In addition, Gillman and Kejak
(2005) bring together for comparison several main approaches to modeling the ination-growth effect by
nesting them within a general monetary endogenous growth model with both human and physical capital.
31 Black (1987) argues that investments in riskier technologies will be pursued only if the expected return on
these investments (expressed as the average rate of output growth) is large enough to compensate for the extra
risk. As real investment takes time to materialize, such an effect would be more likely to obtain in empirical
studies utilizing low-frequency data.
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posits to GDP), informal political instability,32 international nancial markets (interest
rate in the United Kingdom), trade openness and public decit. Equally importantly, we
nd no such evidence from formal political instability and ination rates. The multivari-
ate analysis helps to narrow down this set to the positive effect of nancial development
(private and savings banks deposits to GDP) and to the negative effect of informal po-
litical instability (guerilla warfare and general strikes), international nancial integration
and trade openness as major drivers of growth in Argentina since the 1890s.
How does this set of variables affect predicted growth volatility? Or in other words, how
do they affect growth indirectly through their impact on growth volatility)? The strongest
indirect impacts we nd from the univariate evidence are the volatility-increasing effects
of ination, public decit and the UK interest rate and the volatility-decreasing effects of
trade openness and constitutional changes. Importantly, however, our multivariate results
show that the most robust indirect effects are those from the last three variables.
Our investigation of the dynamic effects shows important differences in terms of short
and long run behavior of our key variables: informal political instability, public decit
and the UK interest rate affect growth negatively both in the short- and the long-run. The
effects of the former are larger in the short- than in the long-run. Those for nancial
development and trade openness are negative in the short- but positive in the long-run.
However, the effets of public decit and trade openness disappear in the multivariate
analysis.
Finally, we subjected all these results to the presence of structural breaks. This is a crucial
exercise given the very long-term nature of our data. We nd that our basic results remain
once we take into structural breaks into account, the notable exception being that the
(in)direct effects of (public decit)UK interest rates disappear once breaks are accounted
for.
32 We follow Campos and Karanasos (2008) in separating informal from formal poltical instability. The
former is dened as instability outside of the government realm and measured here as guerilla warfare, while
the latter is dened as instability within the government realm and measured in this paper by the number of
constitutional changes.
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In sum, our main results suggest that nancial development and political instability (or
institutions) exhibit the most robust rst-order effects on growth and volatility. We also
nd that trade openness and international nancial integration (proxied in this paper by
the UK interest rate) play important yet secondary roles because the effects of the former
do not extend to the long-run (that is, they are restricted to the short-run) and those of the
latter (direct effects) vanishing when structural breaks are fully accounted for.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the historical context for the paper by
documenting the decline of Argentina from a position of a rich or developed country in
year 1900 to that of a middle-income or developing country in year 2000. More im-
portantly, this section briey reviews the Argentinean historiography stressing the main
reasons that have been offered to explain the relative decline. Section 3 describes the
data and Section 4 provides details and justication for our econometric methodology.
Section 5 has our baseline econometric results and the results from various sensitivity
tests are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes and suggests directions for future
research.
2.2 The Argentine Riddle
Argentina was part of the Spanish colonial empire for about three centuries. Its name
as well as the name of its main river indicates that the colonizers had clear expecta-
tions: they expected it to become one of the main transport routes of Potosi silver from
what is today Bolivia to the then metropolis Spain. Argentina, as most of South Amer-
ica, became an independent country in the early XIXth century. Uncharacteristically,
Argentinean Independence was a rather complicated process. It started with the May
Revolution of 1810, continued through the July 9th declaration in 1816 (when the United
Spanish Provinces of South America declare independence from Spain, unilaterally) and
concludes in 1824 with the defeat of the Spanish Empire in the battle of Ayacucho. Char-
acteristically though, the following fty or so years were marked by severe political insta-
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bility. There was a long sequence of civil wars, mostly opposing the interests of Buenos
Aires (the capital) to those of the provinces (Lynch 1985). Economically, this is a period
of modest growth rates which ended with national unication. The Industrial Revolu-
tion in Europe fueled demand for primary products and provided new means to satisfy
it through important technological innovations: around 1875 the transportation of meat
from the other side of the world was made possible and it was made cheap.
There is little disagreement among economists that the period from 1875 to the eve of
World War I is the Golden Age, or the Belle Époque, of Argentinean economic his-
tory (Taylor, 1992; Sanz-Villarroya, 2007). Just to illustrate this, note that for the year
1913, della Paolera and Taylor (2003) estimate income per capita in Argentina to be (in
1992 US Dollars) around USD 3,797. They provide evidence that this gure is higher
than the corresponding gures for France and Germany (USD 3,452 and USD 3,134, re-
spectively) and is substantially higher than those for Spain or Italy. Massive inows of
foreign capital (physical as well as human) supported the rapid expansion of the exports
of primary products (grain, meat, wool and leather) which couple with favorable inter-
national conditions, ultimately fuelled very rapid rates of economic growth (Rock, 1985,
Cortes Conde, 2009). There is also little disagreement that the Argentina's uniqueness
is because no other country climbed down so dramatically from the selected group of
advanced, rich or developed countries.
The major disagreement among economic historians to this day is not whether but actu-
ally when (and, of course, why) this unchecked decline started. Some argue that it started
with the 1930 crisis (e.g., Diaz-Alejandro 1985), others argue for an earlier turning point
(for instance, Taylor suggests 1913), while Sanz-Villarroya (2005) estimates that the rst
important structural break for Argentina happens in 1899.33
33 Below we present and discuss our Bai-Perron estimates of the date of structural breaks in Argentinean
growth. We nd (and adjust our estimates accordingly below) evidence for two structural breaks: 1922 and
1964 (for a full treatment of this issue, see Campos et al. 2008).
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Irrespective of exactly when the decline started, its existence was not undisputed until
the immediate post II World War. In 1947 Argentina was still ranked the 10th country
in the world in terms of per capita income (Alston and Gallo, 2007, p. 6). della Paolera
and Taylor (2003) note that by 1900 Argentina's income per capita had risen from about
67 per cent of developed country-levels in 1870, to 90 percent in 1900, and 100 per cent
in 1913 Whatever its exact status in 1913, for all practical purposes Argentina was an
advance country (2003, p. 5). They also calculate that since then the ratio of Argentina's
income to OECD income fell to 84 percent in 1950, then to 65 percent in 1973, and then
to 43 percent in 1987. This ratio rebounds in the 1990s but again reverts with the 2001
crisis.34 Last, but not least, it should not go unnoticed that in a recent book on the Great
Depressions of the XXth Century (Kehoe and Prescott, 2007), Argentina is the only
country that has two chapters (out of 16) entirely and solely dedicated to its economy.
It is not surprising, therefore, that there is a vast literature on the Argentine puzzle, pro-
viding alternative explanations for its long-run relative economic decline. One argument
is that increased direct competition in international markets during and after WWI (es-
pecially from the other areas of new settlement, i.e. Australia and Canada) has an im-
portant role to play, as does the sharp decline in immigration and foreign capital inows.
One other argument is that its relative decline is well explained by the fact that the agri-
cultural frontier was reached much earlier in Argentina than in Australia and Canada.
Australia's restrictive immigration policy contrasts with Argentina's liberal one, which
has been blamed by Diaz-Alejandro (1985) among others, for the difculties in sustain-
ing and raising productivity levels. Solberg (1987) argues for another reason, this time in
terms of Argentina's adoption of a land distribution policy that favored large farm hold-
ings and sustained high levels of wealth inequality. In light of the very accommodating
migration policy, the large inows of workers end up concentrating in Buenos Aires and
gave rise to a well-organized and increasingly powerful worker's union movement. It
34 Growth was negative from 1999 onwards culminating with around -10% in year 2002. The 2001 crisis en-
tailed a default on large part of the external debt, devaluation, ination, and the freezing of bank accounts (the
corralito.) Riots, looting and anti-government demonstrations followed. See Kehoe (2003) for a discussion.
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sufces to say that this movement was intimately tangled with the Peron governments,
after WWII.
Finance has also received a great deal of attention in terms of its potential role in explain-
ing the Argentinean decline (della Paolera and Taylor, 1998). For example, Prados de
la Escosura and Sanz-Villarroya (2006) argue that contract intensive money is actually
the key factor in explaining the Argentinean puzzle. Taylor (2003) associates the Argen-
tine decline to extremely low savings rates (the high population dependency rate linked
to the immigration policy). This argument combines with Solberg's view and highlights
the issue of (restricted) access to nance as a way of perpetuating high inequality lev-
els. Moreover, the role of the nancial sector does not need to be limited to domestic or
national aspects. Many believe that there may have been excessive dependence on for-
eign capital in the Belle Époque (British foreign capital to be precise) and the associated
radical changes around WWI as an important cause of the Argentinean decline (Taylor,
1992).
Such radical shifts in market conditions extended from the nancial to the goods markets,
the emphasis here being on international trade. Until 1914, Argentina was an aggressive
exporter exhibiting extremely high levels of openness to international trade (measured as
the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP.) The data we use in this paper (more details
below) shows that this ratio exceeds 50% in the years immediately before WWI, with
a clearly declining trend in the inter-wars years (the ratio goes down from about 45%
to 20% in these twenty years), and it never exceeds 25% from 1945 to almost 2000. If
one believes that exports alone are a major driving force of economic growth, then these
numbers surely provide fuel to placing openness as a major reason for the Argentine
decline (Diaz-Alejandro, 1970). One important caveat that should be mentioned in this
context is that it is unclear (and still much debated) what were the reasons for such a
reversal. In particular, the debate is whether this was mainly the disruption and closing
up of international markets rst with WWI and then with the Great Depression, or was
it mainly the adoption of excessively protectionist policies by successive Argentinean
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governments. Note that these policies inspired and were later reinforced by the import
substitution model advocated by the leading Latin American economist of the time, Raul
Prebish (from Argentina.)
In addition to trade policies, many scholars believe that standard macroeconomic poli-
cies, in general, and their inconsistency and the resulting macroeconomic instability, in
particular, are also to blame. For instance, della Paollera et al. (2003) show how pub-
lic decits throughout Argentinean history (and ination, mostly since the 1970s), also
seem to play an important role in explaining the decline.
Although there is a large literature associating the long-run relative decline of the Ar-
gentinean economy with political and institutional factors,35 we are unaware of studies
that try to quantitatively evaluate this association. For instance, Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006) observe that: The political history of Argentina reveals an extraordinary pattern
where democracy was created in 1912, undermined in 1930, re-created in 1946, under-
mined in 1955, fully re-created in 1973, undermined in 1976, and nally reestablished
in 1983 (2006, p. 7). In a recent paper, Alston and Gallo (2007) identify the onset of
widespread electoral fraud in the 1930s as a turning point for the erosion of the rule of
law and one main reason for the Argentinean decline.
In what follows, we take these considerations on board in trying to provide a comprehen-
sive quantitative account of the relative importance of the main reasons often identied
with the Argentinean debacle, namely political instability, domestic nancial develop-
ment, trade openness, macroeconomic volatility (ination and public decits) and inte-
gration in the international nancial system.
35 See also della Paolera and Taylor (2003) and references therein.
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Fig. 2.8. Ratio of Argentina's GDP per Capita to Developed Countries' GDP per Capita,
1885-2003
Figure 1. Ratio of Argentina's  GDP per capita to Developed Countries' GDP per capita, 1885-2003
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2.3 Data
The data set we put together for this paper reects the main factors identied by eco-
nomic historians discussed above. The factors often associated with the relative eco-
nomic decline of Argentina are the following: nancial development, political instability
(or institutions), macroeconomic volatility, ination, trade openness, public decit, and
international nancial integration.
Our basic data source is the Cross National Time Series Data set (Banks 2005) which
contains historical series on income per capita and various dimensions of instability.36
This is a commercial database that has been extensively used in the scholarship on growth
and political instability (Durlauf et al., 2005.) Data are available yearly for Argentina
from 1896 until 2000, for various instability series, excluding the two World War years
(that is, 1914 to 1918 and 1939 to 1945).
36 We have obtained GDP growth and level gures from various other sources (as well as industrial output
series) and initial results (not reported) show that these different measures do not affect our results below.
2.3 Data 55
Fig. 2.9. Measures of Financial Development
Private deposits over GDP Savings banks deposits over GDP
Our two main measures of nancial development try to capture the efciency of the
nancial sector, not its relative size. The source for both is Mitchell (2003). The rst is
the bank deposits by the private sector over GDP (private deposits), which we believe is
a good proxy for the share of credit to the private sector over GDP. Our second measure
from Mitchell (2003) is the total deposits in savings banks over GDP. Given its more
restrictive nature and the fact that the exact denition of savings bank deposits contains
an unobservable legal element, we use this variable mostly for robustness check thereby
attaching greater weight to private deposits.37
We also explore the hypothesis that different types of political instability have different
effects on economic growth.38 This is done by further developing the distinction between
formal and informal political instability introduced in Campos and Karanasos (2008).
The distinction is based on whether or not different forms of instability originate from
37 For robustness we also use two measures of nancial development that reect depth. The rst indicator we
use is the ratio of M3 to GDP, from Alston and Gallo (2007). The main reason for considering this measure
is that it has been used extensively in the nance-growth literature (see Campos et al. 2011). We also use a
narrower version of this variable (M1 over GDP) to further check for the robustness of our results (source of
data is Bordo et al., 2001). For the Figures and the results see the Appendix in Campos et al. ( 2011a).
38 Another puzzle we are interested in regards the duration of the political instability effects: while the con-
ventional wisdom is that these are severe in the long-run, placeCityCampos and Nugent (2002) and Murdoch
and Sandler (2004) argue that they are signicantly stronger in the shorter- than in the long-run. In placeCity-
Campos and Nugent (2002), the long-run effect vanishes when the African countries are excluded from the
estimation and when institutions are taken into account.
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within the political system: guerrilla warfare are thus informal political instability, while
constitutional reforms are classied as formal instability. In addition to the obvious pol-
icy implications this taxonomy generates (in a literature in which policy implications are
scarce), this distinction allows us to investigate questions that naturally have not been in-
vestigated so far, such as whether or not the effects of some forms of informal instability
are more severe in the short- than in the long-run, and whether or not the main effect of
formal instability occurs through growth volatility. One of our hypotheses is that the an-
swer to these questions is the same (yes) and below we provide further justication as
well as full econometric support.
Our informal political instability variables39 are strikes (a general strike of 1,000 or
more workers involving more multiple employers and aimed at government policies) and
guerrilla warfare (armed activity, sabotage, or bombings by independent bands of citizens
and aimed at regime overthrow). These series are available since 1919 (Figure 2.10).
Fig. 2.10. Measures of Informal Political Instability
Guerilla Warfare Strikes
Our formal political instability variables (Figure 2.11) are as follows: the number of
constitutional changes and legislative elections.40
39 Our political instability variables enter one by one in the econometric framework we use, so our results
are not affected by the taxonomy and as such it is used simply to facilitate the interpretation.
40 For robustness we use two more measures of informal political instability: annual number of anti-
government demonstrations (peaceful public gatherings of at least 100 people) and assassinations (dened
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Fig. 2.11. Measures of Formal Political Instability
Constitutional changes Legislative elections
Our measures of ination, trade openness and public decit are from Alston and Gallo
(2007). Ination is measured as yearly changes in the consumer price index (CPI). Public
decit is proxied as the ratio of the federal decit to GDP, but it does exclude state-owned
enterprises.41 Trade openness is measured in standard fashion as the ratio of imports plus
exports to GDP. Alston and Gallo (2007) have carried out various necessary adjustments
to underlying data from Venganzones and Winograd (1997), from the Ministry of Econ-
omy of Argentina and from the IMF's International Financial Statistics.
Finally, international nancial sector developments have also been repeatedly blamed
for Argentina's poor economic performance. There are two aspects of this issue that are
often said to play a role: the rst being the credit crunch associated with the onset ofWWI
and with the Great Crisis of 1929, and the second being the change in global nancial
leadership which went from London to New York during this period. We must say that
we proceed as if the second aspect is less important, but also that we are absolutely sure
it is much more difcult to measure than the rst. Thus, in standard fashion in this type
as politically motivated murders or attempted murders of a high government ofcial or politician). We also
use two more measures of formal political instability: the number of cabinet changes and the size of the
cabinet (see Figure 2.14 in Appendix).
41 Because the original ination series contain a number of obvious outliers between the years 1987 and
1991 (reaching almost 5,000% in 1989), we lower the relative weight of these observations for estimation.
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Fig. 2.12. Other Variables
Inflation Trade Openess
Public Deficit UK Interest Rate
of study, we use the level of interest rates in the United Kingdom as our proxy for the
overall conditions in international nancial markets (the source of these data is Bordo
et al. 2001). Because the transition to the U.S. nancial leadership is often said to be
even less benecial to Argentina (mainly because American investors often refrained
to take managerial control of Argentine rms), our estimates for this effect should be
conservative and if at all biased will show a smaller than actual effect of the international
nancial market in the Argentinean decline.
2.4 Econometric Framework
The PARCH model was introduced by Ding, Granger and Engle (1993) and quickly
gained currency in the nance literature.42 Let growth ( yt) follow a white noise process
42 See, for example, Karanasos and Kim (2006). Karanasos and Schurer, (2005, 2008) use this process to
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augmented by a risk premium dened in terms of volatility:
yt = c+ kht + xit + t; (2.10)
with
t = eth
1
2
t ;
where xit is either the political instability or the nancial development variable or one of
the other explanatory variables.43
In addition, fetg are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) random variables
withE(et) = E(e2t 1) = 0;while ht is positive with probability one and is a measurable
function of the sigma-algebra
P
t 1, which is generated by fyt 1; yt 2; : : :g:
In other words, ht denotes the conditional variance of growth. In particular, ht is speci-
ed as an asymmetric PARCH(1,1) process with lagged growth included in the variance
equation:
h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1f (et 1) + h

2
t 1 + xit + 
yt l; (2.11)
with
f (et 1) = [jet 1j   &et 1] ;
where  (with  > 0) is the heteroscedasticity parameter,  and  are the ARCH and
GARCH coefcients respectively, & with j&j < 1 is the leverage term and 
 is the level
term for the lth lag of growth.44 In order to distinguish the general PARCH model from
model output growth and ination respectively.
43 Because the original nancial development, openness, public decit and country-regionplace UK interest
rate variables, are I(1), they enter our models in rst differences.
44 The model imposes a Box-Cox power transformation of the conditional standard deviation process and
the asymmetric absolute residuals.
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a version in which  is xed (but not necessarily equal to two) we refer to the latter as
(P)ARCH.
The PARCH model increases the exibility of the conditional variance specication by
allowing the data to determine the power of growth for which the predictable structure
in the volatility pattern is the strongest. This feature in the volatility process has impor-
tant implications for the relationship between political instability, nance, ination, and
growth and its volatility. There is no strong reason for assuming that the conditional vari-
ance is a linear function of lagged squared errors. The common use of a squared term
in this role is most likely to be a reection of the normality assumption traditionally in-
voked. However, if we accept that growth data are very likely to have a non-normal
error distribution, then the superiority of a squared term is unwarranted and other power
transformations may be more appropriate.
The PARCH model may also be viewed as a standard GARCH model for observations
that have been changed by a sign-preserving power transformation implied by a (modi-
ed) PARCH parameterization. He and Teräsvirta (1999) emphasize that if the standard
Bollerslev type of model is augmented by the heteroscedasticity parameter (the power
term), the estimates of the ARCH and GARCH coefcients almost certainly change.45
We present our main reasons in three interdependent blocs: the direct, indirect and dy-
namic (short and long-run) effects. We proceed with the estimation of the PARCH(1,1)
model in equations (2.10) and (2.11) in order to take into account the serial correlation
observed in the levels and power transformations of our time series data. The tables
below report the estimated parameters of interest for the period 1896-2000. These were
obtained by quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) as implemented in EVIEWS.
The best tting specication is chosen according to the Likelihood Ratio (LR) results and
the minimum value of the Information Criteria (IC) (not reported). Once heteroscedas-
45 Karanasos and Schurer (2008) nd that the relationship between the variable and its conditional variance
is sensitive to changes in the values of the heteroscedasticity parameter. Put differently, the estimated values
of the in-mean and the level effects are fragile to changes in the power term.
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ticity has been accounted for, our specications appear to capture the serial correlation
in the power transformed growth series.46
Our set of variables tries to reect the different explanations for the Argentinean puzzle
previously put forward by economic historians. This set comprises domestic and inter-
national nancial developments, informal and formal political instability, ination and
public decit, and the degree of openness to international trade. In order to study the di-
rect effects of our set of explanatory variables, we specify model 1 with  = 
 = 0 in
equation (2.11), while model 2 with  = 0 in equation (2.10) allows us to investigate
their indirect impacts on growth. 47
2.5 Empirical Results
Our results are presented following specic types of effects. That is, we discuss direct
(on mean economic growth), indirect (via volatility), dynamic (short and long-run) and
structural break effects. Moreover, in trying to satisfy both the time-series and economic
growth literature traditions (the former mostly univariate and the latter multivariate), for
each effect we report estimates for one variable at a time before discussing the full mul-
tivariate results.
2.5.1 Direct Growth Effects
Table 2.13 reports the results from our estimation of the (P)ARCH(1,1) model for each
one of the elements in our set of explanatory variables. The parameter we are most in-
terested in is  (in the third column.) The results reveal that the direct effect of nancial
46 For all cases, we nd that the leverage term is insignicant, so we re-estimate our models excluding this
parameter.
47 As indicated in the previous section we jointly estimate the conditional mean and variance of growth in
order to take into account PARCH effects. At the same time, with a limited number of time-series observa-
tions the non-linear structure should not be overextended as this imposes excessive requirements on the data.
Therefore, we estimate the direct (model 1) and indirect (model 2) effects separately.
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Table 2.13. Direct Effects on Economic Growth: (P)ARCH estimates, Argentina
1896-2003
xit # k    
Ination 1:05
(2:42)
 4 10 5
(0:71)
0:48
(4:34)
0:69
(7:66)
0:80 
Trade Openness 0:90
(1:95)
 0:060
(1:73)
0:77
(3:63)
0:47
(2:28)
0:80 
Public Decit 0:72
(1:94)
 0:070
(3:13)
0:95
(3:05)
0:43
(2:00)
0:90 
UK Interest Rate 0:94
(3:86)
 0:001
(0:37)
0:82
(3:64)
0:44
(1:61)
0:90 
Guerilla Warfare 1:00
(3:69)
 0:001
(4:35)
0:77
(5:43)
0:47
(3:13)
0:90 
Constitutional Changes 1:80
(1:99)
 0:003
(1:35)
0:56
(3:01)
0:48
(1:25)
0:80 
Private Deposits/GDP 0:76
(2:66)
0:980
(9:21)
0:70
(4:99)
0:57
(4:94)
0:80 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + xit + "t; h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 j et 1 j +h

2
t 1
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
development (private deposits) on per capita economic growth rates is positive and statis-
tically signicant, those of informal political instability (guerrilla warfare), trade open-
ness, and public decit are negative,48 whereas the effects of formal political instability,
international nancial development (interest rate in the United Kingdom) and ination
are not statistically signicant, at conventional levels. 49
As for the in-mean parameter (k), notice that in all cases the estimates are statistically
signicant and positive which is in line with the theoretical argument of Black (1987).
Also the power term coefcients  are rather stable, with the Akaike IC (AIC) criteria
choosing a (P)ARCH specication with power term ranging from 0:8 (e.g., ination) to
0:9 (e.g., public decit.) 50
48 This result for trade openness is clearly unexpected. Notice, however, that we show below that its short-
run effect is negative but the long-run impact is positive (see Table 2.17 in below).
49 We also estimate bivariate regressions (results not reported) to examine the joint effect of informal political
instability and nancial development on growth. It appears that anti-government demos, assasinations and
M3/GDP have no impact on growth. Therefore, in what follows we only use guerrilla warfare, strikes and
nancial efciency. The results are not reported for the sake of space. They are available in the Appendix.
50 Notice that in all our estimations the ARCH and GARCH parameters ( and ) are highly signicant in
the majority of the cases. Also the estimated power term coefcients are stable ranging from 0.80 to 1.10.
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Table 2.14. Direct Effect of Guerilla Warfare/Strikes, Private Deposits/Savings Bank De-
posits, UK Interest Rate, and Trade Openness on Economic Growth. (P)ARCH estimates
k 1 2 3 4   
Guerilla Warfare
Private
Deposits/GDP 0:81(2:06)
 0:001
(3:32)
0:328
(1:98)
 0:001
(1:40)
 0:011
(1:18)
0:81
(4:42)
0:51
(4:31)
1:00 
Savings Bank
Deposits/GDP 0:75(1:54)
 0:001
(2:63)
0:147
(2:16)
 0:004
(7:18)
 0:014
(2:50)
0:96
(5:07)
0:52
(7:46)
1:10 
Strikes
Private
Deposits/GDP 0:74(2:15)
 0:002
(2:14)
0:263
(1:69)
 0:001
(1:50)
 0:046
(6:89)
0:89
(4:60)
0:43
(2:86)
0:80 
Savings Bank
Deposits/GDP 0:73(1:62)
 0:001
(2:01)
0:308
(1:79)
 0:004
(5:17)
 0:127
(1:46)
1:00
(3:87)
0:51
(5:05)
1:10 
This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + 1x
(pi)
it + 2x
(fd)
it + 3xuk;t + 4xto;t + "t; h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 j et 1 j +h

2
t 1;
where x
(pi)
it is either guerilla warfare or strikes, x
(fd)
it is either private deposits/GDP
or savings bank deposits/GDP, xuk;t is UK interest rate, and xto;t is trade openess.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
How robust are these baseline individual results? As discussed above, previous research
on Argentina has given considerable weight to the roles of informal political instability
and nancial development. It is not as surprising therefore that these are the two dominant
inuences since they are the ones we estimate with greatest precision (more signicant).
One robustness test would be to investigate whether or not such powerful and precise
effects obtain in the presence of the other explanatory variables. In other words, we
want to be sure that they remain if we add to the baseline specication any of our four
additional variables. 51
Table 2.14 presents the results when we add all four regressors. That is, informal po-
litical instability, domestic and international nancial development, and trade openness.
Both guerilla warfare and strikes still show the expected negative and statistically signif-
icant direct impact (see the 1 column). As for the effect of nancial efciency, it is still
51 Our bivariate/trivariate analysis (results not reported) shows that the direct effect of nancial efciency is
not affected by the addition of any of the four explanatory variables to the model, with both indicators still
showing a positive and signicant effect and the same conclusion remains for the case of guerilla warfare
and government strikes (see Tables 2.24-2.29 in Appendix). Interestingly, the direct negative effect of public
decit disappears when we control for either informal political instability or private deposits. The results also
reinforce that ination has no direct impact on growth (see Tables 2.26-2.27 in Appendix).
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positive and statistically signicant (see the 2 column). It is worth noting that the inu-
ences of the UK interest rate and the trade openness on growth are qualitatively altered
by the presence of informal political instability and nancial efciency. In particular, the
signicance of their inuence is altered by changes in the choice of the informal politi-
cal instability and nancial efciency variables. More specically, the negative impact of
UK interest rate on growth remains when we include in the model the impact of savings
bank deposits on growth but it disappears when we include private deposits. Similarly,
trade openness affects growth negatively only in two out of the four cases. (see the 3
and 4 columns in Table 2.14).52
In summary, we nd that the main explanatory factors, solely in terms of their direct
effects on economic growth in Argentina, turn out to be domestic (mainly nancial ef-
ciency) and international (UK interest rate) nancial development, and trade openness.
Although informal political instability also seems to play an important role, we nd that
only one aspect seems to survive our battery of sensitivity tests, that being guerrilla war-
fare and to a lesser extend strikes. We now turn to the investigation of the indirect effects.
2.5.2 Indirect Effects (Via Growth Volatility)
One of the main advantages of the (P)ARCH framework is that it allow us to study not
only the direct growth effects from the full set of explanatory variables described above,
but also their indirect effects on economic growth through the predicted component of
growth volatility (conditional on its past values). As we can see from Tables 2.13 and
2.14 above and from Tables 2.15 and 2.16 in this section, the effect of conditional or
predicted volatility on growth is in all cases positive (k > 0) and statistically signicant
at conventional levels. By construction, an increase in the unexpected volatility should
decrease economic growth rates?. In the current section, we present our results for such
52 Interestingly, this is not the case when we use a trivariate analysis. That is, when we include as a regressor
either UK interest rate or trade openess (but not both) then we nd the expected negative and signicant
inuence in all four cases (see Table 2.28 in Appendix). Finally, as with the bivariate analysis in the trivariate
one, public decit and ination have no effect on growth (see Table 2.29 in Appendix).
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indirect effects in two parts and follow the same format as before: we rst discuss the
indirect effects of each one of our explanatory variables and then we present results for
our complete set (that is, including all the main explanatory variables).
Table 2.15 reports the estimation results for each one of the elements in our data set for
what we call the indirect effect, which is the effect on growth via the volatility channel.53
The parameter we are most interested in is  (in the fth column.) Our results show
that the indirect effects of trade openness and formal political instability (in this case,
constitutional changes) on the conditional volatility of per capita economic growth rates
are negative and statistically signicant whereas those of ination, public decit and
UK interest rate are positive and signicant. Interestingly, the volatility of growth is
independent of changes in nancial development and formal political instability.
Larger public decits, escalating ination rates and (to a lesser extent) higher UK interest
rates are associated with a larger fraction of growth volatility that is anticipated by the
relevant economic agents. And the larger the share of the total growth volatility that is
anticipated, the higher the per capita growth rates we observe. Therefore, ination, UK
interest rate and public decits register a negative direct effect on growth (the rst two
an insignicant one) but a positive and substantial impact on the expected or conditional
share of growth volatility (see Tables 2.13 and 2.15).
On the other hand, we nd that exogenous increases in trade openness has a negative
and signicant impact on the conditional growth volatility (recall that the direct effect is
also negative). This result reects one of the costs many economists associate with trade
liberalization efforts: in the short-run, changes in the share of trade in GDP decrease the
conditional or expected share of growth volatility (or, equivalently, increase the amount
of growth volatility that economic agents are not able to anticipate.) Therefore such a
decrease in conditional volatility driven by trade openness translate into lower rates of
economic growth (because k > 0).
53 In the expressions for the conditional variances reported in the tables, various lags of growth (from 1 to
12) were considered with the best model (l = 6) chosen on the basis of the minimum value of the AIC.
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Last, and also of interest, is that we could not detect any signicant indirect effects from
domestic nancial development (proxied by private deposits) or informal political insta-
bility (proxied by the occurrence of guerilla warfare). There is no evidence that such
factors affect growth in Argentina indirectly, through the conditional volatility of growth.
Recall, however, that we do nd that the direct effects of both domestic nancial devel-
opment and guerrilla warfare are substantial (see Table 2.14).
It is also worth noting that since the estimates for the in-mean parameter (k) and the level
coefcient (
) in Table 2.15 are statistically signicant and positive they offer strong
strong evidence for a positive bidirectional feedback relationship between growth and its
volatility,54 which seems robust to the presence of various nance and instability vari-
ables.
We now proceed by investigating the robustness of these results. Specically, and for
comparability purposes, we ask how the results from the various aspects of nancial
development and political instability change if we add to the baseline model the complete
set of explanatory variables (as opposed to assess their effects one by one).55
Table 2.16 shows that after adding this full set of controls, the indirect negative effect of
formal political instability remains statistically signicant throughout. Focusing our at-
tention rst on the 1 and k parameters, note that both forms of formal instability (in this
case, the occurrence of changes in the constitution or of legislative elections in a given
year) are found to affect conditional volatility negatively 1 (1 < 0). Since k > 0, con-
54 The existing empirical literature focuses mainly on the effect of volatility on growth, see Fountas et al.
(2006), Fountas and Karanasos (2007), Conrad et al. (2010) and Conrad and Karanasos (2011).
55 For the sake of space, we do not report the results for the intermediate steps (namely, between the results
for one by one variables and for all variables together). These results for the indirect effects for each pair of
variables and each three are thus available upon request. When we include in the variance of growth the UK
interest rate and/or trade openess, and one of the four alternative measures of formal political instability the
effects of cabinet changes and cabinet size disappear (see tables 2.30-2.31 and 2.34 in Appendix). Therefore,
in what follows we only use constitutional changes and legislative elections. Moreover when we control
for formal political instability ination has no impact on growth volatility (see Table 2.33 in Appendix). In
addition, our bivariate/trivariate analysis shows that the effects of the UK interest rate, trade openess and
public decit are not affected by the addition of any of the four measures of formal political instability (see
tables 2.30-2.32 and 2.34 in Appendix).
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Table 2.15. Indirect effect on Economic Growth. (P)ARCH estimates
xit # k    
 
Ination 1:66
(3:03)
0:60
(5:36
0:54
(7:52)
5 10 5
(2:98)
0:24
(2:44)
0:80 
Trade Openness 1:65
(2:72)
0:75
(6:41)
0:28
(0:16)
 0:200
(3:48)
0:19
(2:69)
0:80 
Public Decit 1:02
(2:73)
0:69
(5:45)
0:45
(5:15)
0:120
(2:44)
0:29
(4:76)
0:80 
UK Interest Rate 1:55
(2:26)
0:50
(2:98)
0:55
(5:35)
0:004
(1:57)
0:15
(4:67)
1:00 
Guerilla Warfare 1:12
(2:46)
0:73
(4:80)
0:46
(4:00)
0:001
(0:82)
0:10
(2:00)
0:90 
Constitutional Changes 1:18
(1:94)
0:69
(4:40)
0:45
(4:15)
 0:008
(3:40)
0:18
(3:75)
1:00 
Private Deposits/GDP 2:05
(2:23)
0:41
(3:04)
0:62
(6:75)
0:580
(0:53)
0:40
(5:69)
0:80 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + "t; h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 j et 1 j +h

2
t 1 + xit + 
yt 6
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
stitutional changes affect growth negatively as well. Economic agents have severe dif-
culties in anticipating the consequences of changes in the rules of the game (constitutions)
and in the composition of the legislature following democratic elections. Such changes
increase the share of unanticipated uncertainty and this accordingly reduces growth. Of
course, these results reinforce the notion that the type of political instability matters vis-
à-vis economic growth: while informal may have a direct effect, the impact of formal
instability operates indirectly, via growth volatility.
There a number of additional important results from Table 2.16. In terms of the effects of
nancial globalization (or, more specically, of the international dimensions of nancial
development), we nd that they tend to be positive and signicant (2 > 0) on antici-
pated growth volatility when proxied by the interest rate in the United Kingdom. This is
intuitive as reductions in the UK interest rate translate into the reduction of the price of
money internationally with the latter pricing accounting for risk. Moreover, the impact
of public decit on volatility also remains positive (4 > 0) and statistically signicant.
On the other hand, we nd evidence that increases in trade openness are associated with
decreases in conditional volatility (3 < 0) of per capita growth in Argentina.
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Table 2.16. Indirect Effect of Constitutional Changes/Legislative Elections, UK Interest
Rate, Trade Openness, and Public Decit on Economic Growth. (P)ARCH estimates
k   1 2 3 4 
 
Constitutional Changes 1:52
(3:09)
0:46
(4:04)
0:69
(7:03)
 0:02
(6:19)
0:01
(2:99)
 0:17
(5:91)
0:08
(2:96)
0:04
(0:74)
l=7
1:00 
Legislative Elections 5:24
(1:39)
0:13
(0:76)
0:96
(7:72)
 0:01
(1:74)
0:01
(2:43)
 0:11
(2:35)
0:12
(3:69)
 0:06
(0:49)
l=6
0:90 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model: yt = c+ kht + "t;
h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 j et 1 j +h

2
t 1 + 1x
(pi)
it + 2xuk;t + 3xto;t + 4xpd;t + 
yt l,
where x
(pi)
it indicates either constitutional changes or legislative elections,
xuk;t is UK interest rate, xto;t is trade openness, and xpd;t is public decit.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
In summary, we nd strong evidence that both informal political instability (constitu-
tional changes) and trade openness have a negative indirect (via volatility) impact on
growth whereas UK interest rate and public decit affect it positively. No other vari-
ables in our set of explanatory variables seem to exhibit equally robust estimates of their
indirect effects.
2.5.3 Dynamic Aspects
In this section we investigate how short- and long-run considerations help us rene our
baseline results. Another potential benet from this exercise is that the required use of
lags may help ameliorate any lingering concerns about endogeneity. In order to estimate
short- and long- run relationships we employ the following error correction (P)ARCH
form
yt = + xi;t l + '(yt 1   c  xi;t 1) + "t; (2.12)
where  and  capture the short and long-run effects respectively, and ' is the speed of
adjustment to the long-run relationship.56 This is accomplished by embedding a long-
56 As pointed out by Loayaza and Rancière (2006) the requirements for the validity of this methodology are
that: i) there exists a long-run relationship between the variables of interest and, ii) the dynamic specication
of the model is sufciently augmented so that the regressors are strictly exogenous and the resulting residual
is serially uncorrelated.
2.5 Empirical Results 69
run growth regression into an ARDL model.57 In other words, the term in parenthesis
contains the long-run growth regression, which acts as a forcing equilibrium condition
yt = c+ xit + ut; (2.13)
where t is I(0). The lag of the rst difference of either the political instability or -
nancial development variable or one of the explanatory variables (xi;t l) characterizes
the short-run effect. The condition for the existence of a long-run relationship (dynamic
stability) requires that the coefcient on the error-correction term be negative and not
lower than  2 (that is,  2 < ' < 0). We also take into account the PARCH effects by
specifying the error term ut as follows
"t = eth
1
2
t ; (2.14)
where
h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 jet 1j + h

2
t 1: (2.15)
Table 2.17 presents the results on the estimation of short and long-run parameters linking
the four explanatory variables with growth. In all cases, the estimated coefcient on
the error correction term (') lies within the dynamically stable range ( 2; 0). From
investigating whether dynamic considerations affect our conclusions, we nd important
differences in terms of short and long-run behavior of our explanatory variables, more
specically, while the effects (negative) of informal political instability, public decit and
UK interest rate are similar in the long- and short-run, that of the nancial development
and trade openness are negative in the short- and positive in the long-run (see the  and 
columns). Interestingly, the effect of ination is not statistical signicant.
For the sake of space, we do not report the results for the intermediate steps (namely,
between the results for one by one variables and for all variables together). These results
57 For details on the ARDL approach, see Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran and Shin (1999).
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Table 2.17. The short- and long-run effects on Growth
xit #  '    
Ination  5 10 5
(0:75)
l=0
 0:88
(9:98)
0:0001
(1:53)
0:91
(5:22)
0:42
(4:81)
0:90 
Trade Openness  0:1000
(1:45)
l=3
 0:58
(4:83)
0:2500
(2:01)
0:65
(5:16)
0:61
(7:64)
0:90 
Public Decit  0:1100
(9:08)
l=0
 0:60
(25:94)
 0:1700
(5:88)
1:42
(4:08)
0:22
(2:16)
0:80 
UK Interest Rate  0:0150
(4:77)
l=5
 0:39
(7:47)
 0:0160
(4:21)
1:27
(3:81)
0:14
(0:95)
0:90 
Guerilla Warfare  0:0014
(3:38)
l=3
 0:60
(7:20)
 0:0007
(2:59)
1:10
(4:19)
0:36
(3:59)
0:90 
Private
Deposits/GDP  1:3500(1:81)
l=5
 0:44
(4:64)
0:9399
(23:72)
0:37
(2:63)
0:80
(6:69)
0:90
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = + xi;t l + '(yt 1   c  xi;t 1) + "t;
h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 jet 1j + h

2
t 1.  (l is the order of the lag)
and  capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
' indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
for each pair of variables and each three are thus available upon request.58 Table 2.18
presents the results when we add all four regressors. That is, informal political instability,
domestic and international nancial development, and trade openness.
The estimates of ' lie within the range  0:68 to  0:36. Regarding the short and long-
run estimates, i and  i we focus our analysis rst on those obtained from the informal
political instability variables. All four estimates of the short-run coefcients (see the 1
column) are highly signicant and negative and their absolute values are higher than the
corresponding values for the long-run coefcients (see the 1 column). This provides
supporting evidence for the notion that the duration of the political instability effect does
indeed matter and, for guerilla warfare and general strikes, such effects tend to be con-
siderably stronger in the short- than in the long-run as previously noted by Campos and
58 The results from the bivariate analysis suggest that from the four informal political instability variables
only guerilla warfare and strikes affect signicantly growth in the long-run (see Table 2.37 in Appendix).
That is when we control for the nancial development the long-run effects of anti-government demos and
assassinations disappear. Similarly, M3/GDP has no long-run effect on growth in three out of the four cases.
Finally, when we control for informal political instability and nancial efciency the effect of public decit
on growth disappears.
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Nugent (2002), Murdoch and Sandler (2004), Campos and Karanasos (2008) and Cam-
pos et al. (2011). As with the univariate analysis both the short- and long-run effects of
the UK interest rate are negative (see the 3 and 3 columns).
Next we discuss the results regarding the nancial development variables. In the long-
run, we nd that nancial development affects growth positively (see the 2 column).
This result is very much in line with the large empirical literature reviewed by Levine
(2005) and it is interesting we can reproduce it with our rather different methodology.
Maybe more interestingly, the short-run coefcients tell a very differently story: we nd
that the short-run impact of nancial development on growth is negative and signicant
(see the 2 column). Thus our results square well with recent ndings by Loayaza and
Rancière (2006), among others, in that the sign of the relationship between economic
growth and nancial development depends on whether the movements are temporary
or permanent (the effect being negative in the former and positive in the latter.) It is
noteworthy that the stronger long-run effects we obtain are for savings bank deposits.
Finally, the long-run impact of trade openness disappears.
In summary, in the short-run all four variables have a negative effect on growth. In the
long-run informal political instability and the UK interest rate affect growth negatively
whereas the impact of nancial efciency turns to positive and that of trade openness
disappears.
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2.5.4 Structural Breaks
One nal important robustness test regards the role of structural breaks. We use the
methodology developed by Bai and Perron (2003) to examine whether there are any
structural breaks in growth, its volatility, the various political instability series and the
rst differences of the four nancial development variables. Bai and Perron (2003) ad-
dress the problem of testing for multiple structural changes under very general conditions
on the data and the errors. In addition to testing for the existence of breaks, these statistics
identify the number and location of multiple breaks.
In the case of the economic growth series (and, interestingly, also for growth volatility)
the Bai-Perron methodology supports two structural break points.59The rst occurs for
year 1922 and the second for year 1964. For our political instability variables, we nd no
structural breaks for the guerilla warfare and constitutional changes series,60 and we also
nd no breaks in the four nancial development variables.
However, our Bai-Perron results support that general strikes have one structural break,
which is dated for year 1955. This is a result of great importance: 1955 is the year of the
military coup in which President Juan Domingo Perón was overthrown by the military
thus concluding a dening chapter in Argentine history. Further, we also nd one struc-
tural break in legislative elections (it is dated 1949).61
59 As a measure of volatility we use the power transformed absolute growth jytjd
60 Our data shows no guerilla warfare before 1948 and after 1977.
61 We also nd no structural breaks for assassinations and cabinet changes. Further, we also nd one struc-
tural break in cabinet size (it is dated 1946) while in anti-government demonstrations we nd two breaks
dated 1954 and 1972 (see graph 2.15 in the Appendix).
With arguably one exception (anti-government demonstrations in 1972, which were motivated by de-
mands for the return of Perón from exile), all the structural breaks in our political instability series occur
during Perón governments. Perón was elected president three times. His rst term is from 1946 to 1952. He
is re-elected in 1951, his second term starts in 1952 and ends abruptly in 1955. His third term is between 1973
(allowed to return from country-regionplaceSpain after 18-year exile) and 1974 (suffers fatal heart attack.)
Although marked by severe economic problems, the second term (1951 to 1955) is more often remembered
by the political instability (the various terrorist attacks being a sad prelude to the so-called Dirty War of
1970s.)
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In what follows, we incorporate dummy variables in the equations ( 2.10), ( 2.11) ( 2.12)
and ( 2.15), thus taking into account breaks in the political instability variables and in the
volatility of growth. First, we introduce the following notation. D1t, D2t are (intercept)
dummies dened asD1t,D2t = 1 in the periods 1922-2000 and 1964-2000, respectively,
and D1t, D2t = 0 otherwise. Similarly, Dit is a (slope) dummy indicating the period
which starts from the year of the break in the political instability variable (xit). For
example for strikes Dit = 1 in the period from 1955 to 2000 whereas for legislative
elections Dit = 1 during the period from 1949 until the end of the sample.
The augmented model is given by
yt = c+ c1D1t + c2D2t + kht + xit + dDitxit + t; (2.16)
and
h

2
t = ! + !1D1t + !2D2t + h

2
t 1f (et 1) + h

2
t 1 + xit + dDitxit + 
yt l: (2.17)
Recall that the coefcients ' and  capture the impacts of the political instability variable
on growth and its volatility respectively. Similarly, 'd and d correspond to the two
effects from the year of the break onwards. Thus the two effects are captured by ' and 
in the period up to the year of the structural break, and by '+ 'd and + d during the
period from the year of the break until the end of the sample. As above in order to study
the direct effects of political instability and nancial development we specify model 1
with ' = 'd = 0; while model 2 with  = d = 0 allows us to investigate their indirect
impacts on growth.
We also incorporate intercept dummies and level effects in the error correction equation
(2.12) and conditional variance equation (2.15), as follows
yt = + 1D1t + 2D2t + xi;t l + '(yt 1   c  xi;t 1) + "t; (2.18)
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h

2
t = ! + !1D1t + !2D2t + h

2
t 1 jet 1j + h

2
t 1 + 
yt l: (2.19)
Overall, we nd our results to be quite robust to the inclusion of the structural break
dummies. That is, (i) informal instability (either guerilla warfare or strikes) and trade
openness have a direct negative effect on growth, while formal instability (constitutional
changes) have an indirect (through volatility) negative impact on growth (ii) trade open-
ness affects growth negatively both directly and indirectly (see tables 2.19, and 2.20),
(iii) the negative effects of the informal instability are signicantly stronger in the short-
than in the long-run, (iv) nancial development affects growth positively in the long-run
but negatively in the short-run (see table 2.21), (v) both the short- and long-run impact
of the UK interest rate is negative, while trade openness does not affect growth in the
long-run (see table 2.21).
It is also noteworthy that the causal negative effect of strikes reects the period 1955-
2000, which is not surprising given the intricate relationship between the Peron govern-
ment and organized labor (see the 1 and d columns in Table 2.39 in the Appendix of
Campos et al., 2011). Interestingly, before 1949 there is no causal effect from legislative
elections to growth volatility, whereas after 1949 a negative impact began to exist.
Finally, the only differences with the previous results is that the direct(indirect) effect
of the UK interest rate(public decit) disappears when we take into account structural
breaks.
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2.5.5 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Out of the ve informal political instabiliy variables used in Campos et al. (2011a)
two, namely guerilla warfare and strikes, have powerful and precise negative effects on
growth, which remain if we add to the baseline specication any of our additional vari-
ables. The negative growth effects of the informal instability are signicantly stronger in
the short- than in the long-run. The direct negative impact of strikes on growth reects
the 1955-2000 period.
From the six measures of formal political instability used in Campos et al. (2011a) only
constitutional changes have a dominant indirect negative inuence on growth.
From the four nancial development variables employed in Campos et al. (2011a) the
two measures of nancial efciency (private and saving bank deposits) rather than the
two measures of the size of the nancial sector are the primary inuences. They affect
growth positively in the long-run but negatively in the short-run.
From the four additional variables, namely ination, public decit, UK interest rate and
trade openness, only the last two play an important role for growth. Both short- and
long-run effects of the UK interest rate are negative whereas the indirect inuence is
positive. However, when we take into account structural breaks the negative direct impact
disappears. Finally both direct and indirect effects of trade openness are negative but in
the long-run the impact disappears.
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2.6 Conclusions and Future Research
Using a PARCH framework and data for Argentina from approximately 1890 to 2000 we
ask the following questions: What is the relationship between, on the one hand, nan-
cial development (domestic and international), ination, public decit, trade openness
and political instability and, on the other hand, economic growth and (predicted) growth
volatility? Are these effects fundamentally and systematically different? Does the inten-
sity and the direction (the sign) of these effects vary over time, in general and, in partic-
ular, do they vary with respect to short- versus long-run considerations? We nd that the
main explanatory factors, solely in terms of their direct effects on economic growth in
Argentina, turn out to be nancial efciency, informal political instability (either guerilla
warfare or strikes), the UK interest rate and trade openness. However, the effect of the
UK interest rate disappears once breaks are accounted for. Further, we nd robust evi-
dence that both formal political instability (constitutional changes), the UK interest rate
and trade openness affect growth indirectly via its volatility. No other variables in our ba-
sic set exhibit such robust estimates of their indirect effects. From investigating whether
dynamic considerations affect our conclusions, we nd important differences in terms of
short and long-run behavior of our key variables, more specically, while the effects of
informal political instability and the UK interest rate (negative) are similar in the long-
and short-run, that of nancial development and trade openness are negative in the short-
and positive in the long-run. However, the long-run effect of trade openness disappears
in the multivariate analysis.
These ndings are interest in themselves but they also matter because they raise a num-
ber of new questions that we believe may be useful in motivating future research. Here
we highlight two suggestions. Regarding the role of nance in the process of economic
development, our nding reinforces a large body of previous research in that we also
show a strong, positive impact of nancial development on growth in the long-run. We
nd that different forms of political instability affect growth through different channels
over different time windows, making up for a strong and rather resilient effect that seem
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really too powerful vis-à-vis the benets brought to the table by nancial development.
We can not forget however that Argentina is unique: no other country in the world since
the Industrial Revolution went from riches to rags. Put it differently, Argentina is an out-
lier and further research could try to replicate our analysis using the historical experience
of other countries (ideally in a panel setting). That is, to study the relationship between
nancial development and economic growth in a panel of developing countries would
strengthen what we know. Yet, the data requirements are very heavy indeed, with most
developing countries lacking historical data even on key gures, such as per capita GDP,
going back to the beginning or middle of the XIXth century. This, of course, does not
make this task less important.
The second suggestion refers to a possible methodological improvement, namely the
application of the bivariate GARCH model to the problem at hand (albeit the relatively
small number of observations). The joint estimation of the political instability-nancial
development-growth system in a panel of countries would clearly represent progress and
is something we feel future research should try to address.
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2. Either Guerilla Warfare/Strikes or Financial Efciency and UK Interest Rate
In the regressions in Table 2.24 we include UK interest rate with either informal political
instability (guerilla warfare or strikes) or nancial efciency as explanatory variables. In
almost all cases both variables have a signicant effect on growth (see the 1 column).
UK interest rate has a signicant effect in two out of the four cases (see the 2 column).
Table 2.24. Direct Effect of either Guerilla Warfare/Strikes or Financial Efciency and UK
Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k 1 2   
Panel A. Informal Political Instability (x(pi)it )
Guerilla Warfare 2:08
(2:86)
 0:001
(3:45)
 0:005
(18:08)
0:89
(5:69)
0:40
(6:32)
0:90 
Strikes 0:96
(2:32)
 0:001
(1:70)
 0:002
(1:30)
0:69
(3:68)
0:53
(3:49)
0:90 
Panel B. Financial Efciency (x(fd)it )
Private Deposits/GDP 0:63
(2:70)
1:01
(3:19)
0:0002
(0:19)
0:89
(4:69)
0:51
(4:05)
0:90 
Savings Bank Deposits/GDP 0:67
(1:66)
0:55
(2:27)
 0:0020
(1:95)
0:88
(4:30)
0:49
(2:87)
0:80 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + 1x
(j)
it + 2xuk;t + "t, h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 j et 1 j +h

2
t 1,
where the superscript j indicates either an informal political instability (pi)
or a nancial development/efciency (fd) variable and xuk;t is UK interest rate.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
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3. Either Guerilla Warfare/Strikes or Financial Efciency and Trade Openness
In the regressions in Table 2.25 in almost all cases both variables (trade openness and
either informal political instability or nancial efciency) have a signicant effect on
growth (see the 1 and 2 columns).
Table 2.25. Direct Effect of either Guerilla Warfare/Strikes or Financial Efciency and
Trade Openness on Economic Growth
k 1 2   
Panel A. Informal Political Instability (x(pi)it )
Guerilla Warfare 0:98
(3:15)
 0:001
(2:52)
 0:05
(3:26)
0:66
(4:93)
0:55
(5:40)
0:80 
Strikes 0:96
(2:89)
 0:001
(1:78)
 0:04
(2:47)
0:69
(3:60)
0:54
(3:78)
0:90 
Panel B. Financial Efciency (x(fd)it )
Private Deposits/GDP 2:08
(3:11)
0:58
(2:70)
 0:04
(1:35)
0:64
(5:49)
0:62
(8:24)
0:80 
Savings Bank Deposits/GDP 0:78
(1:80)
0:54
(2:22)
 0:04
(3:96)
0:81
(4:07)
0:56
(5:25)
0:90 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + 1x
(j)
it + 2xto;t + "t, h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 j et 1 j +h

2
t 1,
where the superscript j indicates either an informal political instability (pi)
or a nancial development/efciency (fd) variable and xto;t is trade openness.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
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4. Either Guerilla Warfare/Strikes or Financial Efciency and Public Decit
When we control for either informal political instability or nancial efciency the effect
of public decit on growth disappears in three out of the four cases (see the 1 and 2
columns ).
Table 2.26. Direct Effect of either Guerilla Warfare/Strikes or Financial Efciency and
Public Decit on Economic Growth
k 1 2   
Panel A. Informal Political Instability (x(pi)it )
Guerilla Warfare 1:06
(3:41)
 0:0009
(1:87)
 0:01
(0:64)
0:65
(3:71)
0:54
(2:99)
0:80 
Strikes 1:05
(12:27)
 0:0025
(4:51)
 0:02
(0:70)
0:66
(3:33)
0:54
(3:12)
0:90 
Panel B. Financial Efciency (x(fd)it )
Private Deposits/GDP 0:84
(2:03)
0:92
(4:31)
 0:01
(0:47)
0:53
(4:84)
0:70
(11:16)
0:80 
Savings Bank Deposits/GDP 0:94
(1:73)
0:62
(3:92)
 0:03
(2:67)
0:72
(4:15)
0:56
(3:57)
0:80 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + 1x
(j)
it + 2xpd;t + "t, h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 j et 1 j +h

2
t 1,
where the superscript j indicates either an informal political instability (pi)
or a nancial development/efciency (fd) variable and xpd;t is public decit.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
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5. Either Guerilla Warfare/Strikes or Financial Efciency and Ination
As can be seen in Table 2.27 in the bivariate analysis growth is independent of changes
in ination (see the 2 column).
Table 2.27. Direct Effect of either Guerilla Warfare/Strikes or Financial Efciency and In-
ation on Economic Growth
k 1 2   
Panel A. Informal Political Instability (x(pi)it )
Guerilla Warfare 0:80
(3:12)
 0:0012
(4:52)
4 10 7
(0:01)
0:95
(6:16)
0:43
(2:83)
1:00 
Strikes 1:08
(2:36)
 0:0013
(1:38)
 1 10 5
(0:25)
0:67
(3:94)
0:56
(4:91)
1:00 
Panel B. Financial Efciency (x(fd)it )
Private Deposits/GDP 1:52
(2:14)
0:99
(5:79)
4 10 5
(0:94)
0:79
(4:47)
0:56
(6:79)
0:90 
Savings Bank Deposits/GDP 0:61
(2:18)
0:59
(2:99)
3 10 6
(0:11)
0:78
(4:64)
0:55
(4:25)
0:80 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + 1x
(j)
it + 2xt + "t, h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 j et 1 j +h

2
t 1,
where the superscript j indicates either an informal political instability (pi)
or a nancial development/efciency (fd) variable and xt is ination.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
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II TRIVARIATE ANALYSIS.
1. Guerilla Warfare/Strikes, Financial Efciency and either UK Interest Rate or Trade
Openness
Table 2.28 reports the results from the trivariate analysis. That is, in the growth equation
we include as explanatory variables: i) informal political instability, ii) nancial ef-
ciency and iii) either UK interest rate or trade openness. In almost all cases the three
variables have a signicant effect on growth (see the 1, 2 and 3 columns).
Table 2.28. Direct Effect of Guerilla Warfare/Strikes, Financial Efciency,and either UK
Interest Rate or Trade Openness on Economic Growth
1 2 3  1 2 3 
x
(fd)
it # UK Interest Rate (xuk;t) Trade Openness (xto;t)
Guerilla
Warfare
Private
Deposits/GDP  0:001(2:79) 0:39(3:30)  0:003(3:33) 1:00   0:001(8:32) 0:49(9:70)  0:02(4:56) 0:80 
Savings Bank
Deposits/GDP  0:001(2:54) 0:30(2:13)  0:004(4:49) 1:20   0:001(2:58) 0:09(0:68)  0:04(3:62) 0:80 
UK Interest Rate (xuk;t) Trade Openness (xto;t)
Strikes
Private
Deposits/GDP  0:001(4:64)  0:01(0:07)  0:003(3:92) 0:90   0:001(1:88) 0:41(2:28)  0:04(2:34) 0:90 
Savings Bank
Deposits/GDP  0:001(2:61) 0:34(1:97)  0:004(4:70) 1:00   0:001(1:80) 0:36(3:69)  0:05(4:92) 0:80 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates of interest for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + 1x
(pi)
it + 2x
(fd)
it + 3xnt + "t; h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 j et 1 j +h

2
t 1
where x
(pi)
it is either guerilla warfare or strikes, x
(fd)
it is either private deposits/GDP or savings
bank deposits/GDP, and xnt indicates either UK interest rate (xuk;t) or trade openness (xto;t).
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
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2. Guerilla Warfare, Financial Efciency and either Ination or Public Decit
As with the bivariate analysis in the trivariate one, public decit and ination have no
effect on growth (see the 3 columns in Table 2.29 ).
Table 2.29. Direct Effect of Guerilla Warfare, Financial Efciency and Ination/Public
Decit on Economic Growth
x
(fd)
it :
Private
Deposits/GDP
Saving Bank
Deposits
xit 1 2 3  1 2 3 
Ination  0:0012
(5:05)
0:67
(7:83)
4 10 5
(1:44)
0:80   0:0007(1:25) 0:84(7:09) 1 10
 5
(0:31)
0:90 
Public Decit  0:0011
(4:60)
0:48
(2:94)
0:01
(1:40)
1:00   0:0007(0:98) 0:79(4:99) 0:02(0:86) 0:90 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates of interest for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + 1xgw;t + 2x
(fd)
it + 3xit + "t; h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 j et 1 j +h

2
t 1
where xgw;t is guerilla warfare, x
(fd)
it is a nancial efciency variable,
and xnt indicates either ination (xt) or public decit (xpd;t).
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
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B. INDIRECT EFFECTS.
I. BIVARIATE ANALYSIS.
1. Formal Political Instability and UK Interest Rate
As can be seen from Table 2.30 when we include in the variance of growth UK interest
rate and one of the four alternative measures of formal political instability the effects of
cabinet changes and cabinet size disappears (see the 1 column).
Table 2.30. Indirect Effect of Formal Political Instability and UK Interest Rate on Eco-
nomic Growth
x
(pi)
it # k   1 2 
 
Cabinet Changes 3:81
(1:81)
0:16
1:19
0:91
(10:19)
0:0016
(0:69)
0:016
(3:09)
 0:024
(0:22)
1:00 
Cabinet Size 2:47
(2:97)
0:27
(1:67)
0:77
(8:18)
0:0003
(0:25)
0:011
(5:10)
0:042
(0:76)
1:00 
Constitutional Changes 2:04
(2:36)
0:32
(5:36)
0:72
(18:62)
 0:0016
(7:31)
0:012
(5:11)
0:138
(6:61)
1:00 
Legislative Elections 2:01
(3:21)
0:38
(4:10)
0:68
(8:13)
 0:0060
(3:21)
0:010
(4:65)
0:006
(1:62)
1:00 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + "t, h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 j et 1 j +h

2
t 1 + 1x
(pi)
it + 2xuk;t + 
yt 6,
where x
(pi)
it indicates a formal political instability variable and xuk;t is UK interest rate.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
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2. Formal Political Instability and Trade Openness
As can be seen from Table 2.31 when we include in the variance of growth trade open-
ness and one of the four alternative measures of formal political instability the effects of
cabinet size disappears (see the 1 column). In addition, the effect of trade openness is
signicant in three out of the four cases (see the 2 column).
Table 2.31. Indirect Effect of Formal Political Instability and Trade Openness on Economic
Growth
x
(pi)
it # k   1 2 
 
Cabinet Changes 0:90
(2:43)
0:88
(6:32)
0:34
(4:66)
 0:0037
(5:16)
 0:08
(4:74)
0:180
(5:12)
1:00 
Cabinet Size 1:22
(2:48)
0:75
(4:98)
0:42
(6:57)
 0:0001
(0:90)
 0:06
(4:14)
0:200
(4:64)
1:00 
Constitutional Changes 2:50
(2:01)
0:48
(2:34)
0:53
(2:29)
 0:0142
(4:62)
 0:10
(1:20)
 0:002
(0:02)
0:90 
Legislative Elections 2:93
(2:56)
0:26
(2:09)
0:78
(5:36)
 0:0100
(2:06)
 0:16
(2:53)
 0:008
(0:11)
0:90 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + "t, h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 j et 1 j +h

2
t 1 + 1x
(pi)
it + 2xto;t + 
yt 6,
where x
(pi)
it indicates a formal political instability variable and xto;t is trade openness.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
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3. Formal Political Instability and Public Decit
In the regressions in Table 2.32 we include formal political instability and public decit
as explanatory variables. Both variables have a signicant effect on growth volatility (see
the 1 and 2 columns).
Table 2.32. Indirect Effect of Formal Political Instability and Public Decit on Economic
Growth
x
(pi)
it # k   1 2 
 
Cabinet Changes 1:23
(2:22)
0:549
(3:00)
0:54
(5:39)
 0:0034
(2:28)
0:01
(0:86)
0:21
(3:54)
1:00 
Cabinet Size 1:02
(2:07)
0:674
(3:23)
0:50
(4:88)
 0:0002
(4:52)
0:06
(4:90)
0:19
(4:05)
1:00 
Constitutional Changes 1:57
(2:22)
0:613
(3:15)
0:48
(3:06)
 0:0066
(1:73)
0:08
(3:72)
0:09
(1:19)
1:00 
Legislative Elections  0:44
(1:55)
0:001
(0:02)
1:03
(25:49)
 0:0094
(1:84)
0:01
(2:21)
0:04
(0:57)
0:80 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + "t, h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 j et 1 j +h

2
t 1 + 1x
(pi)
it + 2xpd;t + 
yt 6,
where x
(pi)
it indicates a formal political instability variable and xpd;t is public decit.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
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4. Formal Political Instability and Ination
When we control for formal political instability the effect of ination on growth volatility
disappears. That is, the 2 estimated coefcients are insignicant (See Table 2.33 ).
Table 2.33. Indirect Effect of Formal Political Instability and Ination on Economic
Growth
x
(pi)
it # k   1 2 
 
Cabinet Changes 1:70
(2:07)
0:44
(6:56)
0:55
(12:90)
 0:0064
(4:99)
5 10 5
(1:47)
0:19
(2:98)
1:00 
Cabinet Size 1:96
(3:36)
0:61
(3:17)
0:56
(6:70)
 0:0003
(13:42)
6 10 5
(2:28)
0:17
(8:89)
1:00 
Constitutional Changes 1:37
(1:54)
0:58
(5:33)
0:51
(5:81)
 0:0090
(3:82)
2 10 5
(0:58)
0:16
(2:06)
1:00 
Legislative Elections 2:86
(2:63)
0:38
(4:99)
0:54
(8:45)
 0:0161
(2:37)
6 10 5
(1:96)
0:16
(5:70)
0:90 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + "t, h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 j et 1 j +h

2
t 1 + 1x
(pi)
it + 2xt + 
yt 6,
where x
(pi)
it indicates a formal political instability variable and xt is ination.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
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II. TRIVARIATE ANALYSIS.
Formal Political Instability, UK Interest rate and Trade Openness
As with the bivariate analysis when we control for UK interest rate and trade openness
the effects of cabinet changes and cabinet size disappear (see table 2.34 ). That is, the
estimates of 1 in the rst two rows are insignicant.
Table 2.34. Indirect Effect of Formal Political Instability, UK Interest Rate and Trade
Openness on Economic Growth
x
(pi)
it # k   1 2 3 
 
Cabinet Changes 3:15
(2:59)
0:34
(2:22)
0:65
(7:45)
 0:0001
(0:02)
0:009
(4:76)
 0:08
(3:16)
0:24
(0:35)
l=7
1:00 
Cabinet Size 1:96
(1:77)
0:53
(3:44)
0:52
(3:23)
 0:0001
(0:62)
0:007
(1:91)
 0:07
(2:03)
0:01
(0:15)
l=5
1:00 
Constitutional Changes 1:62
(2:49)
0:36
(2:36)
0:77
(6:35)
 0:0112
(1:92)
0:012
(1:88)
 0:07
(4:35)
0:01
(0:12)
l=6
1:00 
Legislative Elections 3:00
(2:39)
0:32
(5:05)
0:71
(10:75)
 0:0056
(2:17)
0:012
(3:70)
 0:06
(2:04)
0:08
(0:98)
l=7
1:00 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + "t,
h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 j et 1 j +h

2
t 1 + 1x
(pi)
it + 2xuk;t + 3xto;t + 
yt l,
where x
(pi)
it indicates a formal political instability variable,
xuk;t is UK interest rate and xto;t is trade openness.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
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FOUR VARIABLES.
Constitutional Changes/Legislative Elections, UK Interest rate, Trade Openness and In-
ation
When we include four explanatory variables in the variance of growth we nd that ina-
tion has no effect on growth (see the 4 column in Table 2.35). This result is consistent
with the ndings from the bivariate and trivariate analyses.
Table 2.35. Indirect Effect of Formal Political Instability, UK Interest Rate, Trade Open-
ness, and Ination on Economic Growth
k   1 2 3 4 
 
Constitutional Changes 3:32
(4:63)
0:57
(3:05)
0:5
(3:30)
 0:0004
(0:21)
0:006
(3:04)
 0:079
(2:37)
0:0002
(0:52)
0:018
(0:54)
l=6
1:00 
Legislative Elections 4:17
(2:15)
0:23
(2:43)
0:73
(9:73)
 0:0036
(2:29)
0:008
(1:59)
 0:085
(1:52)
0:0005
(0:06)
 0:004
(0:52)
l=7
1:00 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = c+ kht + "t, h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 j et 1 j +h

2
t 1 + 1x
(pi)
it + 2xuk;t + 3xto;t + 4xt + 
yt l,
where x
(pi)
it indicates a formal political instability variable,
xto;t is trade openness, xuk;t is UK interest rate, and xt is ination.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
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C. SHORT- AND LONG-RUN EFFECTS.
I. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS.
Either Informal Political Instability or Financial Development
In our univariate analysis in almost all cases the short- and long-run growth effects of
informal political instability and of nancial development are signicant. Assassinations
and M3/GDP have a weak long-run effect on growth (see columns  and  in Table 2.36).
Table 2.36. The Short- and Long-run Growth Effects of Informal Political Instabil-
ity/Financial Development
 '    
Panel A. Informal Political Instability (x(pi)it )
Anti-Government
Demos  0:0036(1:81)
l=5
 0:43
(6:69)
 0:0017
(2:37)
0:84
(4:11)
0:51
(4:58)
0:80 
Assassinations  0:0010
(2:38)
l=2
 0:64
(4:52)
 0:0007
(1:54)
1:18
(4:45)
0:34
(2:88)
0:90 
Guerilla Warfare  0:0011
(7:00)
l=0
 0:74
(7:03)
 0:0017
(3:83)
1:14
(5:76)
0:34
(5:24)
0:90 
Strikes  0:0014
(4:01)
l=0
 0:65
(6:34)
 0:0015
(3:26)
1:16
(5:81)
0:31
(4:08)
0:80 
Panel B. Financial Development (x(fd)it )
Private
Deposits/GDP  1:35(1:81)
l=5
 0:44
(4:64)
0:94
(23:72)
0:37
(2:63)
0:80
(6:69)
0:90 
Savings Bank
Deposits/GDP  0:55(1:89)
l=1
 0:70
(3:23)
0:59
(4:84)
0:74
(6:69)
0:56
(6:21)
0:80 
M3/GDP  0:16
(3:00)
l=4
 0:83
(4:11)
0:16
(1:60)
0:81
(6:59)
0:52
(7:19)
0:80 
M1/GDP  0:21
(1:91)
l=1
 0:85
(4:14)
0:43
(4:20)
0:74
(6:89)
0:54
(6:62)
0:80 
Note: This table reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt = + x
(j)
i;t l + '(yt 1   c  x(j)i;t 1) + "t;
h

2
t = ! + h

2
t 1 jet 1j + h

2
t 1.  (l is the order of the lag)
and  capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
' indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
The superscript j indicates either an informal political
instability (pi) or a nancial development (fd) variable.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
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Fig. 2.13. Measures of Financial Development
M3 over GDP M1 over GDP
Private deposits over GDP Savings banks deposits over GDP
Fig. 2.14. Measures of Political Instability
Anti-Government Demos Assasinations
Cabinet Changes Cabinet Size
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Fig. 2.15. Breaks
Chapter 3
Are Economic Growth and the Variability of
the Business Cycle Related? Evidence From
Asia
3.1 Introduction
62Until the early 1980s, macroeconomic theorists treated the analysis of the real business
cycle (RBC) as separate from the study of economic growth. In the 1980s, three impor-
tant contributions in business cycle theory by Kydland and Prescott (1982), Long and
Plosser (1983), and King et al. (1988) integrated the theories of the business cycle and
economic growth in their models. However, these models did not consider the possibil-
ity that the variability of the business cycle might relate to the rate of economic growth.
Similarly, for the most part, developments in growth theory have been made without con-
sideration of the variability in the business cycle. The scene has changed recently at both
the theoretical and empirical front. At the theoretical level, Blackburn and Pelloni (2005)
and a number of studies summarised by these authors examine how the cyclical uctu-
ations might relate to long-run economic growth. At the empirical level, highlight the
importance of the reduction in US GDP growth volatility in the last two decades and its
implications for growth theory. The early dichotomy in macroeconomic theory between
economic growth and the variability of economic uctuations should be reconsidered
given several theories outlined below regarding the relationship between output volatility
and growth. These theories predict a positive, negative or no association between the two
variables. The empirical evidence to date, based on cross-section country studies, panel
62 This chapter is a sister paper of Fountas and Karanasos (2008) Are economic growth and the variability
of the business cycle related? Evidence from ve European countries, Introduction and literature sections
are generally based on Fountas and Karanasos (2008).
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data studies, or time-series analyses of individual countries is also quite mixed. The
theoretical and empirical ambiguity surrounding the RBC variabilityeconomic growth
relationship provides us with the motivation to expand on the empirical aspects of this
issue.
We attempt to cover a gap in the existing empirical literature by employing a monthly
output data that starts in the 1960s on four Asian countries/regions. This approach allow
us to analyze the RBC variabilitygrowth relationship over a period that including sig-
nicant variation in output growth, such as the 1970s oil shock (supply shock), the 2001
electronic industry depression (demand shock) and the credit crunch in 2008 (nancial
crisis). The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a survey of the
theoretical literature on the relationship between the RBC and economic growth. Sec-
tion 3 reviews the existing empirical literature. Section 4 outlines our econometric model
and section 5 presents our main results and an interpretation. Section 6 describes some
robustness tests. Finally, Section 7 summarizes our main conclusions.
3.2 Theoretical Background
Given the absence of a theoretical consensus, the anticipated relationship between output
variability and economic growth remains an empirical issue. Macroeconomic theory of-
fers three possible scenarios regarding the impact of the former on the latter. First, there
is the possibility of independence between output variability and growth. In other words,
the determinants of the two variables are different from each other. According to some
business cycle models, output uctuations around the natural rate are due to price mis-
perceptions in response to monetary shocks. On the other hand, changes in the growth
rate of output arise from real factors such as technology (Friedman 1968). The scenario
of a negative association between output variability and average growth goes back to
Keynes (1936) who argued that entrepreneurs, when estimating the return on their in-
vestment, take into consideration the uctuations in economic activity. The larger the
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output uctuations, the higher the perceived riskiness of investment projects and, hence,
the lower the demand for investment and output growth. A similar result is obtained
by the literature on sunspot equilibria (Woodford 1990). According to Bernanke (1983)
and Pindyck (1991), the negative relationship between output volatility and growth arises
from investment irreversibilities at the rm level. Ramey and Ramey (1991) show that
in the presence of commitment to technology in advance, higher output volatility can
lead to suboptimal ex post output levels by rms (due to uncertainty-induced planning
errors) and hence, lower mean output and growth. Finally, the positive impact of output
variability on growth can be justied by several economic theories. First, more income
variability (uncertainty) would lead to a higher savings rate (Sandmo, 1970) for precau-
tionary reasons, and hence, according to neoclassical growth theory, a higher equilibrium
rate of economic growth. This argument has been advanced by Mirman (1971). An alter-
native explanation is due to Black (1987) and is based on the hypothesis that investments
in riskier technologies will be pursued only if the expected return on these investments
(average rate of output growth) is large enough to compensate for the extra risk. As real
investment takes time to materialize. More recently, Blackburn (1999) using a model of
endogenous growth generated by learning-by-doing shows that business cycle volatility
raises the long-run growth of the economy.
The effect of output volatility on growth is not always unambiguous. A number of studies
(Smith 1996; Grinols and Turnovsky 1998; Turnovsky 2000) show that, with preferences
represented by a constant elasticity utility function, the growth rate is positively related
to volatility provided the coefcient of risk aversion exceeds one. Smith (1996) shows
that the sign of the growth-volatility relationship depends on whether the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution exceeds or falls short of one. The above papers all refer to a
closed economy. Turnovsky and Chattopadhyay (2003), in a stochastic general equilib-
rium small-open economy model of a developing country, examine the effect of output
volatility on growth allowing for three additional types of variability (in the terms of
trade, government spending and money supply) to have an impact on output growth. The
theoretical model implies that output volatility has an ambiguous effect on growth. This
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result is conrmed by numerical simulations that show that the effect is small. The oppo-
site type of causality, running from growth to output uncertainty, may also be examined
in the present analysis. From a theoretical point of view, the sign of this causality rela-
tionship is negative. An increase in growth leads to more ination (the short-run Phillips
curve effect). Empirical evidence by Briault (1995) supports this effect. Furthermore,
a higher ination rate lowers output growth uncertainty (Ball et al. 1988). In the tradi-
tion of New Keynesian Economics, a higher ination rate leads to more frequent optimal
price adjustments and therefore nominal shocks cause smaller real effects as well as a
lower output variability. Recently, a growing theoretical literature has developed that
examines the correlation between average output growth and its variability in an endoge-
nous growth set-up (Blackburn and Galinder 2003; Blackburn and Pelloni 2004, 2005).
Blackburn and Galinder (2003) focus on the importance of the source of technological
change for the sign of correlations between growth and its volatility. In a stochastic real
growth model the authors show that positive (negative) correlation will most likely arise
in a framework of internal (external) learning where the agents improve their productive
efciency by investing time in learning (benet from knowledge spillovers taking place
among agents). In a stochastic monetary growth model Blackburn and Pelloni (2004)
show that the correlation between growth and its variability is a function of the type of
shocks buffeting the economy. The study concludes that the correlation will be positive
(negative) depending on whether the real (nominal) shocks dominate. In a richer set-
ting, Blackburn and Pelloni (2005) use a stochastic monetary growth model with three
different types of shocks (technology, preference and monetary) that have permanent ef-
fects on output due to wage contracts and endogenous technology. The authors show that
output growth and output variability are negatively correlated irrespective of the type of
shocks causing uctuations in the economy.
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3.3 Empirical Evidence
The empirical evidence to date on the association between output growth and its variabil-
ity is mixed. Early studies employ cross-section (Kormendi and Meguire 1985) or pooled
data (Grier and Tullock 1989) and nd evidence for a positive association. Ramey and
Ramey (1995) use a panel of 92 countries and a sample of OECD countries (for the
19601985 period) and nd strong evidence that countries with higher output variabil-
ity have lower growth. A similar result was obtained by Zarnowitz and Moore (1986)
who divid the 19031981 period into six subperiods and compare high and low growth
periods in terms of output variability (measured by the standard deviation of the annual
growth rate in real GNP). In a recent study, Kneller and Young (2001), using a panel-data
framework, nd that output variability reduces growth. Turnovsky and Chattopadhyay
(2003) nd a similar, although small, effect in a sample of 61 developing countries al-
lowing in their model for various types of volatility to have an impact on growth. More
recent studies use the time series techniques of Generalized Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models to proxy for output uncertainty rather than vari-
ability (Caporale and McKiernan 1996, 1998; Speight 1999). The rst two papers use
UK and US data, respectively, and nd a positive association between output variabil-
ity and growth, whereas the last paper uses UK data and nds no association. Grier and
Perry (2000) using the GARCH-M model and monthly US data nd no evidence that
uncertainty about output affects the rate of growth. Henry and Olekalns (2002) nd ev-
idence in favour of a negative association using post-war real GDP data for the United
States. Allowing for asymmetries, Grier et al. (2004) nd US evidence for a positive ef-
fect. Fountas et al. (2002) nd no evidence for an effect of output uncertainty on growth
using data from Japan and a bivariate GARCH model that includes ination and growth.
This result is conrmed in a recent study by Fountas et al. (2004) using Japanese data
and three different univariate GARCH models. The motivation for our empirical study
comes from several factors. First, the inconclusiveness of the existing empirical time se-
ries literature, second the sparsity of evidence on the effect of growth on its uncertainty.
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We, therefore, attempt to provide more robust evidence on the bi-directional relationship
between the two variables using monthly data for four Asian countries/regions.
3.4 PARCHModel
We adopt PARCH estimation for our output data. Since its introduction by Ding et al.
(1993), the PARCH model has been frequently applied. For example, Hentschel (1995)
dened a parametric family of asymmetric GARCH formulations that nests the EGARCH
and PARCH models. He and Teräsvirta (1999) considered a family of rst-order asym-
metric GARCH processes which includes the asymmetric PARCH (A-PARCH) as a spe-
cial case. Brooks et al. (2000) analyzed the applicability of the PARCH models to
national stock market returns for ten countries63. Laurent (2004) derives analytical ex-
pressions for the score of the A-PARCH model. The use of the PARCH model is now
widespread in the literature (see, for example, Mittnik and Paolella, 2000, Giot and Lau-
rent, 2003, Karanasos and Schurer, 2005, Karanasos and Kim, 2006, and Conrad et al.,
2006, 2007).
Let y follow an autoregressive (AR) process augmented by a `risk premium' dened in
terms of volatility
(L)yt = 0 + kg(ht) + "t (3.20)
with
"t = eth
1
2
t
63 It is worth noting that Fornari and Mele (1997) show the usefulness of the PARCH scheme in approx-
imating models developed in continuous time as systems of stochastic differential equations. This feature
of GARCH schemes has usually been overshadowed by their well-known role as simple econometric tools
providing reliable estimates of unobserved conditional variances (Fornari and Mele, 2001).
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where by assumption the nite order polynomial (L) =
pP
i=1
Lihas zeros outside the
unit circle. In addition, fetg are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) random
variables with E (et) = E (e2t   1) = 0 . The conditional variance of output growth fytg
, is positive with probability one and is a measurable function of the sigma-algebra
P
t 1,
which is generated by fyt 1; yt 2; :::g.
Furthermore, we need to choose the form in which the time-varying variance enters the
specication of the mean to determine the risk premium. This is a matter of empirical
evidence. In the empirical results that follow we employ three specications for the
functional form of the `risk premium' (g (ht) = ht , g (ht) =
p
ht, or g (ht) = ln (ht)).
Moreover, ht is specied as an A-PARCH(1, 1) process with lagged output growth in-
cluded in the variance equation
h

2
t = ! + f (et 1) + h

2
t 1 + 
lt 1 (3.21)
with
f (et 1)  [jet 1j   et 1]
Where  with  > 0 is the heteroscedasticity parameter,  and  are the ARCH and
GARCH coefcients respectively,  with jj < 1 is the leverage term and 
l is the
level term for the lag of output growth. The model imposes a Box-Cox power transfor-
mation of the conditional standard deviation process and the asymmetric absolute resid-
uals. The expected value of is given by:
E [f (et 1)] =
8><>:
1p

h
(1  ) + (1 + )
i
2(

2
 1) 
 
+1
2

; if et 1
(i:d) N(0; 1)
(r 2) 2  ( r 2 ) ( +12 )
 ( r2)2
p

h
(1  ) + (1 + )
i
; if et 1
(i:d) tr(0; 1)
9>=>;
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where N and t denote the Normal and student-t distributions respectively, r are the de-
grees of freedom of the student-t distribution and   (:) is the Gamma function. The th
moment of the conditional variance is a function of the above expression (see Karanasos
and Kim, 2006).
Within the A-PARCH model, by specifying permissible values for , , ,  and 
l in
Equation (3.21), it is possible to nest a number of the more standard ARCH and GARCH
specications (see Ding et al., 1993, Hentschel, 1995, and Brooks et al., 2000). For
example, in Equation (3.21) let  = 2 and  = 
l = 0 to get the GARCH model. In order
to distinguish the general model in Equations (3.20) and (3.21) from a version in which
k = 
l =  =  = 0, we will hereafter refer to the former as A-PARCH-in-mean-level
(A-PARCH-ML) and the latter as PARCH.
3.5 Empirical Analysis
3.5.1 Data and Power-transformed Growth
We use monthly data on the index of industrial production (IP) as proxies for the output
and cover four Asian countries/regions, namely, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Tai-
wan. The data end at March 2010, the starting point differs across countries/regions of
our sample64. The source of our data series is Datastream. The growth rate of output is
measured by the year-to-year changes in the log of Census X12 seasonal adjusted indus-
trial production. Figure 3.16 plots the growth of the IP series in the four countries/regions.
The choice of IP as a proxy for output is dictated by data availability considerations. It
should be borne in mind that this proxy is not perfect since IP is about one quarter of real
GDP and is more variable than the latter.
64 April 1960, January 1975, January 1983 and January 1971 for Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan
respectively.
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Fig. 3.16. Output Growth over Time
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We employ the Augmented DickeyFuller (ADF) and PhillipsPerron (PP) unit root tests
to test for the stationarity of all growth series as the estimation of GARCH models re-
quires that all variables are stationary. Both unit root test results indicate that the four out-
put growth series are I(0). We calculate the sample autocorrelations of the absolute value
of growth  (d) as a function of d for lags  = 1; 12 and 36; and taking d = 0:1; 0:2; 0:3:::
to 4:5. Figure 3.17 provides the plots of the calculated  (d). For example, for lag 36,
there is a unique point d equal to 0:7; 1:2; 1:0 and 1:4 for Japan, South Korea, Singa-
pore and Taiwan respectively. Such that 36 (d) reaches its maximum at this point: for
36 (d
) > 36 (d) for d 6= d. These gures indicate that in our data the autocorrelation
structure of growth is the strongest for values of d smaller than two.65.
65 the lag1 of Japan data has maximum autocorrelation at d = 2:1.
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Fig. 3.17. Autocorrelation of jtjd at Lag 1, 12, 36
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
p
LAG1
LAG36
LAG12
Japan
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
p
LAG1
LAG36
LAG12
South Korea
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
p
LAG1
LAG36
LAG12
Singapore
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
p
LAG1
LAG36
LAG12
Taiwan
3.5.2 Estimated Models of Growth
We proceed with the estimation of the AR-PARCH(1,1) model in equations (3.20) and
(3.21) in order to take into account the serial correlation observed in the levels and power
transformations of our time series data. The estimated parameters are obtained by quasi-
maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) as implemented in EVIEWS. The best tting
specication is chosen according to the Likelihood Ratio (LR) results and the minimum
value of the Information Criteria (IC) (not reported). Once heteroscedasticity in the con-
ditional mean is accounted for, an AR(12) specication appears to capture the serial cor-
relation in all four growth series. Table 3.41 reports AR lags for the conditional means
of ination series.
The estimated standard errors are determined by the Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992)
procedure that accounts for the non-normality of the residuals. To check the sensitivity
of our results to the form in which the time varying variance enters the specication of
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Table 3.41. AR Lags
Japan 1; 2; 3; 9; 10; 11
South Korea 1; 2; 7; 9; 12
Singapore 1; 2; 12
Taiwan 1; 3; 12
Notes: The numbers represent the AR lags
used in the mean equations of the model.
the mean, we not only use the conventional conditional variance, but also use either the
conditional standard deviation or the logarithm of the conditional variance as regressor
in the mean. In addition, we allow for the impact of ination on growth and output
uncertainty. Moreover, we allow for the possibility of structure break in the growth data.
The mean equation and variance equation are modied to include structure break dummy
variables. In other words, the dummy variables are included to reect the difference
between the low/negative periods (oil shock, demand shock, nancial crisis) and the
normal growth periods in the series. We nd that dummies in all countries/regions are
statistically signicant in the mean equation but dummies are insignicant in the variance
equation for South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan except Japan.
For all countries/regions, we nd the leverage term  to be insignicant and therefore
we re-estimate the model excluding this parameter. The estimated  parameter is highly
signicant in all cases. However, the  parameter is only signicant in very small number
of cases, so we re-estimate the model with ARCH term only. In order to distinguish the
general PARCH model from a version in which  is xed to a specic value we will
hereafter refer to the latter as (P)ARCH.
Table 3.42 reports the (P)ARCH models with or without level effect. The IC chooses
a (P)ARCH model with estimated power term parameter  = 0:7; 0:5; 0:5 and 1:1 of for
Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, respectively. The corresponding values for
the model with lagged growth included in the conditional variance as the level effect
(see level panel of Table 3.42) are lower for Japan:  = 0:5; but remarkably higher for
Singapore, which the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) choose (P)ARCH models with
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Table 3.42. (P)ARCH Models
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
 0:358
(5:443)
0:285
(4:193)
0:378
(5:228)
2:235
(10:843)
 0:7 0:5 1:1 1:1
Level

i
 0:061
(4:281)
f3g
 0:029
(2:330)
f1g
 0:020
(2:158)
f2g
 0:334y
(1:766)
f1g
 0:061
(2:128)
f2g
 0:5 0:5 1:5 1:0
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table
reports estimates of the parameters of interest for the (P)ARCH
and (P)ARCH-L models.
ylag 2 of output growth (negative insignicant) also included.
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The numbers in {} indicate the order of lags.
power coefcients  = 1:5. For South Korea and Taiwan, the estimated value of  stay
in a similar level. Various lags of growth (from 1 to 12) are considered with the best
model chosen on the basis of the minimum value of the AIC. For all countries/regions,
there is strong evidence that growth affects its uncertainty negatively. The estimated (ab-
solute) level coefcient is in the range 0:334 < j
ij < 0:020. This result is consistent
with the theory outlined in Section 2, even though it does not prove that the channel out-
lined in Section 2 is in effect. More analysis of the mechanism through which growth
affects its uncertainty is offered in the following section. Moreover, this nding is in
broad agreement with the predictions of the analysis of Blackburn and Pelloni (2005) for
a negative correlation between output growth and its variability. It should be kept in mind
though that our evidence is in terms of causality rather than correlation.
Next, we report the estimation results of an AR-(P)ARCH-M model of growth with
g(ht) = ht, g(ht) =
p
htor g(ht) = ln(ht) for all countries/regions. Table 3.43, 3.44
and 3.45 report the estimated parameters of interest for different form of variance in the
mean equation, respectively. In Japan and Singapore the estimates for the in-mean pa-
rameter (k) are statistically insignicant no matter the form in which the time varying
variance enters the specication of the mean (see the Mean panel of Table 3.43, 3.44
and 3.45). For South Korea, the effects are positive and signicant at 5% (g(ht) =
p
ht)
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Table 3.43. (P)ARCH-ML Models, Conditional Variance in Mean
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 0:026
(0:610)
0:034
(1:336)
 0:016
(0:703)
0:036
(2:616)
 0:7 0:7 1:1 1:2
Mean-level
k 0:010
(0:185)
0:021
(0:904)
 0:016
(0:808)
0:040
(3:645)

i  0:060
(4:182)
f3g
 0:054
(2:210)
f1g
 0:034
(2:023)
f2g
 0:146y
(1:664)
f1g
 0:166
(2:607)
f2g
 0:5 0:7 1:2 1:3
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table reports
estimates of the parameters of interest for the various (P)ARCH-M
and (P)ARCH -ML models. In all cases g(ht) = ht.
ylag 2 of output growth (negative insignicant) also included.
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The numbers in {} indicate the order of lags.
and 1% (g(ht) = ln(ht)) levels. For Taiwan, the effect is positive and signicant at the
1% level when conditional variance incorporated in the mean equation.
Finally, Table 3.43, 3.44 and 3.45 report the estimation results of an AR-(P)ARCH-ML
model. That is, we estimate a system of equations that allows not only the current value
of the conditional variance to affect average growth, but also allows lag of the latter to
inuence the former (see the Mean-Level panel of Table 3.43, 3.44 and 3.45). All
level estimated coefcients are signicant and robust to the inclusion or exclusion of
in-mean effects. As with the (P)ARCH-L model, we again nd support for the the-
ory outlined in Section 2 in all countries/regions. The level parameter is in the range
0:166 < j
ij < 0:013. Moreover, we nd evidence of positive impact from growth un-
certainty on growth itself for South Korea(g(ht) =
p
ht) and Taiwan (g(ht) = ht or
ln(ht)) at 5% signicance level, which support Mirman (1971), Black (1987) and Black-
burn (1999). Again, the in-mean parameter is insignicant in Japan and Singapore. In
all countries/regions, the values of the power coefcients are below 1:3.
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Table 3.44. (P)ARCH-ML Models, Conditional Standard Deviation in Mean
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 0:15
(1:144)
0:257
(2:061)
 0:221
(0:873)
0:146
(1:352)
 0:7 0:6 1:1 1:1
Mean-level
k 0:094
(0:519)
0:198
(2:253)
0:327
(1:180)
0:117
(1:057)

i  0:075
(4:255)
f3g
 0:019
(2:305)
f1g
 0:013
(1:969)
f2g
 0:114y
(1:683)
f1g
 0:068
(1:701)
f2g
 0:6 0:5 1:1 1:1
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table reports
estimates of the parameters of interest for the various (P)ARCH-M
and (P)ARCH-ML models. In all cases g(ht) = ln(ht).
ylag 2 of output growth (negative insignicant)
also included. The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The numbers in {} indicate the order of lags.
Table 3.45. (P)ARCH-ML Models, Logarithm of the Conditional Variance in Mean
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 0:083
(0:914)
0:574
(2:243)
 0:855
(1:022)
0:250
(1:254)
 0:7 0:5 1:1 1:0
Mean-level
k 0:131
(1:040)
0:355
(1:752)
 0:956
(1:162)
0:407
(5:107)

i  0:060
(4:204)
f3g
 0:027
(2:116)
f1g
 0:019
(2:003)
f2g
 0:116y
(1:683)
f1g
 0:134
(11:272)
f2g
 0:5 0:5 1:1 1:2
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table reports
estimates of the parameters of interest for the various (P)ARCH-M
and (P)ARCH-ML models. In all cases g(ht) = ln(ht).
ylag 2 of output growth (negative insignicant) also included.
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The numbers in {} indicate the order of lags.
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3.6 Robustness Checks
To check the sensitivity of our results to the impact of ination66 on growth and output
uncertainty, lags of ination are included in both mean and variance equations, since
no signicant effect from ination was detected in the variance, we reestimated these
model with lags of ination in mean only. Table 3.46 shows that ination has signicant
negative impact on output growth in all countries/regions, which is broadly in line with
existing empirical studies. Consisting with our previous results, higher growth lead to
lower growth variation.
Table 3.46. (P)ARCH Models with Ination
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
ARCH
  0:199
(2:108)
f2g
 0:441
(10:439)
f6g
 1:620
(2:163)
f9g
 1:68
(2:584)
f7g
 0:214
(3:261)
f9g
 0:369
(5:737)
0:351
(7:250)
0:386
(5:286)
0:663
(5:486)
 0:7 0:5 1:1 1:2
Level
  0:184
(2:671)
f2g
 0:417
(5:207)
f6g
 1:713
(2:234)
f9g
 0:176
(2:012)
f7g
 0:212
(5:162)
f9g

i  0:062
(4:196)
f3g
 0:029
(2:392)
f1g
 0:018
(1:787)
f2g
 0:118
(1:777)
f1g
y  0:046
(1:940)
f2g
 0:5 0:5 1:1 0:9
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table reports
estimates of the parameters of interest for the (P)ARCH and
(P)ARCH-L models. captures the effect of ination on growth.
ylag 2 of output growth (negative insignicant) also included.
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The numbers in {} indicate the order of lags.
Table 3.47, 3.48 and 3.49 report the estimation results of (P)ARCH-M and (P)ARCH-
ML models of growth with ination in mean, with g(ht) = ht, g(ht) =
p
htand g(ht) =
ln(ht); respectively. for all countries/regions. We nd evidence regarding the direction
66 Ination is measured by growth of CPI.
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Table 3.47. (P)ARCH-ML Models with Ination, Conditional Variance in Mean
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 0:052
(1:199)
0:043
(1:374)
 0:019
(1:058)
0:035
(3:033)
  0:202
(2:216)
f2g
 0:400
(2:315)
f6g
 1:659
(2:428)
f9g
 0:219
(2:445)
f7g
 0:195
(2:545)
f9g
 0:7 0:6 0:9 1:6
Mean-level
k 0:037
(0:746)
0:044
(1:753)
 0:016
(0:840)
0:038
(3:672)
  0:032
(0:436)
f2g
 0:486
(3:431)
f6g
 1:692
(2:262)
f9g
 0:207
(2:304)
f7g
 0:190
(2:446)
f9g

i  0:057
(3:865)
f3g
 0:054
(2:210)
f1g
 0:034
(2:023)
f2g
 0:084
(1:688)
f1g
y  0:226
(2:708)
f2g
 0:5 0:6 1:0 1:5
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table reports
estimates of the parameters of interest for the various (P)ARCH-M
and (P)ARCH-ML models. In all cases g(ht) = ht.
captures the effect of ination on growth.
ylag 2 of output growth (negative insignicant) also included.
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The numbers in {} indicate the order of lags.
of the impact of a change in uncertainty on growth. That is, in South Korea and Taiwan,
volatility of growth has positive and signicant impact on growth. In detail, we nd that
growth uncertainty positively affect growth in form of the logarithm of conditional vari-
ance(at 1% signicance level) in South Korea, and in form of the conditional variance(at
1% signicance level) and conditional standard deviation(at 10% signicance level) in
Taiwan, these results do not alter with impact of level- effect. Again, level- effect
and ination impact are both negative.
Since we did not nd any impact of ination on growth uncertainty, in order to nd out
the channel that growth affects its uncertainty, we test the effect of the ination uncer-
tainty67 on growth uncertainty. GROWTH panel of Table 3.50 shows that effects of
67 We use conditional variance derivate from a (P)ARCHmodel of ination as proxy of ination uncertainty.
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Table 3.48. (P)ARCH-ML Models with Ination, Conditional Standard Deviation in Mean
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 0:052
(0:417)
0:302
(3:232)
 0:366
(1:532)
0:224
(1:732)
  0:198
(2:183)
f2g
 0:545
(9:600)
f6g
 1:647
(2:371)
f9g
 0:190
(2:080)
f7g
 0:212
(3:091)
f9g
 0:7 0:5 1:0 1:2
Mean-level
k 0:0002
(0:002)
0:178
(1:091)
 0:391
(1:528)
1:081
(1:929)
  0:176
(2:413)
f2g
 0:462
(2:783)
f6g
 1:798
(2:434)
f9g
 0:241
(1:636)
f7g
 0:189
(2:009)
f9g

i  0:062
(4:329)
f3g
 0:053
(2:290)
f1g
 0:032
(1:915)
f2g
 0:173
(2:026)
f1g
y  0:130
(2:166)
f2g
 0:5 0:7 1:2 1:0
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table reports
estimates of the parameters of interest for the various (P)ARCH-M
and (P)ARCH-ML models. In all cases g(ht) =
p
ht.
captures the effect of ination on growth.
ylag 2 of output growth (negative insignicant) also included.
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The numbers in {} indicate the order of lags.
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Table 3.49. (P)ARCH-ML Models with Ination, Logarithm of the Conditional Variance
in Mean
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 0:118
(1:054)
0:602
(3:475)
 0:689
(1:176)
0:210
(0:922)
  0:185
(1:988)
f2g
 0:467
(3:191)
f6g
 1:698
(2:486)
f9g
 0:181
(2:049)
f7g
 0:207
(3:243)
f9g
 0:7 0:6 0:9 1:0
Mean-level
k 0:100
(0:871)
0:432
(2:075)
 1:024
(1:414)
0:620
(5:861)
  0:029
(0:387)
f2g
 0:566
(3:369)
f6g
 1:795
(2:461)
f9g
 2:000
(2:049)
f7g
 0:227
(2:887)
f9g

i  0:058
(4:037)g
f3g
 0:047
(2:078)
f1g
 0:027
(1:524)
f2g
 0:092
(1:814)
f1g
y  0:202
(5:757)
f2g
 0:5 0:7 1:0 1:4
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table reports
estimates of the parameters of interest for the various (P)ARCH-M
and (P)ARCH-ML models. In all cases g(ht) = ln(ht).
captures the effect of ination on growth.
ylag 2 of output growth (negative insignicant) also included.
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The numbers in {} indicate the order of lags.
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ination uncertainty on growth uncertainty are negative and signicant in Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Again, ination has negative impact on growth in all coun-
tries/regions. Table 3.50 also presents a (P)ARCH model of ination with lagged output
growth variable been added in both mean and variance equations( see INFLATION
panel of Table 3.50 ). In Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, it is very clear that growth has
positive effect on both ination and ination uncertainty, however, no evidence of posi-
tive/negative effect of growth on ination/ination uncertainty was found in Singapore.
In addition, the level- effect for ination are positive in all countries/regions, which in-
dicate that higher ination uncertainty associate with higher ination rate. Hence, com-
bining the two panels in Table 3.50, we nd in three out of four countries/regions that
growth negatively impact on its uncertainty via the ination uncertainty channel: higher
growth leads to higher ination uncertainty (directly and via level- effect), and higher
ination uncertainty induces lower growth uncertainty.
In order to capture the difference between low/negative growth periods (oil shock, de-
mand shock, nancial crisis, et al.) and normal growth period in the series, we use the
methodology developed by Bai and Perron (2003) to examine whether there is any struc-
tural break in growth and when it occurred. Bai and Perron (2003) address the problem
of testing for multiple structural changes under very general conditions on the data and
the errors. In addition to testing for the existence of breaks, these statistics identify the
number and location of multiple breaks. Table 3.51 reports the implicated break points
and the corresponding economic events: DO stands for oil shock in 1970s, DH stands for
the Japanese assets price bubble's burst in 1991, DF stands for the 1997 nancial crisis
in Asia, DE stands for the deep decline in demand for electronic industry in 2001, and
DC is the recent credit crunch in 2008.
Table 3.52 reports the (P)ARCH models with structural break dummy variable incor-
porated in the mean and variance equations and with or without level- effect. We
 = 0:5; 0:5; 0:5 and 0:6 for Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan respectively.
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Table 3.50. (P)ARCH Models with Ination Uncertainty
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
GROWTH
  0:360
(4:376)
f2g
 0:340
(2:227)
f6g
 1:690
(2:033)
f9g
 0:194
(2:483)
f7g
 0:218
(15:016)
f9g

h  0:291
(3:301)
f2g
 0:263
(1:818)
f8g
 6:485
(1:928)
f4g
 0:097
(7:874)
f8g
 0:5 0:7 1:1 1:0
INFLATION
y 0:009
(2:339)
f5g
0:006
(1:734)
f6g
  0:016
(1:884)
f6g

i 0:029
(2:315)
f1g
0:080
(3:227)
f1g
0:081
(2:133)
f1g
0:135
(3:093)
f1g

y 0:009
(5:620)
f5g
0:007
(2:564)
f5g
  0:087
(3:056)
f5g
 0:5 0:5 0:6 0:9
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table reports
estimates of the parameters of interest for the (P)ARCH models.
(y)captures the effect of ination (growth) on growth (ination).

h(
y)captures the effect of ination uncertainty (growth) on
growth uncertainty (ination uncertainty).
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The numbers in {} indicate the order of lags.
Table 3.51. Break Points and Dummy Variables
DO DH DF DE DC
JAPAN 11/1973-03/1975 05/1991-03/1993 12/2000-12/2001 02/2008-09/2008-02/2009y
SOUTH KOREA 10/1997-07/1998 05/2008-01/2009
SINGAPORE 02/1974-12/1974 02/2001-12/2001 04/2008-01/2009
TAIWAN 11/2000-08/2001 03/2008-01/2009
DO: oil shock in1970s, DH: Japanese assets price bubble burst in 1991,
DF: the1997 nancial crisis in Asia, DE: the deep decline in demand for
electronic industry in 2001, DC: the credit crunch in 2008.
The dummy variables equal to "1" in the corresponded
period ( start date not included ) and "0" elsewhere.
yJapan has 2 dummy variables for credit crunch: DC1( 01/2008-09/2008 )
and DC2( 10/2008-02/2009 )
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nd that dummies in all four countries/regions are statistically signicant in the mean
equation with negative sign and are irrelevant with level- effect incorporated or not,
but all dummies are insignicant in the variance equation for South Korea, Singapore
and Taiwan, we reestimated the models with dummies in mean only for these coun-
tries/regions. level- effect are negative in Japan, South Korea, Singapore( insignicant)
and Taiwan. the IC chooses a (P)ARCH model with estimated power term parameter of
 = 0:7; 0:9; 0:6 and 0:8 for Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, respectively.
The corresponding values for the (P)ARCH-L model are 0:6; 0:8; 0:9 and 1:0.
Next, we report the estimation results of (P)ARCH-ML and (P)ARCH-M models of
growth with structural break dummy variable incorporated in the mean and variance
equation and g(ht) = ht ,
p
ht and ln(ht) for all countries/regions. Table 3.53 3.54
and 3.55 report only the estimated parameters of interest and in all cases, the coefcients
for the dummy variables are negative and signicant. Regarding to level- effect, the
results are very similar to those obtained without using dummy variables, The growth of
all countries/regions' have negative impact on its uncertainty, the strong evidence in all
countries/regions is invariant to the form of the in-mean variable. Regarding the re-
verse causal effect, our evidence is country/region specic. As before, the estimates for
the in-mean parameter (k) in South Korea and Taiwan are positive, interestingly, with
the join of dummy variables, these effects are signicant in 10% level with all form of
growth uncertainty we tested and do not alter with inclusion of level- effect. Very inter-
estingly, the in-mean effects for Japan become signicant at 10% level in all MEAN
panel, however when lags of growth were added into the variance equation, this effect
disappeared except the case of g(ht) =
p
ht. In all cases, in-mean effects are insignif-
icant for Singapore. Again, all power term parameters of  are below 1:5:
We also estimated models with both ination and dummy variables. In all case, the
impact from ination becomes insignicant and dummy variables still have negative sig-
nicant inuence on growth. We do not present these results since they are very similar
to the results with dummy variables only.
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Table 3.52. (P)ARCH Models with Dummies
Japanz South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Normal
do  1:736
(6:876)
     2:397
(10:668)
dh  1:324
(3:819)
     
df    5:203
(2:990)
   
de  1:498
(6:801)
   7:896
(3:736)
 1:295
(3:318)
dc
DC1 DC2
 2:284
(3:428)
 7:622
(6:432)
 3:520
(2:707)
 6:279
(5:302)
 7:481
(2:339)
 0:223
(3:460)
0:418
(5:704)
0:313
(4:409)
0:561
(6:342)
 0:7 0:9 1:0 0:8
Level
do  1:653
(7:532)
     2:548
(4:191)
dh  1:219
(4:482)
     
df    5:309
(3:491)
   
de  1:514
(5:507)
   7:737
(3:715)
 1:109
(1:972)
dc
DC1 DC2
 2:442
(3:571)
 7:104
(5:023)
 4:476
(2:537)
 6:372
(5:471)
 7:339
(2:316)

i  0:065
(4:528)
f3g
 0:076
(2:294)
f1g
 0:040
(1:937)
f2g
 0:028
(0:795)
(1)
y  0:053
(1:738)
f2g
 0:6 0:8 0:9 1:0
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this
table reports estimates of the parameters of interest for
the (P)ARCH and (P)ARCH-L models.
di,(i = o; h; f; e; c) are coefcients of dummy variables.
ylag 2 of output growth (negative insignicant) also included.
zdummies in the variance equation also included.
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The numbers in {} indicate the order of lags.
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Table 3.53. (P)ARCH-ML Models with Dummies, Conditional Variance in Mean
Japanz South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 0:204
(1:985)
0:059
(2:206)
 0:002
(0:047)
0:107
(3:055)
do  1:618
(4:608)
     3:390
(6:806)
dh  1:361
(3:811)
     
df    2:898
(4:596)
   
de  1:255
(4:022)
   7:844
(3:735)
 1:497
(1:975)
dc
DC1 DC2
 3:022
(3:003)
 8:650
(5:955)
 4:122
(2:491)
 6:422
(5:543)
 8:790
(4:917)
 1:0 1:0 0:9 1:3
Mean-level
k 0:248
(1:612)
0:048
(1:946)
 0:001
(0:049)
0:140
(2:798)
do  1:382
(4:313)
     3:672
(7:000)
dh  1:184
(3:229)
     
df    4:737
(2:740)
   
de  1:100
(3:038)
   7:780
(3:697)
 4:581
(2:272)
dc
DC1 DC2
 2:939
(3:004)
 9:174
(7:196)
 4:273
(2:435)
 6:255
(5:073)
 10:474
(8:842)

i  0:105
(3:943)
f3g
 0:078
(1:735)
f1g
 0:042
(1:731)
f2g
 0:038
(0:818)
f1g
y  0:087
(1:542)
f2g
 0:5 0:9 1:0 1:3
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table
reports estimates of the parameters of interest for the various
(P)ARCH-M and (P)ARCH-ML models. In all cases g(ht) = ht.
di,(i = o; h; f; e; c) are coefcients of dummy variables.
ylag 2 of output growth (negative insignicant) also included.
zdummies in the variance equation also included.
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The numbers in {} indicate the order of lags.
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3.7 Conclusions
We use monthly data for four Asian countries/regions to test the relationship between
output growth and its variability. Our empirical approach employs a PARCH model that
allows lagged growth to appear in the conditional variance equation. Various alternative
specications are estimated in order to conrm the robustness of our results. These spec-
ications allow for different forms of growth uncertainty as regressor in the mean, also
allow the impact of ination on growth and growth uncertainty. In addition, our mod-
els are also estimated with dummy variables in order to establish robustness to major
events such as oil shocks and the credit crunch. We derive two main conclusions. First,
we nd evidence in supporting of Mirman(1971), Black (1987) and Blackburn (1999)
that output volatility has positive effect on economic performance in three of the four
countries/regions, however, signicance of this positive impact is subjects to the form of
growth uncertainty, we nd that, growth uncertainty in form of the logarithm of condi-
tional variance in South Korea and in form of conditional variance in Taiwan are most
robust. For Japan, we nd signicant positive impact from growth uncertainty on growth
when dummy variables were taken in to account but only when the growth uncertainty
take the form of conditional standard deviation can survive in the (P)ARCH-ML mod-
els. Second, we nd strong evidence that growth negatively affects its uncertainty via the
channel of ination uncertainty. Overall, the relationship between growth and its vari-
ability which, in most of the cases considered, is bi-directional (with the causal effect of
the former on the latter being negative). These results support the recent emphasis on
the treatment of the variability of the business cycle in tandem with the theory of eco-
nomic growth. Furthermore, our evidence for bi-directional causality between growth
and its variability with mixed signs concurs with the predictions of theoretical models by
Blackburn and Galinder (2003) and Blackburn and Pelloni (2004) that either type of cor-
relation (positive or negative) between the two variables depend on the type of learning
and the type of shocks hitting the economy.
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Table 3.54. (P)ARCH-ML Models with Dummies, Conditional Standard Deviation in
Mean
Japanz South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 1:374
(1:859)
0:443
(2:411)
 0:021
(0:062)
0:669
(3:145)
do  2:173
(3:594)
     3:265
(6:811)
dh  1:608
(3:354)
     
df    5:009
(2:497)
   
de  1:251
(2:659)
   7:751
(3:729)
 1:258
(1:505)
dc
DC1 DC2
 3:236
(2:465)
 11:785
(4:776)
 4:266
(2:438)
 6:612
(5:765)
 8:762
(2:387)
 0:7 0:9 0:8 1:2
Mean-level
k 0:765
(1:701)
0:342
(1:852)
 0:033
(0:105)
2:017
(4:156)
do  1:333
(3:542)
     4:473
(10:612)
dh  1:206
(3:279)
     
df    3:292
(5:288)
   
de  1:007
(2:503)
   7:661
(3:725)
 4:974
(1:994)
dc
DC1 DC2
 2:843
(3:085)
 8:294
(7:600)
 4:923
(2:602)
 6:585
(5:682)
 10:350
(3:872)

i  0:073
(4:419)
f3g
 0:048
(1:914)
f1g
 0:029
(1:728)
f2g
 0:019
(0:738)
f1g
y  0:182
(8:302)
f2g
 0:7 0:7 0:8 1:4
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table
reports estimates of the parameters of interest for the various
(P)ARCH-M and (P)PARCH-ML models. In all cases g(ht) =
p
ht.
di,(i = o; h; f; e; c) are coefcients of dummy variables.
ylag 2 of output growth (negative insignicant) also included.
zdummies in the variance equation also included.
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The numbers in {} indicate the order of lags.
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Table 3.55. (P)ARCH-ML Models with Dummies, Logarithm of the Conditional Variance
in Mean
Japanz South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 0:386
(1:838)
0:612
(2:503)
 0:072
(0:088)
1:125
(3:038)
do  1:605
(4:186)
     3:225
(6:418)
dh  1:421
(4:023)
     
df    2:557
(2:995)
   
de  1:178
(3:599)
   7:627
(3:683)
 1:168
(1:438)
dc
DC1 DC2
 2:707
(2:873)
 7:951
(6:213)
 4:520
(2:773)
 6:713
(6:008)
 8:589
(2:358)
 1:0 0:8 0:8 1:1
Mean-level
k 0:314
(1:248)
0:486
(2:330)
 0:059
(0:069)
2:753
(5:778)
do  1:496
(4:004)
     4:875
(10:382)
dh  1:284
(3:463)
     
df    3:173
(6:027)
   
de  1:164
(2:788)
   7:754
(3:727)
 4:271
(11:471)
dc
DC1 DC2
 2:590
(3:083)
 7:648
(6:133)
 4:935
(2:626)
 6:428
(5:391)
 10:222
(2:948)

i  0:097
(4:388)
f3g
 0:035
(1:934)
f1g
 0:021
(1:491)
f2g
 0:026
(0:747)
f1g
y  0:139
(10:796)
f2g
 0:9 0:6 0:9 1:3
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table
reports estimates of the parameters of interest for the various
(P)ARCH-M and (P)ARCH-ML models. In all cases g(ht) = ln(ht).
di,(i = o; h; f; e; c) are coefcients of dummy variables.
ylag 2 of output growth (negative insignicant) also included.
zdummies in the variance equation also included.
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The numbers in {} indicate the order of lags.
3.A Appendix 132
3.A Appendix
Table 3.56. Power Term Parameters of (P)ARCH-ML Models
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Simple 0:7 0:5 1:1 1:1
Level 0:5 0:5 1:5 1:0
With Ination
Simple 0:7 0:5 1:1 1:2
Level 0:5 0:5 1:1 0:9
With Structural Break
Simple 0:7 0:9 1:0 0:8
Level 0:6 0:8 0:9 1:0
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table
reports the power term Parameters of the various (P)ARCH
and (P)ARCH-L models.
Table 3.57. Power Term Parameters of (P)ARCH-ML Models with Conditional Variance
in Mean
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean 0:7 0:7 1:1 1:2
Mean-level 0:5 0:7 1:2 1:3
With Ination
Mean 0:7 0:6 0:9 1:6
Mean-level 0:5 0:6 1:0 1:5
With Structural Break
Mean 1:0 1:0 0:9 1:3
Mean-level 0:5 0:9 1:0 1:3
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table
reports the power term Parameters of the various (P)ARCH-M
and (P)ARCH-ML models. In all cases g(ht) = ht.
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Table 3.58. Power Term Parameters of (P)ARCH-ML Models with Conditional Standard
Deviation in Mean
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean 0:7 0:6 1:1 1:1
Mean-level 0:6 0:5 1:1 1:1
With Ination
Mean 0:7 0:5 1:0 1:2
Mean-level 0:5 0:7 1:2 1:0
With Structural Break
Mean 0:7 0:9 0:8 1:2
Mean-level 0:7 0:7 0:8 1:4
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table
reports the power term Parameters of the various (P)ARCH-M
and (P)ARCH-ML models. In all cases g(ht) =
p
ht.
Table 3.59. Power Term Parameters of (P)ARCH-ML Models with Logarithm of the Con-
ditional Variance in Mean
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean 0:7 0:5 1:1 1:0
Mean-level 0:5 0:5 1:1 1:2
With Ination
Mean 0:7 0:6 0:9 1:0
Mean-level 0:5 0:7 1:0 1:4
With Structural Break
Mean 1:0 0:8 0:8 1:1
Mean-level 0:9 0:6 0:9 1:3
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table
reports the power term Parameters of the various (P)ARCH-M
and (P)ARCH-ML models. In all cases g(ht) = ln(ht).
Chapter 4
Is the Relationship Between Ination and its
Uncertainty Linear? Evidence from Asia
4.1 Introduction
68The issue of the welfare costs of ination has been one of the most researched topics
in macroeconomics both on the theoretical and empirical fronts. Friedman (1977) argues
that a rise in ination leads to more nominal uncertainty. The opposite direction of cau-
sation has also been analyzed in the theoretical literature. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986)
argue that central banks tend to create ination surprises in the presence of more nominal
uncertainty. Clarida et al. (1999) emphasize the fact that since the late 1980s a stream of
empirical work has presented evidence that monetary policy may have important effects
on real activity. Consequently, there has been a great resurgence of interest in the issue of
how to conduct monetary policy. If an increase in the rate of ination causes an increase
in its uncertainty, one can conclude that greater uncertainty - which many have found to
be negatively correlated to economic activity - is part of the costs of ination. Thus, if
we attempt to provide a satisfactory answer to the questions What actions should cen-
tral bankers take? and What is the optimal strategy for monetary authorities to follow?
we must rst develop a clear view about the temporal ordering of ination and nominal
uncertainty.
Many studies examining the link between ination and uncertainty use GARCH esti-
mation methods, but they differ in the choice of sample periods, frequency data sets
and empirical specications. For example, Baillie et al. (1996) employ an ARFIMA-
68 This chapter is a sister paper of Karanasos and Schurer (2008), Is the Relationship Between Ination and
its Uncertainty Linear? Introduction and literature sections are generally based on Karanasos and Schurer
(2008).
134
4.1 Introduction 135
GARCH-in-mean model, Grier and Perry (1998) and Fountas and Karanasos (2007) es-
timate univariate component GARCH specications, Conrad and Karanasos (2005a, b)
utilize the ARFIMA-FIGARCHmodel, and Fountas et al. (2006) use a bivariate constant
correlation GARCH formulation.
Despite using different GARCH specications, all these studies focus exclusively on the
standard Bollerslev type of model which assumes the conditional variance is a linear
function of lagged squared errors. There seems to be, however, no economic reason why
one should make such a strong assumption. The common use of a squared term in this
role is most likely to be a reection of the normality assumption traditionally invoked
working with ination data. However, if we accept that ination data are very likely to
have a non-normal error distribution, then the superiority of a squared term is lost and
other power transformations may be more appropriate. Indeed, for non-normal data, by
squaring the ination rates one effectively imposes a structure on the data which may
potentially furnish sub-optimal modeling and forecasting performance relative to other
power terms. If t represents ination in period t, Considers the temporal properties of
the functions of jtjd for positive values of d. We nd, as an empirical fact, that the
autocorrelation function of jtjd is a concave function of d and reaches its maximum
when d is smaller than one. This result serves as an argument against a Bollerslev type
model.
In this chapter, we illustrate these concerns empirically for Japan, South Korea, Singa-
pore and Taiwan using a parametric power ARCH model (PARCH). The PARCH model
can be viewed as a standard GARCHmodel for observations that have been changed by a
sign-preserving power transformation implied by a (modied) PARCH parameterization.
The PARCH model increases the exibility of the conditional variance specication by
allowing the data to determine the power of ination for which the predictable structure
in the volatility pattern is the strongest. This feature in the volatility processes of ination
has major implications for the ination-uncertainty hypothesis. To test for the relation-
ship between the two variables we use the simultaneous-estimation approach. Under this
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approach, we estimate a PARCH-in-mean model with the conditional variance equation
incorporating lags of the ination series (the level effect), thus allowing simultaneous
estimation and testing of the bidirectional causality between the ination series and the
associated uncertainty. Moreover, He and Terävirta (1999) emphasize that if the stan-
dard Bollerslev type of model is augmented by the `heteroscedasticity' parameter (the
power term), the estimates of the ARCH and GARCH coefcients almost certainly
change. More importantly, we nd that the ination-uncertainty relationship is sensi-
tive to changes in the values of the heteroscedasticity parameter. Put differently, the
estimated values of the in-mean and the level effects are fragile to changes in the
power term.
The chapter is organized as follows: In section 2 we consider in more detail the hypothe-
ses about the causality between ination and its uncertainty. In Section 3, we describe the
time series model for ination and explain its merits. We report the empirical results in
Section 4 and in Section 5 we evaluate the robustness of our ndings. Section 6 outlines
our conclusions and discusses our results.
4.2 The Link between Ination and Its Uncertainty
4.2.1 Theory
The effect of ination on its uncertainty is theoretically ambiguous. The Friedman (1977)
hypothesis stresses the harmful effects of nominal uncertainty on employment and pro-
duction. On this basis several researchers contend that a high rate of ination produces
greater uncertainty about the future direction of government policy and, thus, about fu-
ture rates of ination. Ball (1992) formalizes this idea in the context of a repeated game
between the monetary authority and the public. This extension of a Barro-Gordon model
introduces exogenous shocks and two Central Bank (CB) policy-makers, one Conserva-
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tive and one Liberal, who have different preferences over how to react in times of high
ination. During these times the public is confused because it does not know which pol-
icy maker is in charge. This incomplete information, in return, increases the public's
uncertainty about future ination. In accordance with the Friedman hypothesis we test
for a positive effect.
In contrast, Ungar and Zilberfarb (1993) propose a mechanism that may weaken, offset,
or even reverse the direction of the traditional view concerning the ination-uncertainty
relationship. They argue that, as ination rises, economic agents invest more resources
in forecasting it, thus reducing nominal uncertainty. However, this effect might only be
present in periods of extreme ination, which means that it comes into action only if the
ination rate surpasses a crucial threshold.
On the other hand, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) predict that an increase in uncertainty
will raise ination due to the behavior of the CB in an uncertain environment. Their
model is embedded in a Barro-Gordon setting in which the CB is not tied to a commit-
ment rule on money supply growth. Therefore, the CB can pursue both objectives of
keeping ination low and stimulating the economy by surprise ination. Since the
objective function of the CB and the money supply process are modelled as random vari-
ables, the public has difculties inferring what caused higher ination. It could be either
that the CB nds it more important to stimulate the economy or that a random money
supply shock occurred. Due to this information asymmetry the CB has an incentive to
create ination surprises in the presence of higher nominal uncertainty. In accordance
with the Cukierman and Meltzer hypothesis, we test for a positive effect.
Finally, Holland (1995) predicts the opposite effect of uncertainty on ination. He as-
sumes the CB to be motivated by a desire for stability. If the CB analysts observe increas-
ing nominal uncertainty due to an increasing ination rate, the CB will restrict money
supply growth. This measure is justied by reducing the potential of severe negative
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welfare effects of increasing ination. In accordance with the Holland hypothesis, we
test for a negative effect.
4.2.2 Empirical Evidence
The relationship between the two variables has been analyzed extensively in the em-
pirical literature. Recent time series studies have focused particularly on the GARCH
conditional variance of ination as a statistical measure of nominal uncertainty (see, for
example, Grier and Perry, 2000). To test for the relationship between uncertainty and in-
dicators of macroeconomic performance such as ination one can use either the two-step
or the simultaneous-estimation approach.
Under the former approach, estimates of the conditional variance are obtained from the
estimation of a standard GARCHmodel and these estimates are used in running Granger-
causality tests to examine the causality between the two variables. Under the latter ap-
proach the model is estimated with the conditional variance (lagged ination) included
as a right-hand side variable in the mean (variance) equation.
Applying the two-step methodology, Grier and Perry (1998) in the G7 countries, Conrad
and Karanasos (2005b) in Japan, UK and US, Thornton (2007) in some emerging market
economies and Jiranyakul and Opiela (2010) in ASEAN-5 countries, nd that ination
signicantly raises its uncertainty. They also nd evidence in favour of the Cukierman-
Meltzer hypothesis for some countries and in favour of the Holland hypothesis for other
countries. Their results regarding the impact of uncertainty on ination were generally
consistent with the rankings of CB independence (CBI).
Some studies use GARCH models that include a function of the lagged ination rate
in the conditional variance equation. In particular, Brunner and Hess (1993) allow for
asymmetric effects of ination shocks on nominal uncertainty and nd a weak link be-
tween the two variables in the US. Two studies use GARCH type models with a joint
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feedback between the conditional mean and variance of ination. Baillie et al. (1996),
for three high ination countries and the UK, and Karanasos et al. (2004) for the US,
nd strong evidence in favour of a positive bidirectional relationship in accordance with
the predictions of economic theory. Karanasos and Schurer (2008) examine three Eu-
ropean countries by using PARCH models. The paper showed evidence for Friedman
hypothesis, but results for the effect of uncertainty on ination are country specic.
4.3 PARCHModel
We follow the methodology of Karanasos and Schurer (2008) by adopting PARCH esti-
mation for our ination data. Since its introduction by Ding et al. (1993), the PARCH
model has been frequently applied. For example, Hentschel (1995) dened a parametric
family of asymmetric GARCH formulations that nests the EGARCH and PARCH mod-
els. He and Teräsvirta (1999) considered a family of rst-order asymmetric GARCH
processes which includes the asymmetric PARCH (A-PARCH) as a special case. Brooks
et al. (2000) analyzed the applicability of the PARCH models to national stock market
returns for ten countries69. Laurent (2004) derives analytical expressions for the score of
the A-PARCH model. The use of the PARCH model is now widespread in the literature
(see, for example, Mittnik and Paolella, 2000, Giot and Laurent, 2003, Karanasos and
Schurer, 2005, Karanasos and Kim, 2006, and Conrad et al., 2007).
Let t follow an autoregressive (AR) process augmented by a risk premium dened in
terms of volatility
(L)t = 0 + kg(ht) + "t (4.22)
69 It is worth noting that Fornari and Mele (1997) show the usefulness of the PARCH scheme in approx-
imating models developed in continuous time as systems of stochastic differential equations. This feature
of GARCH schemes has usually been overshadowed by their well-known role as simple econometric tools
providing reliable estimates of unobserved conditional variances (Fornari and Mele, 2001).
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with
"t = eth
1
2
t
where by assumption the nite order polynomial (L) =
pX
i=1
Li has zeros outside the
unit circle. In addition, fetg are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) random
variables with E (et) = E (e2t   1) = 0 . The conditional variance of ination ftg , is
positive with probability one and is a measurable function of the sigma-algebra
P
t 1,
which is generated by ft 1; t 2; :::g.
Furthermore, we need to choose the form in which the time-varying variance enters the
specication of the mean to determine the risk premium. This is a matter of empirical
evidence. In the empirical results that follow we employ three specications for the
functional form of the `risk premium' (g (ht) = ht , g (ht) =
p
ht, or g (ht) = ln (ht)).
Moreover, ht is specied as an A-PARCH(1, 1) process with lagged ination included in
the variance equation
h

2
t = ! + f (et 1) + h

2
t 1 + 
lt l (4.23)
with
f (et 1) = [jet 1j   et 1]
where  with  > 0 is the `heteroscedasticity' parameter,  and  are the ARCH and
GARCH coefcients respectively,  with jj < 1 is the leverage term and 
l is the
level term for the lth lag of ination. The model imposes a Box-Cox power transforma-
tion of the conditional standard deviation process and the asymmetric absolute residuals.
The expected value of f (et 1) is given by:
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E [f (et 1)] =
8><>:
1p

h
(1  ) + (1 + )
i
2(

2
 1) 
 
+1
2

; if et 1
(i:d) N(0; 1)
(r 2) 2  ( r 2 ) ( +12 )
 ( r2)2
p

h
(1  ) + (1 + )
i
; if et 1
(i:d) tr(0; 1)
9>=>;
where N and t denote the Normal and student-t distributions respectively, r are the de-
grees of freedom of the student-t distribution and   (:) is the Gamma function. The th
moment of the conditional variance is a function of the above expression (see Karanasos
and Kim, 2006).
Within the A-PARCH model, by specifying permissible values for , , ,  and 
l in
Equation (4.23), it is possible to nest a number of the more standard ARCH and GARCH
specications (see Ding et al., 1993, Hentschel, 1995, and Brooks et al., 2000). For
example, in Equation (4.23) let  = 2 and  = 
l = 0 to get the GARCH model. In order
to distinguish the general model in Equations (4.22) and (4.23) from a version in which
k = 
l =  =  = 0, we will hereafter refer to the former as A-PARCH-in-mean-level
(A-PARCH-ML) and the latter as PARCH.
4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Power-transformed Ination
We use monthly data on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as proxies for the price level70.
The data range from 1965:02 to 2010:01 and covers four Asian countries/regions, namely,
Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan.
70 Most studies use CPI based ination measures (i.e., Conrad and Karanasos, 2005a, b), therefore, we
construct our measures also from the CPI. Alternatively, one can use either the Producer Price Index (PPI) or
the GNP deator. Brunner and Hess (1993) use all three measures but they discuss only the results using CPI
ination. Grier and Perry (2000) and Fountas and Karanasos (2007) use both (CPI and PPI) indices and nd
that the results are virtually identical.
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Fig. 4.18. Ination over Time
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Ination is measured by the difference between two months of the logarithm of CPI,
i.e.  = 100ln (CPIt=CPIt 1) , which leaves us with 540 usable observations. The
ination rates of the four countries/regions are plotted in Figure 4.18. Japan, Singapore
and Taiwan had a period of relatively high ination during 1970s, this was mainly due
to the 1970s' oil shock. In South Korea, not only the oil shock but also the South
Korea's export-oriented growth strategy during 1960s to 1970s lead to high ination.
this high ination did not decrease until South Korean authorities started to hold down
and stabilise money growth in late 1970s ((Dueker and Kim, 1999).
Figure 4.19 shows ination by season for these four countries/regions, all of them re-
vealed clear seasonal pattern. Census X12 seasonal adjustment is applied in order to
remove the seasonal circle. Figure 4.20 and Figure 4.21 present the seasonal adjusted in-
ation. All tests and estimations in the rest of this chapter is based on seasonal adjusted
data.
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Fig. 4.19. Ination by Season
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Fig. 4.20. Ination over Time, Seasonal Adjusted
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Fig. 4.21. Ination by Season, Seasonal Adjusted
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The results of the Phillips-Perron unit root tests (not reported) imply that we can treat the
three rates as stationary processes. The summary statistics (not reported) indicate that the
distribution of the three series is skewed to the right and has fat tails. The large values of
the Jarque-Bera statistic imply a deviation from normality.
Next, we examine the sample autocorrelations of the power transformed absolute ina-
tion jtjd for various positive values of d. Figure 4.22 shows the autocorrelogram of jtjd
from lag 1 to 100 for d = 0:5; 1:0; 1:5 and 2:0. The horizontal lines show the 1:96=pT
condence interval (CI) for the estimated sample autocorrelations if the process t is
i.i.d. In our case, T = 540, so CI = 0:0872.
The sample autocorrelations for
pjtj are greater than the sample autocorrelations of
jtjd for d = 1:0; 1:5 and 2:0, for most lags. In other words, the most interesting nding
from the autocorrelogram is that jtjd has the strongest and slowest decaying autocorre-
lation when d = 0:5. Furthermore, the power transformations of absolute ination when
d is less than or equal to one have signicant positive autocorrelations at least up to lag
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Fig. 4.22. Autocorrelation of jtjd
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98 and 100 for Japan and South Korea. This power term is also produced most lags with
signicant positive autocorrelation for Singapore and Taiwan.
Figure 4.23 shows the autocorrelogram for power transformations of absolute residuals
j"tjd from AR models (see Table 4.60 ). We plot the sample autocorrelations from lag
1 to 100 for d = 0:5; 1:0; 1:5 and 2:0. In general, the most interesting nding from the
autocorrelogram is that, at most lags, j"tjd has the lowest autocorrelation when d = 2:0.
To illustrate this more clearly, we calculate the sample autocorrelations of the absolute
value of ination  (d) as a function of d for lags  = 12; 24 and 36 and taking d =
0:1; 0:2; 0:3; to 4:5. Figure 4.24 provides the plots of the calculated  (d). For example,
for lag 12, there is a unique point d equal to 0:5; 0:5; 0:4 and 0:5 for Japan, South Korea,
Singapore and Taiwan respectively, such that 12 (d) reaches its maximum at this point:
for 12 (d) > 12 (d) for d 6= d.
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Fig. 4.23. Autocorrelation of j"tjd
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Fig. 4.24. Autocorrelation of jtjd at Lag 12, 24, 36
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
°
p
LAG12
LAG36
LAG24
Japan
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
°
p
LAG12
LAG36
LAG24
South Korea
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
°
p
LAG12
LAG36
LAG24
Singapore
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.125
0.150
°
p
LAG12
LAG36
LAG24
Taiwan
4.4 Empirical Analysis 147
Fig. 4.25. Autocorrelation of j"tjd at Lag 12, 24, 36
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Since for the choice of the econometric model it is important whether the strength of
autocorrelation persists in the residuals of the model, we analogously present in Figure
4.25 the plots of calculated  (d) for j"tjd. For example, 12 (d), reaches its maximum at
0:6; 0:6; 0:7 and 0:7 for Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan respectively. These
gures conrm the claim that in our data the autocorrelation structure of ination is the
strongest for values of d smaller than one.
4.4.2 Estimated Models of Ination
We proceed with the estimation of the AR-PARCH(1,1) model in Equations (4.22) and
(4.23) in order to take into account the serial correlation observed in the levels and power
transformations of our time series data. These were obtained by quasi-maximum likeli-
hood estimation (QMLE) as implemented in EVIEWS. The best tting specication is
chosen according to the Likelihood Ratio (LR) results and the minimum value of the In-
formation Criteria (IC) (not reported). Once heteroscedasticity in the conditional mean
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Table 4.60. AR Lags
Japan 1; 2; 3; 5; 6; 8; 9; 10
South Korea 1; 2; 3; 9; 10; 12
Singapore 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 8; 12
Taiwan 1; 3; 4; 6; 10; 12
Notes: The numbers represent the AR lags
used in the mean equations of the model.
has been accounted for, an AR(12) specication appears to capture the serial correla-
tion in all four ination series. Table 4.60 reports AR lags for the conditional means of
ination series.
The existence of outliers causes the distribution of ination to exhibit excess kurtosis.
To accommodate the presence of such leptokurtosis, one should estimate the PARCH
models using non-normal distributions. As reported by Palm (1996), the use of a student-
t distribution is widespread in the literature. In accordance with this, we estimate all
the models using two alternative distributions: the normal and the student-t. Moreover,
we allow for the possibility of structure break in the ination data. The mean equation
is modied to include structure break dummy variables. In other words, the dummy
variables are included to reect the difference between high ination periods (oil shock,
growth strategy) and low/normal ination period in the series. We nd that dummies in
all four countries/regions are statistically signicant.
For all countries/regions, we nd the leverage term  to be insignicant and therefore
we re-estimate the model excluding this parameter. The estimated  and  parameter
are highly signicant in all cases. In order to distinguish the general PARCH model
from a version in which is xed to a specic value we will hereafter refer to the latter as
(P)ARCH.
Table 4.61 reports the (P)ARCH models with normal distribution applied on the inno-
vations term. The IC chooses a (P)ARCH model with estimated power term parameter
 = 0:5; 0:5; 0:5 and 0:6 for Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, respectively.
4.4 Empirical Analysis 149
Table 4.61. (P)ARCH Models
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Normal
 0:158
(4:124)
0:138
(3:733)
0:279
(4:980)
0:332
(3:736)
 0:809
(17:030)
0:869
(21:426)
0:674
(7:792)
0:565
(4:680)
 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:6
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this
table reports estimates of the parameters of interest for
the (P)ARCH models. The numbers in parentheses
are z-Statistic. r are the degrees of freedom of Student-t
distribution.
Next, we report the estimation results of an AR-(P)ARCH-M model of ination, with
g(ht) = ht, for all four countries/regions. Table 4.62 reports only the estimated para-
meters of interest. In Japan, South Korea and Singapore the estimates for the in-mean
parameter (k) are statistically signicant (see the Mean panel of Table 4.62). In these
three countries, there is evidence in favour of the Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis as the
value of the in-mean coefcient is positive. We also nd negative in-mean effect for
Taiwan which is in accordance with the Holland hypothesis. For Japan, South Korea and
Singapore, the values of the power coefcients are 0:6. For Taiwan, the power term is
1:0.
In what follows, we report the estimation results of an AR-PARCH-L model of ination
in the four countries/regions with lagged ination included in the conditional variance
as the level effect. In the expressions for the conditional variances reported in Table
4.62, various lags of ination (from 1 to 12) were considered with the best model chosen
on the basis of the minimum value of the AIC (see the Level panel of Table 4.62).
For all countries/regions, there is strong evidence that ination affects its uncertainty
positively as predicted by Friedman (1977) and Ball (1992). The estimated (absolute)
level coefcient is in the range 0:036 < j
ij < 0:086. The chosen value of  are 0:5
(Japan, Singapore) and 0:6 (South Korea, Taiwan).
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Finally, Table 4.62 also reports the estimation results of an AR-(P)ARCH-ML model.
That is, we estimate a system of equations that allows not only the current value of the
conditional variance to affect average ination but also allows lag of the latter to in-
uence the former (see the Mean-Level panel of Table 4.62). All estimated level
coefcients are highly signicant. As with the L model, we again nd support for Fried-
man's hypothesis in all four countries/regions. The level parameter is in the range
0:039 < j
ij < 0:206. Moreover, we show evidence regarding the direction of the impact
of a change in nominal uncertainty on ination. That is, we nd evidence in favour of the
Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis in Japan, South Korea and Singapore. The in-mean pa-
rameter is negative but insignicant in Taiwan. Japan is the country with the highest risk
premium parameter (0:568). As with the Mmodels in all four countries/regions, the val-
ues of the power coefcients are 0:5 except Taiwan. When we include level effects
the impact of uncertainty on ination holds in the similar level. On the other hand, the
impact of ination on its uncertainty is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of in-mean
effects.
Table 4.63 reports for Japan estimates of the k parameters of the (P)ARCH-Mmodel with
g(ht) = ht and errors that are conditionally normal, for various positive : The estimated
values of the in mean effect are sensitive to changes in the power term. Note that the
statistical signicance of the risk premium decreases as the value of  increases (see t-
statistic in brackets in Table 4.63). The most interesting nding is that the autocorrelation
function of jtjd (for lag 12) reaches its maximum, approximately, at this point.
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Table 4.62. (P)ARCH-ML Models, Normal Distribution
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 0:928
(2:778)
0:117
(1:879)
0:210
(2:672)
 0:087
(1:721)
 0:6 0:6 0:6 1:0y
Level

i 0:082
(3:154)
f1g
0:036
(2:079)
f1g
0:074
(1:614)
f1g
0:086
(4:417)
f1g
 0:5 0:6 0:5 0:6
Mean-level
k 0:568
(1:796)
0:158
(2:638)
0:282
(2:748)
 0:037
(0:699)

i 0:071
(3:045)
f1g
0:039
(2:824)
f1g
0:066
(1:775)
f1g
0:206
(3:652)
f1g
 0:5 0:5 0:5 1:4z
Notes: For each of the ve Asian countries/regions, this table
reports estimates of the parameters of interest for the various
(P)ARCH-M, (P)ARCH-L and (P)ARCH-ML models.
In all cases g(ht) = ht.
y No convergence with  < 1:0:
z No convergence with  < 1:4:
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic. r are the degrees of
freedom of Student's t distribution. The numbers in { } indicate
the lags of the `level' terms.
Table 4.63. (P)ARCH-M Models for Japan, Normal Distribution
 0:5 0:6 0:8 1:0 1:2 1:5 1:8 2:0 2:5
k 0:813
(2:719)
0:928
(2:778)
0:406
(1:572)
0:291
(1:094)
0:409
(1:516)
0:357
(1:333)
0:311
(1:208)
0:302
(1:195)
0:306
(1:262)
AIC 0:768 0:760 0:770 0:776 0:777 0:783 0:788 0:792 0:799
LL  192:54  190:15  192:81  194:51  194:88  196:43  197:83  198:71  200:68
Notes: This table reports estimates of the in mean parameters for the (P)ARCH-M models.
In all cases g(ht) = ht. The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The bold numbers indicate the minimum value of the AIC. LL denotes the maximum log-likelihood value.
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Table 4.64. (P)ARCH models with Structural Break
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
 0:207
(4:492)
0:178
(4:532)
0:255
(5:698)
0:404
(3:482)
 0:715
(10:201)
0:838
(21:056)
0:691
(10:862)
0:411
(2:933)
Di  0:217
(5:497)
 0:710
(8:438)
 0:110
(2:737)
 0:417
(4:557)
 0:5 0:6 0:5 0:8
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this
table reports estimates of the parameters of interest for
the (P)ARCH models with structural break.
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
r are the degrees of freedom of Student-t distribution.
4.5.1 Structural Break
In order to capture the difference between high ination periods (oil shock, export-
oriented growth strategy) and low/normal ination period in the series, we use the method-
ology developed by Bai and Perron (2003) to examine whether there is any structural
break in ination and when it occurred. Bai and Perron (2003) address the problem of
testing for multiple structural changes under very general conditions on the data and the
errors. In addition to testing for the existence of breaks, these statistics identify the num-
ber and location of multiple breaks.
Following Bai-Perron methodology, we detected structural break points at February of
1981 for Japan, October of 1981 for South Korea, March of 1982 for Singapore and
August of 1981 for Taiwan, respectively.
Table 4.64 reports the (P)ARCH models with structural break dummy variable incor-
porated in the mean equation and with normal distribution applied on the innovations
term. The IC chooses a (P)ARCH model with estimated power term parameter of  =
0:5; 0:6; 0:5 and 0:8 for Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan respectively. In all
cases, the coefcients for the structural break dummy variables are negative and signi-
cant.
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Next, to check the sensitivity of our results to the presence of structural break in the in-
ation data, we report the estimation results of an AR-(P)ARCH-M model of ination
with structural break dummy variable incorporated in the mean equation and g(ht) = ht
for all four countries/regions. Table 4.65 reports only the estimated parameters of inter-
est and in all cases, the coefcients for the structural break dummy variables are negative
and signicant. Regarding to level effect, the results are very similar to those obtained
without using dummy variables, all four countries/regions' ination have positive im-
pact on its uncertainty, the strong evidence in support of the Friedman hypothesis in all
countries/regions is invariant to the inclusion or exclusion of the in-mean effect. Re-
garding the reverse causal effect, our evidence is country/region specic. As before, the
estimates for the in-mean parameter (k) in Japan and Singapore are positive (0:315
and 0:162) and statistically signicant at 10% levels. Very interestingly, the in mean
effect for South Korea turns around, it become negative and signicant. The impact of
nominal uncertainty on ination in Taiwan is remaining negative and signicant at 2%
level. So, when we take structural break into account, we nd evidence in support of the
Cukierman-Meltzer theory in Japan and Singapore and evidence for the Holland hypoth-
esis in South Korea and Taiwan. When we account for level effects, the inuence of
nominal uncertainty on ination becomes stronger in Japan and Singapore and become
weaker in South Korea and Taiwan. All power term parameters of  are below 1, except
the ML model for Taiwan.
Table 4.66 reports, again for Japan for the same reasons as before, estimates of the pa-
rameters of the (P)ARCH-M model with structural break dummy and g(ht) = ht, for
various positive . Similar to our sensitivity analysis before, the estimated values of the
in mean effect are sensitive to changes in the power term. It is important to mention
that when the errors are conditionally normal and we incorporate structural dummies in
the model the statistical signicance of the risk premium decreases as the value of 
increases. the AIC is minimized when  = 0:5, note that the autocorrelation function of
jtjd (for lag 12) reaches its maximum at this point.
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Table 4.65. (P)ARCH-ML Models with Structrual Break, Normal Distribution
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 0:315
(1:833)
 0:248
(1:921)
0:162
(1:682)
 0:134
(2:556)
 0:5 0:9 0:7 0:9y
Level

i 0:096
(4:140)
f1g
0:106
(3:394)
f1g
0:061
(1:886)
f1g
0:112
(4:369)
f1g
 0:5 0:9 0:5 0:7
Mean-level
k 0:427
(1:736)
 0:141
(1:788)
0:318
(3:725)
 0:088
(2:375)

i 0:080
(4:055)
f1g
0:093
(3:098)
f1g
0:070
(4:086)
f1g
0:208
(3:101)
f1g
 0:5 0:8 0:5 1:4z
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions,
this table reports estimates of the parameters of
interest for the various (P)ARCH-M,(P)ARCH-L
and (P)ARCH-ML models with structural break.
In all cases g(ht) = ht.
y No convergence with  < 0:9:
z No convergence with  < 1:4:
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic. r are the
degrees of freedom of Student's t distribution. The
numbers in { } indicate the lags of the `level' terms.
Table 4.66. (P)ARCH-M Models with Structrual Break for Japan, Normal Distribution
 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:8 1:0 1:5 1:8 2:0 2:5
k 0:361
(2:094)
0:315
(1:833)
0:257
(1:124)
0:211
(0:996)
0:111
(0:472)
0:157
(0:641)
0:160
(0:666)
0:174
(0:746)
0:206
(0:924)
AIC 0:796 0:745 0:747 0:749 0:754 0:762 0:765 0:770 0:777
LL  198:91  185:21  185:70  186:28  187:52  189:66  197:83  191:90  193:87
Notes: This table reports estimates of the in mean parameters for the (P)ARCH-M models.
In all cases g(ht) = ht. The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The bold numbers indicate the minimum value of the AIC. LL denotes the maximum log-likelihood value.
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Table 4.67. (P)ARCH Models,Student-t Distribution
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
without structural dummy
 0:145
(4:311)
0:116
(4:387)
0:339
(5:956)
0:266
(4:867)
 0:863
(25:291)
0:903
(43:989)
0:643
(10:511)
0:533
(5:145)
 0:7 0:7 0:7 0:6
r 5:593
(5:245)
5:298
(4:391)
4:637
(4:803)
3:701
(5:910)
with structural dummy
 0:252
(5:029)
0:238
(4:395)
0:383
(5:951)
0:265
(4:738)
 0:728
(12:958)
0:897
(39:801)
0:582
(8:244)
0:491
(4:050)
Di  0:241
(5:228)
 0:557
(6:091)
 0:049
(1:762)
 0:251
(3:698)
 0:7 0:7 0:7 0:6
r 5:507
(5:336)
5:736
(4:385)
4:430
(4:728)
3:553
(5:997)
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this
table reports estimates of the parameters of interest for
the (P)ARCH models. The numbers in parentheses
are z-Statistic. r are the degrees of freedom of Student-t
distribution.
4.5.2 Student-t Distribution
One important robustness test regards the role of error distribution. To check the sensi-
tivity of our results to the distribution of the innovations we are also using the student-t
distribution. Table 4.67 reports the (P)ARCH models with student-t distribution applied
in the error term. Compare with corresponding models with normal distribution, IC pre-
fer higher values of :
In general, the results are very similar to those obtained when the innovations are drawn
from the normal distribution (see Table 4.68 and 4.69 ). That is, in all four coun-
tries/regions, ination has a positive impact on its uncertainty. Regarding the reverse
causal effect, our evidence is country specic. In particular, in the models without struc-
ture break dummy, we nd ination uncertainty positively impact ination in Japan,
South Korea and Singapore. When structure break is considered, the inuence from
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Table 4.68. (P)ARCH-ML Models, Student-t Distribution
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 1:272
(4:049)
0:199
(2:768)
0:144
(2:798)
 0:014
(0:276)
 0:7 0:8 0:5 1:4y
r 4:998
(5:354)
4:957
(4:608)
4:859
(4:596)
3:898
(5:775)
Level

i 0:093
(2:923)
f1g
0:040
(2:208)
f1g
0:082
(2:666)
f1g
0:107
(4:339)
f1g
 0:7 0:8 0:6 0:6
r 5:911
(5:040)
5:666
(4:162)
4:999
(4:947)
4:602
(5:983)
Mean-level
k 0:439
(1:598)
0:275
(2:860)
0:136
(1:764)
0:0002
(0:004)

i 0:091
(2:935)
f1g
0:044
(2:569)
f1g
0:080
(2:655)
f1g
0:230
(3:329)
 0:8 0:8 0:7 1:4y
r 6:045
(5:112)
5:231
(4:402)
4:833
(4:890)
4:382
(5:982)
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table
reports estimates of the parameters of interest for the various
(P)ARCH-M, (P)ARCH-L and (P)ARCH-ML models with
structural break and assuming Student's t distribution for the
error term. In all cases g(ht) = ht.
y No convergence with  < 1:4:
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
r are the degrees of freedom of Student's t distribution.
The numbers in { } indicate the lags of the `level' terms.
ination uncertainty on ination is positive for Japan and Singapore while, negative for
South Korea and Taiwan (insignicant).
4.5.3 In-mean Structure
Next, to check the sensitivity of our results to the form in which the time varying variance
enters the specication of the mean, we also use either the conditional standard deviation
or the logarithm of the conditional variance as regressor in the mean equation (see Table
4.70 4.71 4.72 and 4.73 ). The strong evidence in support of the Friedman hypothesis in
all countries/regions is invariant to the different form of the in-mean effect and the in-
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Table 4.69. (P)ARCH-ML Models with Structrual Break, Student-t Distribution
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 0:471
(2:159)
 0:050
(0:429)
0:133
(2:005)
 0:052
(0:923)
 0:8 0:7 0:6 1:4y
r 4:173
(5:623)
5:875
(4:450)
4:424
(8:436)
3:859
(5:678)
Level

i 0:083
(2:941)
f1g
0:053
(3:616)
f1g
0:088
(3:139)
f1g
0:089
(4:583)
f1g
 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5
r 6:595
(5:037)
7:471
(3:202)
4:447
(4:729)
4:639
(6:114)
Mean-level
k 0:230
(1:711)
 0:112
(1:729)
0:115
(1:815)
 0:040
(0:574)

i 0:072
(2:847)
f1g
0:048
(4:142)
f1g
0:093
(3:275)
f1g
0:222
(3:332)
 0:5 0:5 0:5 1:4y
r 6:307
(5:352)
7:818
(3:072)
4:356
(4:787)
4:421
(5:929)
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table
reports estimates of the parameters of interest for the various
(P)ARCH-M, (P)ARCH-L and (P)ARCH-ML models with
structural break and assuming Student's t distribution for the
error term. In all cases g(ht) = ht.
y No convergence with  < 1:4:
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
r are the degrees of freedom of Student's t distribution.
The numbers in { } indicate the lags of the `level' terms.
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Table 4.70. (P)ARCH-ML Models,Varying Variance in Mean, Normal Distributions
g(ht) =
p
ht g(ht) = ln(ht)
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 0:531
(2:616)
0:377
(4:688)
0:224
(3:853)
 0:048
(0:397)
0:044
(2:125)
0:050
(2:648)
0:055
(2:334)
 0:037
(0:699)
 0:5 0:5 0:6 0:8 0:5 0:5 0:6 0:5
Mean-level
k 0:547
(2:337)
0:471
(3:423)
0:194
(1:842)
0:109
(0:981)
0:096
(2:343)
0:186
(4:665)
0:056
(2:467)
0:033
(0:356)

i 0:062
(3:349)
f1g
0:040
(2:540)
f1g
0:072
(1:749)
f1g
0:107
(4:668)
f1g
0:067
(3:643)
f1g
0:098
(3:795)
f1g
0:052
(1:652)
f1g
0:097
(5:060)
f1g
 0:5 0:6 0:5 0:7 0:5 0:5 0:6 0:6
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table reports estimates
of the parameters of interest for the various(P)ARCH-M and (P)ARCH-ML
models and assuming normal distribution for the error term.
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The numbers in {} indicate the lags of the level terms.
mean effects are the same as our previous results in the models without structural break.
In the models with structural break incorporated, the signs of all in-mean coefcients
are same with the results form models which with conditional variance in mean, however,
these effects become insignicant in Japan and South Korea when error term assumed
to be normal distributed, and none of them are statistically signicant when student-t
distribution applied in the error. This result indicates that the models with conditional
variance as measurement of uncertainty have most robust results.
4.6 Conclusions
The results presented above carry noteworthy implications for macroeconomic modelling
and policy making. Our very strong evidence on the Friedman hypothesis is in broad
agreement with the ndings of the overwhelming majority of empirical studies. The
country-specic evidence on the Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis is anticipated given that
national central banks adjust their rate of money growth differently to nominal uncer-
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Table 4.71. (P)ARCH-ML Models wih Structrual Break,Varying Variance in Mean, Nor-
mal Distributions
g(ht) =
p
ht g(ht) = ln(ht)
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 0:027
(0:161)
 0:173
(1:483)
0:237
(3:023)
 0:347
(1:830)
0:002
(0:129)
 0:025
(0:653)
0:062
(3:604)
 0:178
(2:004)
 0:7 0:5 0:7 0:8 0:5 0:8 0:5 0:6
Mean-level
k 0:203
(0:660)
 0:084
(1:060)
0:215
(2:559)
 0:366
(1:747)
0:091
(0:220)
 0:007
(0:234)
0:039
(2:495)
 0:156
(1:723)

i 0:105
(4:417)
f1g
0:058
(3:037)
f1g
0:059
(1:888)
f1g
0:126
(3:897)
f1g
0:112
(4:360)
f1g
0:071
(3:125)
f1g
0:065
(1:865)
f1g
0:176
(3:171)
f1g
 0:6 0:5 0:5 0:8 0:7 0:6 0:6 1:2y
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table reports estimates
of the parameters of interest for the various (P)ARCH-M and (P)ARCH-ML
models with structural break and assuming normal distribution for the error term.
yNo convergence with  < 1:2:
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic.
The numbers in {} indicate the lags of the level terms.
Table 4.72. (P)ARCH-ML Models,Varying Variance in Mean, Student-t Distributions
g(ht) =
p
ht g(ht) = ln(ht)
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 0:695
(3:350)
0:300
(2:934)
0:054
(14:251)
0:217
(1:605)
0:085
(2:687)
0:055
(2:043)
0:030
(1:981)
0:072
(1:074)
 0:8 0:7 0:7 0:6 0:9 0:8 0:7 0:6
r 4:897
(84:015)
5:140
(4:478)
4:637
(4:803)
3:490
(5:999)
4:853
(5:313)
5:225
(4:432)
4:847
(4:671)
3:618
(5:917)
Mean-level
k 0:557
(1:764)
0:388
(2:751)
0:182
(1:943)
0:231
(1:294)
0:074
(1:868)
0:343
(6:412)
0:036
(1:855)
0:072
(1:118)

i 0:097
(2:982)
f1g
0:043
(2:668)
f1g
0:089
(2:807)
f1g
0:103
(4:402)
f1g
0:105
(3:084)
f1g
0:177
(5:539)
f1g
0:090
(2:864)
f1g
0:106
(4:185)
f1g
 0:8 0:8 0:7 0:6 0:7 0:9 0:7 0:6
r 5:991
(5:122)
5:367
(4:219)
4:893
(4:852)
4:487
(5:989)
5:976
(5:199)
3:201
(5:747)
4:913
(4:816)
4:620
(5:933)
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table reports estimates
of the parameters of interest for the various (P)ARCH-M and (P)ARCH-ML
models with structural break and assuming Student's t distribution for the error term.
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic. r are the degrees of freedom of
Student's t distribution. The numbers in {} indicate the lags of the level terms.
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Table 4.73. (P)ARCH-ML Models with Structrual Break,Varying Variance in Mean, Stu-
dent-t Distributions
g(ht) =
p
ht g(ht) = ln(ht)
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Mean
k 0:136
(1:107)
 0:074
(0:457)
0:043
(0:457)
 0:165
(0:959)
0:027
(0:129)
 0:009
(0:263)
0:019
(0:999)
 0:074
(0:930)
 0:6 0:9 0:7 0:8 0:7 0:9 0:7 0:6
r 5:502
(5:357)
5:840
(4:479)
4:492
(4:702)
3:741
(5:801)
5:201
(5:249)
5:827
(4:485)
4:617
(10:168)
3:691
(5:987)
Mean-level
k 0:292
(1:308)
 0:076
(0:477)
0:105
(1:045)
 0:058
(0:289)
0:027
(1:027)
 0:008
(0:261)
0:025
(1:142)
 0:042
(0:473)

i 0:098
(3:059)
f1g
0:083
(3:323)
f1g
0:100
(2:924)
f1g
0:141
(4:056)
f1g
0:112
(3:032)
f1g
0:057
(3:120)
f1g
0:105
(3:017)
f1g
0:109
(4:416)
f1g
 0:6 0:9 0:7 0:8 0:7 0:7 0:7 0:6
r 6:211
(5:122)
6:908
(3:310)
4:682
(4:798)
4:571
(6:055)
6:241
(5:470)
6:984
(3:392)
4:675
(4:778)
4:718
(6:144)
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table reports estimates
of the parameters of interest for the various (P)ARCH-M and (P)ARCH-ML
models with structural break and assuming Student's t distribution for the error term.
The numbers in parentheses are z-Statistic. r are the degrees of freedom of
Student's t distribution. The numbers in {} indicate the lags of the level terms.
tainty depending on their relative preference towards ination stabilisation. Previous
literature reports mixed results that are sensitive to factors such as the measure of uncer-
tainty and the countries examined. In general, when we use the value of the power term
that is preferred by the IC, we nd that the evidence in support of the Cukierman-Meltzer
hypothesis for Japan and Singapore are robust to i ) the distribution of the innovations
and ii) the presence of structural break in the ination data. We show, however, that the
signicance of the in-mean effect is sensitive to the choice of the heteroscedasticity
parameter. Moreover, we nd positive in-mean effect for South Korea in the models
without structural dummy and negative in mean effect when the structural dummy is
incorporated. Though, we nd negative in mean effect for Taiwan, and this effect only
became statistically signicant when the model be estimated with normal distribution ap-
plied on the error term and structure break was considered. One possible reason for these
differences among countries/regions is that they follow different monetary policies and
dispose of different Central Banking institutions.
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Our results on Japan and Singapore are highly consist with other empirical literatures,
such as, Grier and Perry (1998), Conrad and Karanasos (2005b), Chen et al (2008) and
Jiranyakul and Opiela (2010). These results are well explained by existing theories, given
that Japan and Singapore are generally been considered as exchange rate targeting coun-
tries, rather than monetary authorities which adopt ination rate targeting policy. Refer-
ring to Taiwan, the empirical evidence for the effect of uncertainty on ination is unclear,
for example, Chen et al (2006) use moving average standard deviation as proxy of un-
certainty nd positive linear effect and negative nonlinear effect on ination. Chen et al
(2008) claim a invented U-shape relationship when they describe the impact of ination
uncertainty on ination itself. This may due to the growth under the stable environment
policy that Taiwan monetary authority are pursuing, that is, promote economy when price
stability within certain threshold (Shen and Hakes, 1995). Shouth Korea seems to be
a good evidence of Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis as South Korean authority adopted
export-oriented growth strategy in 1960s and 1970s and they controlled exchange rate
tightly (Start to transit to oating system at the end of 1997). Thomton(1997) and Chen
et al (2008) both nd very signicant results in favour of Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis
in South Korea with data that covers different growth strategy periods. However, none of
them took this possible structure break in to consideration. Our result of South Korea in
line with these two researches when we estimate our models without structural dummy
variable, but when structural dummy is incorporated in, the result reveal a sharp contrast:
ination uncertainty impact on ination negatively and signicantly, no matter the er-
ror term draw from normal distribution or student-t distribution. This dramatic outcome
in favour of Holland hypothesis chime in with Dueker and Kim (1999) who claim that
ination was strictly controlled by South Korean monetary authority even in the export-
oriented growth strategy period, the upper threshold of tolerable annual ination for the
Bank of Korea was about 20% before 1983 and 6% after.
Our results also highlight the importance of using the PARCH specication to model the
power transformation of the conditional variance of ination. It increases the exibility
of the conditional variance specication by allowing the data to determine the power
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of ination, for which the predictable structure in the volatility pattern is the strongest.
The statistical signicance of the in-mean effect is highly dependent on the choice
of the value of the heteroscedasticity parameter. For normal distribution, the effect
becomes insignicant if the power term surpasses a specic value. This suggests that
if we had assumed a prior linear relationship between ination and its uncertainty, the
so-called Bollerslev specication, we would not detect any signicant link between the
two variables. Most interestingly, this value coincides with the one chosen by the IC and
the one for which the sample autocorrelation of the power-transformed ination series is
maximal. Whether this coincidence is systematic will be the focus of further research.
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4.A Appendix
Table 4.74. Power Term Parameters of (P)ARCH-ML Models
Normal Distribution Student-t Distribution
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Without Structural Break
Simple 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:7 0:7 0:6
Level 0:5 0:6 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:6 0:6
With Structural Break
Simple 0:5 0:6 0:5 0:8 0:7 0:7 0:7 0:6
Level 0:5 0:9 0:5 0:7 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table
reports the power term Parameters of the various (P)ARCH
and (P)ARCH-L models.
Table 4.75. Power Term Parameters of (P)ARCH-ML Models with Conditional Variance
in Mean
Normal Distribution Student-t Distribution
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Without Structural Break
Mean 0:6 0:6 0:6 1:0y 0:7 0:8 0:5 1:4z
Mean-level 0:5 0:5 0:5 1:4z 0:8 0:8 0:7 1:4z
With Structural Break
Mean 0:5 0:9 0:7 0:9? 0:8 0:7 0:6 1:4z
Mean-level 0:5 0:8 0:5 1:4z 0:5 0:5 0:5 1:4z
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table
reports the power term Parameters of the various (P)ARCH-M
and (P)ARCH-ML models. In all cases g(ht) = ht.
yNo convergence with  < 1:0
?No convergence with  < 0:9
zNo convergence with  < 1:4
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Table 4.76. Power Term Parameters of (P)ARCH-ML Models with Conditional Standard
Deviation in Mean
Normal Distribution Student-t Distribution
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Without Structural Break
Mean 0:5 0:5 0:6 0:8 0:8 0:7 0:7 0:6
Mean-level 0:5 0:6 0:5 0:7 0:8 0:8 0:7 0:6
With Structural Break
Mean 0:7 0:5 0:7 0:8 0:6 0:9 0:7 0:8
Mean-level 0:6 0:5 0:5 0:8 0:6 0:9 0:7 0:8
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table
reports the power term Parameters of the various (P)ARCH-M
and (P)ARCH-ML models. In all cases g(ht) =
p
ht.
Table 4.77. Power Term Parameters of (P)ARCH-ML Models with Logarithm of the Con-
ditional Variance in Mean
Normal Distribution Student-t Distribution
Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan Japan South Korea Singapore Taiwan
Without Structural Break
Mean 0:5 0:5 0:6 0:5 0:9 0:8 0:7 0:6
Mean-level 0:5 0:5 0:6 0:6 0:7 0:9 0:7 0:6
With Structural Break
Mean 0:5 0:8 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:9 0:7 0:6
Mean-level 0:7 0:6 0:6 1:2y 0:7 0:7 0:7 0:6
Notes: For each of the four Asian countries/regions, this table
reports the power term Parameters of the various (P)ARCH-M
and (P)ARCH-ML models. In all cases g(ht) = ln(ht).
yNo convergence with  < 1:2
Chapter 5
Dual Long-memory and the Link between
Bid-ask Spread, Volatility and Volume in
FTSE100
5.1 Introduction
One of the most critical factors that investors look for in any market is liquidity. Liquidity
is dened as the ability to trade stock rapidly with little price impact. To maintain liq-
uidity, exchanges use market makers, who are individuals willing to provide a nancial
market whenever the investors wish to trade. In return for providing the nancial mar-
ket, market makers are granted monopoly rights by the exchange to post different prices
for stock purchases and sales. As a result, market makers buy stock at the bid price and
sell the stock at the higher ask price. This ability to buy the stock low and sell high is the
market makers' compensation for providing liquidity in the nancial market. Their com-
pensation is dened as the ask price minus the bid price, which in turn is dened as the
bid-ask spread.
Therefore the ask (bid) price is the price that investors actually pay to purchase (sell)
stock. Investors pay these prices instead of the quoted stock price to ensure that market
makers are compensated for providing liquidity in the nancial market71. Purchases and
sales of assets at the ask and bid prices are common in nancial markets. For example,
derivatives asset pricing of both call and put options is found to be more closely related
to the ask and bid prices rather than the usually employed mid-price, Gregoriou et al
(2007).
71 Note the quoted stock price is usually the mid price between the ask and bid prices. The mid price is
dened as ((ask price  bid price)/2).
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Studies such as Atkins and Dyl (1997), Constantinides (1986), Glosten and Harris (1988),
Menyah and Paudyal (2000) and Stoll (1989) relate the spread or the change in the spread
to a vector of characteristics that are associated with the individual securities. These
factors identied in prior spread models are the market value of the rm, the risk of the
security (usually approximated by the standard deviation of returns), and trading volume.
This chapter tries to contribute to the study of the relationship between spread, volatility,
and trading volume in FTSE100 stock index by investigating two-way causality relation-
ships using a bivariate AR-FI-GARCH model and multiple measurements of risk and
spread. Specially, we distinguish the inventory cost component of the bid-ask spread and
the information cost component of the bid-ask spread. the impact of electronic trading
system also be considered.
5.2 Literature Review
Early research on the relationship between bid-ask spread and volatility includes Benston
and Hagerman (1974), Stoll (1978) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) who nd that price
volatility is one of the key explanatory variables on bid-ask spread and have positive ef-
fects on bid-ask spread. Roll (1984) and Karpoff (1986) argue that market makers widen
the bid-ask spread when the variance of returns increases in order to compensate the cost
with increasing risk in security market, this is because the higher the risk, the harder it is
for the market maker to trade the stock, and the market maker has to increase the bid-ask
spread in order to compensate the great cost of inventory. Admati and Peiderer (1988)
and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) also point out that dealers widen the bid-ask spread to
compensate for their informational disadvantage when informed trading increase which
is implied by the rise in the risk. Informed traders tend to be more active when liquidity
trading is concentrated, since price is more informative in these periods and this inter-
action between informed traders and liquidity traders leads to higher volatility of stock
price (Admati and Peiderer, 1988). The positive relationship between bid-ask spread
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and volatility in various markets has been proved by many studies such as Ding and
Chong (1997) who study the Nikkei stock index futures trading in the Singapore Mon-
etary Exchange (SIMEX). Their results implied a positive correlation between bid-ask
spread and volatility. Wang and Yau (2000) use a GMM estimation procedure investi-
gate the S&P500, the deutsche mark, silver and gold futures contracts, the results show
that price volatility and bid-ask spread are positively related, and they also nd negative
relationship between trading volume and bid-ask spread. Ding and Charoenwong (2003)
show evidence of a positive relationship between volatility and bid-ask spread and a neg-
ative relationship between trading volume and bid-ask spread also exist in thinly traded
equity index futures contracts on the Singapore Exchange. In agricultural futures mar-
kets, Bryant and Haigh (2004) nd that for LIFFE coffee, bid-ask spread get wider when
volatility rises, again bid-ask spread and volume are negatively related, but for cocoa,
these relationships only appear after electronic trading was adopted. They also pointed
out that electronic trading widens the bid-ask spread. Frank and Garcia (2009) suggest
that in agricultural futures markets volume and volatility are endogenous variables and
signicantly relate to the bid-ask spread. Volatility has positive effect on the bid-ask
spread while volume negatively correlated with the bid-ask spread, but their result indi-
cate a decrease in bid-ask spread after trading was computerized, which is in line with
Pirrong (1996) and Gilbert and Rijken (2006). In the stock market, Gillemot et al (2005)
who investigate stocks with high capitalization in both NYSE and LSE, detect positive
correlation between spread and volatility. Kanagaretnam et al (2005) study NYSE trans-
actions around quarterly earning announcements, their results indicate a positive correla-
tion between abnormal spread and revision volatility. Gregoriou et al (2005) also nd that
volatility of returns has a positive impact on the spread of FTSE 100 companies, while
the same result is also found in the Australian Stock Exchange by Frino and Jones (2005).
In the foreign exchange markets, the relationship between the magnitude of spread and
the underlying exchange rate volatility is tested by Bollerslev and Melvin (1994) using an
MA(l)-GARCH(l, 1) model. Strong positive relationship between volatility and spreads
are highly statistically signicant. Interestingly, Booth and Gurun (2008) following the
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Bollerslev and Melvin (1994) approach nd that properties of nancial markets that ex-
isted 600 years ago can also be described by modern economic models and reveal same
character as today's nancial markets.
On the other hand, the impact of the trading cost and the information asymmetry on
volatility is also gained many scholars' interests. The effect of the trading cost on volatil-
ity is still not very clear. Tobin (1978, 1984), Stiglitz (1989) and Summers and Sum-
mers (1989) argue that higher transaction costs will lead to a lower market volatility
since it would discourage short-term speculation which is believed as turmoil in the mar-
ket. However, opposing views include Friedman (1953), Miller (1991), Dooley (1996)
who believe that short-term speculation would benet the market stabilization as well.
Grundfest and Shoven (1991) and Kupiec (1996) also point out that higher transaction
cost leads to lower transaction frequency which requires larger price movement. Empir-
ical researches show mixed results, Roll (1989) investigates 23 markets and nds nega-
tive but insignicant correlation between transaction tax and stock volatility. Mulherin
(1990) gets the same result between the NYSE trading cost and the Dow Jones returns.
Liu and Zhu (2009) follow the same methods of Jones and Seguin (1997) nd that lower
commission rate lead to higher market volatility in Japan. Norden (2009) studies the
OMX Nordic Exchange before and after the reduction of the exchange fee for trading
the OMXS 30 index futures with more than 22% in 2006, the result indicates that the
reduction of trading cost leads to higher liquidity (higher trading volume, lower bid-ask
spread) in the market, it also brings greater risk (higher volatility). Umlauf (1993) studies
Swedish equity returns in the 1980s and shows positive relationship between the trans-
action tax and the market volatility. Positive correlation also be found in the US market
by Jones and Seguin (1997), in the UK market by Saporta and Kan (1997) and in French
market by Hau (2006). Green et al (2000, p.595) classify different transaction cost and
identify various measures of the market volatility in London Stock Exchange, point out
that increased transactions costs generally increase market volatility, probably through
a thin trading effect. However, increased transactions costs tend to reduce fundamental
volatility.
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French and Roll (1986) and Jones et al. (1994) point out that the private information af-
fects price via trading. Crouzille et al. (2004) use event study on the effect of asymmet-
ric information on the bank stock price volatility, their results show that unexpected bank
stock volatility can not be easily detected by using proxies of the information asymmetry.
Puffer (1991) points out that the private information in Tokyo market not only inuences
return volatility in Tokyo market but also affects that of New York market. McGroarty et
al. (2009) follow the idea of Easley and O'Hara (1992) that the private information as-
sociates with unexpected volume and use unexpected order ow and unexpected volume
as proxies for the private information, their results show that the informed trading gener-
ates volatility in the market and this volatility larger than the volatility generated by the
uninformed trading.
5.3 Data
Our daily data of FTSE100 index starts from 1st September 1992 to 30th April 2004,
2948 observations are included. Figure 5.26 shows the four measurements of spread
we use, SPRD is the relative bid-ask spread, ESPRD stands for the effective bid-ask
spread, CSPRD and ISPRD represent the estimated inventory cost component of the
bid-ask spread and the estimated information cost component of the bid-ask spread re-
spectively. We use two measurements of price volatility: close-to-close volatility (PVLT)
and range-based volatility (GVLT) ( see Figure 5.27). Figure 5.28 shows the measure-
ment of volume: SVLM which is the 100-day backward moving average of turnover by
volume.
5.3.1 Spread Measures
We use four spread measures to proxy the liquidity of the stock index. The rst measure
is the relative bid-ask spread (SPRD) which is dened as the ask price minus the bid
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Fig. 5.26. Measurements of Spread
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Fig. 5.27. Measurements of Volatility
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
GVLT
GVLT
0
100
200
300
400
500
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
PVLT
PVLT
5.3 Data 171
Fig. 5.28. Measurement of Volume
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price divided by the average of the bid and ask prices. However, Lee and Ready (1991)
point out the problem with the relative spread is that it can be regarded as an inaccurate
measure of liquidity, because many trades occur at prices within the bid and ask price. In
order to overcome this problem we can calculate the effective bid-ask spread (ESPRD)
which is the second measure of liquidity. The effective spread is measured as twice the
absolute value of the difference between a transaction price and the midpoint of the bid
and ask quotes at the time of transaction. Extensive theoretical literature (see among
others Huang and Stoll, 1997; Lin, Sanger and Booth, 1995; Madhavan, Richardson and
Roomans, 1997; to name but a few) decomposes trading costs into its non-information
and information components. The non-information component comprises the direct costs
of inventory holding and order processing while the information component is associated
with the costs of asymmetric information. The latter is commonly known as the adverse
selection costs of trading. Its isolation and use in modeling market liquidity reveals the
magnitude of the inuence of asymmetric information on trading costs.
We compute the adverse selection component of total trading costs following the methods
of Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997, henceforth MRR). The MRR propose the
following model for equity price changes:
pt = + (+ )Qt   (+ )Qt 1 + ut (5.24)
Where,  is the rst difference operator and Pt denotes the transaction price of security
at time t. Qt is a trade initiation indicator variable which is equal to 1. The constant, ,
represents the drift in prices; and ut, a random error term, embeds the noises associated
with price discreteness. measures market-makers' direct cost of supplying liquidity per
share (transaction costs component). Theta () is the information asymmetry parameter
which measures the magnitude of the adverse selection cost. The rho () is the auto-
correlation coefcient of order ow which can also be dened as  = 2
   (1   ) ;
where the parameters 
 and  respectively denote the probabilities of trade ow contin-
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uation and mid-quote execution72. Equation (5.24) expresses changes in security price as
a function of order buy ows, transaction costs, adverse selection costs and the noises as-
sociated with price discreteness. MRR suggest estimating the price formation equation
by Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) under the following moment restrictions:
E[QtQt 1  Q2t] = 0; E[jQitj   (1  )] = 0; E[ut   ] = 0;
E[(ut   )Qit] = 0; E[(ut   )Qit 1] = 0 (5.25)
The rst moment denes the autocorrelation in trade initiation of trades, the second mo-
ment is the crossing probability, the third moment denes the drift term, , as the average
pricing error. The last two moments are OLS normal equations. We estimate the para-
meters of Equation (5.24) by GMM estimator, subject to the moment restrictions given
in Equation (5.25), for each company of our sample. The MRR ratio of the information
component r is calculated as:
r =
b
(b+ b) (5.26)
Thus, we calculate the information component of the spread (ISPRD) by:
ISPRD = r  ESPRD
and the component of costs of inventory holding (CSPRD) by:
CSPRD = (1  r)ESPRD
72 For a detailed exposition of this price evolution mechanism readers are refereed to MRR (1997).
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5.3.2 Volatility Measures
We use two measurements of price volatility, The rst measurement of volatility (PVLT)
is the volatility estimated by classical estimation procedure that based on closing price as
follows:
PV LT = (Ct   Ct 1)2 (5.27)
where Ct is the closing price on day t. The advantages of this classical estimator are its
simplicity of usage and its freedom from obvious sources of error or bias.(Garman and
Klass, 1980, p.70).
The second measurement of volatility GVLT is a range-based volatility constructed us-
ing data on the daily high, low, opening, and closing prices in the FTSE100 index, We
employ the classic range-based estimator of Garman and Klass (1980) which believed as
a measurement of volatility with very little bias and is more efcient than the traditional
close-to-close estimator73. The range-based measure of volatility (GVLT) is derived as:
GV LT =
1
2
u2   (2ln2  1)c2; t 2 Z; (5.28)
where u and c are the differences in the natural logarithms of the high and low, and of the
closing and opening prices respectively.
5.3.3 Volume Measure
Because trading volume is nonstationary, several detrending procedures for the volume
data have been considered in the empirical nance literature (see, for details, Lobato
and Velasco, 2000).74 We form a trend-stationary time series of turnover (SVLM) by
73 See Wiggins (1992), Alizadeh et al. (2002) and Chen and Daigler (2004) for detials.
74 Lobato and Velasco (2000) point out that the determination of a detrending mechanism that would allow
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incorporating the procedure used by Campbell et al. (1993) that uses a 100-day backward
moving average
SV LM =
VOt
1
100
P100
i=1VOt i
;
where VO denotes volume. This metric produces a time series that captures the change in
the long run movement in trading volume (see, Brooks, 1998; Fung and Patterson, 1999).
The moving average procedure is deemed to provide a reasonable compromise between
computational ease and effectiveness.
5.4 Estimation Procedures
5.4.1 Estimation Methodology
Tsay and Chung (2000) have shown that regressions involving FI regressors can lead to
spurious results. In particular, analyzing the bivariate regression of zt on a constant and
xt where zt  I(dz), that is integrated of order dz, and xt  I(dx) they show that the
corresponding t-statistic will be divergent provided that dz + dx > 0:5 even if the two
series are independent.
Moreover, in the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity, Vilasuso (2001) investigates
the reliability of causality tests based on least squares. He demonstrates that when con-
ditional heteroskedasticity is ignored, least squares causality tests exhibit considerable
size distortion if the conditional variances are correlated. In addition, the inference based
on a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix constructed un-
der the least squares framework offers only slight improvement. Therefore, he suggests
that causality tests should be carried out in the context of an empirical specication that
models both the conditional means and conditional variances.
for inference on the long-memory parameter of stock volume is still an unresolved problem. Therefore, they
examine consistent estimation of the long-memory parameter of volume in the frequency domain by tapering
the data instead of detrending them. However, Bollerslev and Jubinski (1999) nd that neither the detrending
method nor the actual process of detrending affected any of their qualitative ndings.
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Furthermore, in many applications the sum of the estimated GARCH(1,1) parameters is
often close to one, which implies integrated GARCH (IGARCH) behavior. For example,
Chen and Daigler (2004) emphasize that in most cases both variables possess substantial
persistence in their conditional variances. In particular, the sum of the GARCH parame-
ters was at least 0.950. Most importantly, Baillie et al. (1996), using Monte Carlo sim-
ulations, show that data generated from a process exhibiting FIGARCH effects may be
easily mistaken for IGARCH behavior. Therefore, we focus our attention on the topic of
long-memory and persistence in terms of the second moments of the two variables. Con-
sequently, we utilize a bivariate AR-FI-GARCH model to test for bidirectional causality
between spread, volatility and volume.75
5.4.2 Dual Long-memory
Along these lines we discuss the dual long-memory time series model for the three vari-
ables and discuss its merits and properties.
Next let us dene the two variables yi;t and "i;t, i = vl; s; vo: the subscripts vl, s and
vo mean that the rst expression represents the volatility and the second one stands for
the spread, the third one stands for the volume. Regarding the residual "i;t we assume
that it is conditionally normal with mean 0; variance hi;t:We also introduce a dummyDt
dened as: Dt = 0 before the introduction of electronic trading (that is 10th October
1997) and Dt = 1 otherwise76.
The structure of the ARFI (pi; dm;i), mean equation is given by
75 An excellent survey of major econometric work on long-memory processes and their applications in
economics and nance is given by Baillie (1996). Baillie et al. (2002) and Conrad and Karanasos (2005a,b)
applied the univariate dual long-memory process to ination, and Karanasos et al. (2006) to interest rates.
The bivariate dual long-memory model was introduced by Teyssière (1998). For applications to the ination-
growth link see Karanasos and Zeng (2006), for applications to the volume-volatility link see Karanasos and
Kartsaklas (2008).
76 We also test for structural breaks by employing the methodology in Bai and Perron (2003), break points
in Oct 1997 were fund in all spread and volatility measurements.
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(1  L)dm;ii(L)[yi;t   ij(L)yj;t   ij(L)yj;tDt   diDt   i] = "it: (5.29)
where, the scalar nite polynomials i(L), ij(L) and ij(L) are given by i(L) ,
1  Ppik=1 ikLk, ij(L) , Ppijr=1 ij;lLl and ij(L) , Ppijr=1 ij;lLl , i; j = vl; s; vo,
j 6= i. i and di are constant and coefcient for constant dummy. The process is
covariance stationary if dm;i < 0:5 and the roots of i(L) lie outside the unit circle. The
impact of yj;t on yi;t is captured byij(L) for the period before the electronic trading was
introduced, and ij(L)+ ij(L) correspond to the impact during the electronic trading
period.
Further, to establish terminology and notation, the FIGARCH(1; dv; 1) process is dened
by77
(1  iL)(hi;t  $i) = [(1  iL)  (1  L)dvi(1  iL)]"2i;t; i = vl; s; vo. (5.30)
Note that the FIGARCH model is not covariance stationary. The question whether it is
strictly stationary or not is still open at present (see Conrad and Haag, 2006). In the
FIGARCH model conditions on the parameters have to be imposed to ensure the non-
negativity of the conditional variances (see Conrad and Haag, 2006).78
77 Following Alizadeh et al. (2002), Brandt and Jones (2006) use the approximate result that if log returns
are conditionally Gaussian with mean 0 and volatility ht then the log range is a noisy linear proxy of log
volatility.
78 Baillie and Morana (2007) introduce a new long-memory volatility process, denoted by Adaptive FI-
GARCH which is designed to account for both long-memory and structural change in the conditional vari-
ance process. One could provide an enrichment of the bivariate dual long-memory model by allowing the
intercepts of the two means and variances to follow a slowly varying function as in Baillie andMorana (2007).
This is undoubtedly a challenging yet worthwhile task.
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Table 5.78. Mean equations: AR Lags
SPREADS
SPRD 1; 2; 3; 8
ESPRD 1; 2; 3; 4
CSPRD 1; 2; 3; 4; 5
ISPRD 1; 2; 8
VOLATILITIES
GVLT 1; 2; 3; 4
PVLT 1
VOLUME
SVLM 1; 4; 5; 7; 10
Notes: The numbers represent the AR lags used in the
mean equations of the model.
5.5 Empirical Results
Within the framework of the bivariate AR-FI-GARCH model79 we will analyze the dy-
namic adjustments of both the conditional means and variances of spread, volatility and
volume, as well as the implications of these dynamics for the direction of causality be-
tween each two variables. The estimates of the various formulations were implemented
by OxMetrics with G@RCH package.
The best tting specication is chosen according to the minimum value of the information
criteria (not reported). In Table 5.78 below, we reported AR lags for the conditional
means of spreads, volatilities and volume. For spreads, we choose ARFI(8, dm;s) model
for SPRD and ISPRD, we choose ARFI(4, dm;s), ARFI(5, dm;s) for ESPRD and CSPRD
respectively. For the conditional mean of volatility, we choose ARFI(4, dm;vl) for GVLT
and ARFI(1, dm;vl) for PVLT. Finally, SVLM has been estimated with ARFI(10, dm;vo):
We do not report the estimated AR coefcients for space considerations.
79 Three tests aimed at distinguishing short and long-memory are implemented for the data. The statistical
signicance of the statistics indicates that the data are consistent with the long-memory hypothesis. (See
Appendix Table 5.91)
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5.5.1 The Spread-Volatility Link
The estimates of the fractional parameters for the models between spread and volatility
are shown in Table 5.79. The ys;t and yvl;t columns report the results for the spread
and volatility equations, respectively. Several ndings emerge from this table. In all
cases, the estimated value of dm;s is robust to the measures of volatility used. In other
words, both bivariate models generated very similar mean fractional parameters dm;s (see
ys;t columns). for SPRD the two long-memory mean parameters are 0.458 and 0.451
with GVLT and PVLT, respectively. ESPRD has similar estimated values of dms (0.498,
0.492), CSPRD has lower dm;s (0.388, 0.390) but, the corresponding values for ISPRD
are higher: 0.526 and 0.524. On the other hand (see yvl;t columns), GVLT generated
similar dm;vl in the models with SPRD, ESPRD and CSPRD (0.562, 0.559 and 0.554) but
got a lower one with ISPRD (0.388). PVLT generated similar dm;vl in all four bivariate
models (0.482, 0.468, 0.469 and 0.487). Generally speaking, we nd that the apparent
long-memory in all variables is quite resistant to the mean shifts.
Moreover, the estimates of dv;i govern the long-run dynamics of the conditional het-
eroscedasticity with different measurements of volatility in the model, spreads generated
very similar fractional variance parameters: (0.382, 0.377), (0.301, 0.300), (0.288,0.288)
and (0.303, 0.304) for SPRD, ESPRD, CSPRD and ISPRD, respectively. Meanwhile,
the estimated value of dv;vl is robust to the measures of spread used as well. In other
words, all four bivariate FIGARCH models generated very similar fractional parameters.
For GVLT all long-memory variance parameters are 0.481 in the models with SPRD,
ESPRD and CSPRD, in the model with ISPRD dv;vl is 0.247. For PVLT long-memory
variance parameters are 0.548 in the models with SPRD, ESPRD, CSPRD, and dv;vl be-
come 0.526 with ISPRD.
Table 5.80 present the estimates of the ARCH and GARCH parameters of FIGARCH
models. The ys;t and yvl;t columns report results for the spread and volatility equations
respectively. Note that in all cases the GARCH coefcients satisfy the necessary and
5.5 Empirical Results 180
Table 5.79. The Spread-Volatility Link, Long Memory in Mean and Variance
SPRD ESPRD CSPRD ISPRD
yvl;t ys;t yvl;t ys;t yvl;t ys;t yvl;t ys;t
GVLT dm;i 0:562

(0:057)
0:458
(0:026)
0:559
(0058)
0:498
(0:049)
0:554
(0:057)
0:388
(0:032)
0:313
(0:080)
0:526
(0:051)
dv;i 0:481

(0:068)
0:382
(0:074)
0:481
(0:068)
0:301
(0:053)
0:481
(0:084)
0:288
(0:057)
0:247
(0:079)
0:303
(0:058)
PVLT dm;i 0:482

(0:064)
0:451
(0:029)
0:468
(0:067)
0:492
(0:051)
0:469
(0:073)
0:390
(0:035)
0:487
(0:182)
0:524
(0:051)
dv;i 0:548

(0:080)
0:377
(0:068)
0:548
(0:079)
0:300
(0:054)
0:548
(0:082)
0:288
(0:056)
0:526
(0:062)
0:304
(0:057)
Notes: The yvl;t and ys;t columns report results for the volatility and spread equations respectively.
dm;i and dv;i (i = s; vl) are the long-memory parameters in mean and variance equations respectively.
, ,  and  denotes signicance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 and 0.15 levels respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 5.80. The Spread-Volatility Link, ARCH and GARCH Coefcients
SPRD ESPRD CSPRD ISPRD
yvl;t ys;t yvl;t ys;t yvl;t ys;t yvl;t ys;t
GVLT   0:123
(0:176)
0:344
(0:074)
 0:119
(0:173)
0:073
(0:199)
 0:122
(0:173)
  0:879
(0:051)
 
 0:177
(0:190)
0:604
(0:235)
0:180
(:187)
0:250
(0:205)
0:181
(0:187)
0:175
(0:080)
0:720
(0:059)
0:184
(0:071)
PVLT    0:345
(0:231)
  0:094
(0:194)
       
 0:332
(0:117)
0:596
(0:237)
0:332
(0:117)
0:271
(0:196)
0:333
(0:120)
0:173
(0:080)
 0:024
(0:091)
0:185
(0:072)
Notes: The yvl;t and ys;t columns report results for the volatility and spread equations respectively.
 and  are the ARCH and GARCH parameters.
, ,  and  denotes signicance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 and 0.15 levels respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
sufcient conditions for the non-negativitiy of the conditional variances (see Conrad and
Haag, 2006).
We employ the bivariate AR-FI-GARCH model with lagged values of one variable in-
cluded in the mean equation of the other variable to test for bidirectional causality. The
estimated coefcients ij;l and ij;l are dened in Equation (5.29), which capture the
possible feedback between the two variables. Recall that the relationship between the
two variables before the adoption of electronic trading system is captured by ij;l, while 
ij;l + ij;l

captures the link commencing with the introduction of electronic trading.
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Table 5.81. The Spread-Volatility Link, Cross Effects
SPRD ESPRD CSPRD ISPRD
yvl;t ys;t yvl;t ys;t yvl;t ys;t yvl;t ys;t
GVLT ij;l  0:922

(0:470)
l=3
0:017

(0:006)
l=2
 0:329
(0:134)
l=3
0:073

(0:022)
l=2
 0:554
(0:243)
l=3
0:021

(0:012)
l=2
4:029

(0:240)
l=0
0:032

(0:010)
l=2
ij;l  0:082
(0:630)
l=3
 0:002
(0:006)
l=2
 0:162
(0:340)
l=3
 0:030
(0:019)
l=2
 0:265
(0:615)
l=3
 0:006
(0:010)
l=2
1:735
(0:557)
l=0
 0:013
(0:008)
l=2
PVLT ij;l  0:417

(0:176)
l=2
0:039
y
(0:016)
l=2
 0:132
(0:048)
l=2
0:193

(0:062)
l=2
 0:236
(0:091)
l=2
0:047

(0:033)
l=2
1:668

(0:099)
l=0
0:084

(0:027)
l=2
ij;l 0:096
(0:292)
l=2
 0:017
(0:016)
l=2
 0:033
(0:142)
l=2
 0:098
(0:050)
l=2
 0:093
(0:239)
l=2
 0:022
(0:028)
l=2
1:394
(0:191)
l=0
 0:044
(0:023)
l=2
Notes: The yvl;t and ys;t columns report results for the volatility and spread equations respectively.
ij;l and ij;l are the parameter estimates of the cross effects and coefcients for slope dummy.
, ,  and  denotes signicance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 and 0.15 levels respectively.
y lag 1 of pvlt (insignicant) also included.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 5.81 reports bidirectional feedback between spread and volatility. The ys;t and
yvl;t columns report results for the spread and volatility equations respectively. ij;l are
signicant in all models, however, we only get signicant ij;l when ESPRD is the depen-
dent variable or in the models between ISPRD and volatilities. Both GVLT and PVLT
have positive effect on all spread measures, in particular, this positive effect become
stronger after electronic trading was adopted in 1997 on both ESPRD and ISPRD (see
ys;t columns). On another hand (see yvl;t columns), spreads include SPRD, ESPRD and
CSPRD have negative effect on volatilities. On contrary, ISPRD has positive effect on
both GVLT and PVLT and this positive effect become higher in magnitude during elec-
tronic trading period. Table 5.82 below gives an overview of the spread-volatility link
over the two different periods.
5.5.2 The Spread-Volume Link
The estimates of the fractional parameters for the models between spread and volume are
shown in Table 5.83. The ys;t and yvo;t columns report results for the spread and volume
equations respectively. Several ndings emerge from this table. The estimated value of
dm;s are equal to 0.491, 0.545, 0.424 and 0.347 for SPRD ESPRD CSPRD and ISPRD
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Table 5.82. The Spread-Volatility Link, Overview
Sample: SPRD ESPRD CSPRD ISPRD
Panel A. The effect of Volatility on Spread
GVLT Positive Positivela Positive Positivela
PVLT Positive Positivela Positive Positivela
Panel B. The impact of Spread on Volatility
GVLT Negative Negative Negative Positiveha
PVLT Negative Negative Negative Positiveha
Notes: la The positive effect is less in magnitude
after electronic trading was adopted in year 1997.
ha The positive effect is higher in magnitude after
electronic trading was adopted in year 1997.
Table 5.83. The Spread-Volume Link, Long Memory in Mean and Variance
SPRD ESPRD CSPRD ISPRD
yvo;t ys;t yvo;t ys;t yvo;t ys;t yvo;t ys;t
dm;i 0:179

(0:042)
0:491
(0:027)
0:178
(0:042)
0:545
(0:040)
0:178
(0:042)
0:424
(0:032)
0:179
(0:042)
0:347
(0:025)
dv;i 0:168
(0:130)
0:388
(0:070)
0:168
(0:129)
0:303
(0:053)
0:166
(0:127)
0:279
(0:051)
0:170
(0:132)
0:305
(0:059)
Notes: The yvo;t and ys;t columns report results for the volume and spread equations respectively.
dm;i and dv;i (i = s; vo) are the long-memory parameters in mean and variance equations respectively.
, ,  and  denotes signicance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 and 0.15 levels respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
respectively. On the other hand, SVLM generated similar dm;vo in the models with dif-
ferent measurement of spread (0.179, 0.178, 0.178 and 0.179 for SPRD, ESPRD,CSPRD
and ISPRD respectively). Generally speaking, we nd that the apparent long-memory in
all variables is quite resistant to the mean shifts.
Moreover, The estimates of dv;i's govern the long-run dynamics of the conditional het-
eroscedasticity. The estimated value of dv;s are equal to 0.388, 0.303, 0.279 and 0.305 for
SPRD ESPRD CSPRD and ISPRD respectively (see ys;t columns). In all cases the esti-
mated value of dv;vo is robust to the measures of spreads used (see yvo;t columns). In other
words, FIGARCH models generated very similar dv;vo 's fractional parameters, SVLM's
long-memory variance parameters are 0.168 in models with SPRD, ESPRD, 0.166 with
CSPRD and 0.170 with ISPRD.
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Table 5.84. The Spread-Volume Link, ARCH and GARCH Coefcients
SPRD ESPRD CSPRD ISPRD
yvo;t ys;t yvo;t ys;t yvo;t ys;t yvo;t ys;t
   0:389
(0:214)
           
 0:388
(0:153)
0:633
(0:219)
0:388
(0:152)
0:303
(0:187)
0:385
(0:151)
0:143
(0:073)
0:391
(0:154)
0:177
(0:074)
Notes: The yvo;t and ys;t columns report results for the volume and spread equations respectively.
 and  are the ARCH and GARCH parameters.
, ,  and  denotes signicance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 and 0.15 levels respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 5.84 present the estimates of the ARCH and GARCH parameters of FIGARCH
models. The ys;t and yvo;t columns report results for the spread and volume equations
respectively. Note that in all cases, the GARCH coefcients satisfy the necessary and
sufcient conditions for the non-negativitiy of the conditional variances (see Conrad and
Haag, 2006).
We employ the bivariate AR-FI-GARCH model with lagged values of one variable in-
cluded in the mean equation of the other variable to test for bidirectional causality. The
estimated coefcients ij;l and ij;l are dened in Equation (5.29), which capture the
possible feedback between the two variables. Recall that the relationship between the
two variables before the adoption of electronic trading system is captured by ij;l, while 
ij;l + ij;l

captures the link commencing with the introduction of electronic trading.
Table 5.85 reports bidirectional feedback between spread and volatility. The ys;t and yvo;t
columns report results for the spread and volatility equations respectively. ij;l are signif-
icant in all models, and ij;l are signicant in all spread equations (ys;t columns). Volume
has positive effect on spread. Interestingly, in all cases, the information criteria chooses
"0" as the order of lags for SVLM, this result indicates that volume and spreads tend to
move toward the same direction simultaneously, We also noticed that this effect become
higher in Magnitude after electronic trading was adopted in year 1997. On the other
hand, spreads have negative inuence on SVLM. Table 5.86 below gives an overview of
the spread-volume link over the two different periods considered.
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Table 5.85. The Spread-Volume Link, Cross Effects
SPRD ESPRD CSPRD ISPRD
yvo;t ys;t yvo;t ys;t yvo;t ys;t yvo;t ys;t
ij;l  0:075
(0:042)
l=6
0:149
(0:015)
l=0
 0:027
(0:055)
l=6
0:457
(0:049)
l=0
 0:049
(0:028)
l=6
0:231
(0:024)
l=0
 0:059
(0:034)
l=6
0:188
(0:024)
l=0
ij;l 0:060
(0:043)
l=6
0:234
(0:045)
l=0
0:020
(0:016)
l=6
0:277
(0:107)
l=0
0:034
(0:030)
l=6
0:172
(0:057)
l=0
0:045
(0:035)
l=6
0:167
(0:053)
l=0
Notes: The yvo;t and ys;t columns report results for the volume and spread equations respectively.
ij;l and  are the parameter estimates of the cross effects and coefcients for slope dummy.
, ,  and  denotes signicance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 and 0.15 levels respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 5.86. The Spread-Volume Link, Overview
Sample: SPRD ESPRD CSPRD ISPRD
Panel A. The effect of Volume on Spread
SVLM Positiveha Positiveha Positiveha Positiveha
Panel B. The impact of Spread on Volume
SVLM Negative Negative Negative Negative
Notes: ha Effect is higher in magnitude after
electronic trading was adopted in year 1997.
5.5.3 The Volume-Volatility Link
The estimates of the fractional parameters for the models between spread and volume
are shown in Table 5.87. The yvo;t and yvl;t columns report results for the volume and
volatility equations respectively. Several ndings emerge from this table. The estimated
value of dm;vo is robust to the measures of volatility used (equal to 0.150 with both GVLT
and PVLT). On the other hand, dm;vl are equal to 0.474 and 0.333 for models of GVLT
and PVLT respectively.
Moreover, The estimates of dv;i's govern the long-run dynamics of the conditional het-
eroscedasticity. The estimated value of dv;vo are equal to 0.577 and 0.578 for GVLT and
PVLT respectively (see yvo;t columns), which imply that the estimated value of dv;vo is ro-
bust to the measures of volatility used. long-memory variance parameters dv:vl for GVLT
and PVLT are 0.493 and 0.540 respectively.
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Table 5.87. The Volume-Volatility Link, Long Memory in Mean and Variance
GVLT PVLT
yvo;t yvl;t yvo;t yvl;t
dm;i 0:150

(0:046)
0:474
(0:051)
0:150
(0:046)
0:333
(0:147)
dv;i 0:577

(0:136)
0:493
(0:059)
0:578
(0:135)
0:540
(0:075)
Notes: The yvo;t and yvl;t columns report results for
the volume and volatility equations respectively.
dm;i and dv;i (i = vo; vl) are the long-memory
parameters in mean and variance equations respectively.
, ,  and  denotes signicance at the 0.01, 0.05,
0.10 and 0.15 levels respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 5.88. The Volume-Volatility Link, ARCH and GARCH Coefcients
GVLT PVLT
yvo;t yvl;t yvo;t yvl;t
   0:165
(0:157)
   
 0:722
(0:096)
0:204
(0:162)
0:723
(0:096)
0:327
(0:121)
Notes: The yvo;t and yvl;t columns report results for
the volume and volatility mean equations respectively.
 and  are the ARCH and GARCH parameters.
, ,  and  denotes signicance at the 0.01, 0.05,
0.10 and 0.15 levels respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 5.88 present the estimates of the ARCH and GARCH parameters of FIGARCH
models. The yvo;t and yvl;t columns report results for the volume and volatility equations
respectively. Note that in all cases, the GARCH coefcients satisfy the necessary and
sufcient conditions for the non-negativitiy of the conditional variances (see Conrad and
Haag, 2006).
We employ the bivariate AR-FI-GARCH model with lagged values of one variable in-
cluded in the mean equation of the other variable to test for bidirectional causality. The
estimated coefcients ij;l and ij;l are dened in Equation (5.29), which capture the
possible feedback between the two variables. Recall that the relationship between the
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two variables before the adoption of electronic trading system is captured by ij;l, while 
ij;l + ij;l

captures the link commencing with the introduction of electronic trading.
Table 5.89 reports bidirectional feedback between volume and volatility. The yvo;t and
yvl;t columns report results for the volume and volatility equations respectively. SVLM
shows no inuence on GVLT, however, it exhibited positive impact on PVLT(ij;l =
0:082). On the other hand, ij;l are positive and signicant and ij;l are negative and
signicant in the yvo;t columns, which indicates positive impacts from both GVLT and
PVLT on SVLM and these positive effects is less in magnitude during electronic trading
period. Table 5.90 below gives an overview of the volume-volatility link over the two
different periods.
Table 5.89. The Volume-Volatility Link, Cross Effects
GVLT PVLT
yvo;t yvl;t yvo;t yvl;t
ij;l 0:014

(0:019)
l=2
0:044
(0:112)
l=2
0:035
(0:019)
l=2
0:082
(0:042)
l=5
ij;l  0:013
(0:019)
l=2
 1:152
(1:185)
l=2
 0:035
(0:019)
l=2
 0:174
(0:340)
l=5
Notes: The yvo;t and yvl;t columns report results for
the volume and volatility equations respectively.
ij;l and ij;l are the parameter estimates of the cross
effects and coefcients for slop dummy.
, ,  and  denotes signicance at the 0.01, 0.05,
0.10 and 0.15 levels respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 5.90. The Volume-Volatility Link, Overview
Sample: GVLT PVLT
Panel A. The effect of Volume on Volatility
SVLM - Positive
Panel B. The impact of Volatility on Volume
SVLM Positivla Positivela
Notes: la The positive effect is less in magnitude
after electronic trading was adopted in year 1997.
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5.6 Conclusion
In this study we investigate two-way causality relationships between spread, volatility
and volume in FTSE100 stock index over the period 19922004 by using bivariate AR-
FI-GARCH model and multiple measurements of risk and spread. Measurements of
spread include relative bid-ask spread, effective bid-ask spread, the inventory cost com-
ponent of the bid-ask spread and the information cost component of the bid-ask spread.
Risk is measured by two measurements of price volatility: the close-to-close volatility
and the range-based volatility. we also take the impact of electronic trading into account.
Our results are in line with the general agreement that volatility positively impacts bid-ask
spread, more specically, we nd evidence supporting Roll (1984) and Karpoff (1986)
that market maker widen bid-ask spread in order to compensate the cost of inventory,
since our results show that inventory cost component of the bid-ask spread is positively
affected by volatility. We also nd that the information cost component of the bid-ask
spread gets higher when risk of stock index increases, this nding supports the claim of
Admati and Peiderer (1988) and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) that higher risk associates
with more informed trading and market makers require premium for their disadvantage in
the information asymmetry. Furthermore, we nd that the impact of volatility on effective
spread and informational cost is weakened by the adoption of electronic trading system.
We also nd evidence supporting positive correlation between volume and volatility. In-
terestingly, we also observed co-movement of volume and spread, this may be due to
their same reaction on the impact of volatility( both positively affected by volatility with
order of lags equal to 2) and the impact from volume on spread is too weak to compare
with that of volatility (see Appendix Table 5.92 and 5.93).
On the other hand, both volatility and volume are negatively affected by the relative
spread and the effective spread. When we classify the components of bid-ask spread in
this causality investigation, we nd that only inventory cost component of spread has
negative effect on volatility. In contrast, information component of spread positively
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impacts volatility and this effect become stronger since electronic trading has been used.
In addition, all measurements of spread components have negative impact on volume.
These results support the argument that speculations generate volatility in the market and
higher transaction cost benet the stability of the market.
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The KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992), Lo's modied R/S test (Lo,1991) and the
HML test (Harris, McCabe and Leybourne, 2008) were conducted in order to distin-
guishing long and short memory for spreads, volatilities and volumes, The KPSS and
R/S tests are alternative implementations based on the partial sums of the series, and have
nonstandard limiting distributions. The HML test is asymptotically N(0,1), and is based
on the long-range autocovariances. (Davidson, 2009, p.50). As seen in Table 5.91 , all
data series include spreads, volatilities and volume are exhibit long memory property.
Table 5.91. Long Memory Tests
KPSS test Lo's RS test HML testy
SPREADS
SRD 92:808 18:901 7:641
ESPRD 58:436 14:605 5:759
ISPRD 57:474 14:492 5:695
CSPRD 58:653 14:625 5:808
VOLATILITIES
GVLT 25:313 9:474 3:904
PVLT 25:857 9:681 3:952
VOLUME
SVLM 0:675 2:828  0:485
Notes: The table reports values of long memory tests
statistic. ytruncation parametersC = 1 and
L = 0:66. , and  denotes signicance at
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively.
Table 5.92 and 5.93 reports the ARFI-FIGARCH estimation of spread on volatility and
volume80. In all cases, vo;l are insignicant.
80 The models on ESPRD have no convergence.
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Table 5.92. ARFI-FIGARCH Estimation: Spreads on GVLT and SVLM
SPRD CSPRD ISPRD
Panel A: Mean Equations
vl;l 0:018

(0:006)
l=2
0:024
(0:012)
l=2
0:006
(0:010)
l=2
vl:l  0:004
(0:006)
 0:009
(0:011)
 0:003
(0:010)
vo;l  0:008
(0:020)
l=3
 0:006
(0:024)
l=2
 0:015
(0:018)
l=3
vo:l  0:027
(0:042)
0:058
(0:053)
 0:029
(0:042)
dm 0:450

(0:025)
0:385
(0:032)
0:337
(0:037)
Panel B: Variance Equations
 0:343
(0:219)
   
 0:619
(0:231)
0:152
(0:082)
0:221
(0:099)
dv 0:400

(0:080)
0:282
(0:058)
0:339
(0:088)
Notes: i;l andi;l are the parameter estimates of
the cross effects and coefcients for slop dummy.
dm and dv are the long-memory parameters in
mean and variance equations respectively.
 and  are the ARCH and GARCH parameters.
, ,  and  denotes signicance at the
0.01, 0.05, 0.10 and 0.15 levels respectively.
The model on ESPRD has no convergence
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table 5.93. ARFI-FIGARCH Estimation: Spreads on PVLT and SVLM
SPRD CSPRD ISPRD
Panel A: Mean Equations
vl;l 0:044

(0:017)
l=2
0:058
(0:035)
l=2
0:013
(0:028)
l=2
vl:l  0:012
(0:008)
 0:034
(0:030)
 0:018
(0:028)
vo;l  0:003
(0:016)
l=2
 0:009
(0:024)
l=2
 0:021
(0:027)
l=3
vo:l 0:056
(0:045)
0:064
(0:054)
 0:019
(0:045)
dm 0:455

(0:037)
0:387
(0:034)
0:356
(0:039)
Panel B: Variance Equations
 0:364
(0:224)
   
 0:625
(0:227)
0:150
(0:081)
0:182
(0:085)
dv 0:392

(0:074)
0:281
(0:056)
0:308
(0:067)
Notes: ij;l andi;l are the parameter estimates of
the cross effects and coefcients for slop dummy.
dm and dv are the long-memory parameters in
mean and variance equations respectively.
 and  are the ARCH and GARCH parameters.
, ,  and  denotes signicance at the
0.01, 0.05, 0.10 and 0.15 levels respectively.
The model on ESPRD has no convergence
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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